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- VII  -1.1  Purpose 
APPROACHES  FOR  EFFECTIVE  ANALYSIS  AND  PRESENTATION 
OF  RISKS  AND  BENEFITS 
IN 
ALTERNATE  ENERGY  SYSTEMS 
FINAL  REPORT 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The  purpose  of this report  is to provide  guidelines for conducting  analyses 
of  the  risks  and  benefits of  alternative energy  systems  in  an  effective manner. 
There  are  considerable difficulties in  carrying out  such  analyses  as  described  in 
our  previous  study for  The  European  Atomic  Energy  Community  entitled 
11Assessment 
of  Comparative  and  Non-Comparative  Factors  In  Alternate  Energy  Systems
11
•  The 
objective of  the  present  study  is  to  carry out  several  of  these  recommendations 
made  in  the  initial  study,  leading  to  rational  and  effective  approaches  for 
analyzing  risks  and  benefits  in  alternate energy  systems  and  meaningful  present-
ation  of  the  results  to  the  user  community.  The  result will  be  guidelines  and 
methods  that can  be  directly employed  in  such  analyses  and  presentations.  Except 
for  examples  illustrating  the  methodologies  described  in  the  guidelines,  no 
actual  analyses  are  carried out  in  this  report. 
1.2  Background 
Many  studies  have  attempted  to  compare  the  risks  and  benefits  of  alterna-
tive  sources  of  energy  production  with  mixed  degrees  of  success.  A review, 
11Assessment  of  Comparative  and  Non-Comparative  Factors  In  Alternate  Energy  Sys-
tems",  has  been  made  of  many  of  these  _studies  to  determine  what  is  valid  and 
useful  in  such  studies,  and  what  should  be  discarded.  Based  upon  this review  and 
critique,  an  approach  has  been  developed  that  provides  for  meaningful  analysis 
•  1 • and  presentation of  risks and  benefits of alternative energy systems  for specific 
purposes  and  audiences. 
Results  of  our  previous  review  show  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a 
universal  risk  analysis  or  risk/benefit  analysis  of  alternative energy  systems, 
rather  there  is  an  array  of  different  risk  and  benefit  analyses  directed  to  a 
whole  spectrum  of different uses  and  audiences.  Improper  use  of  a  risk  analysis 
for  an  application  different  than  that  for  which  the  risk  analysis  was  made, 
errant use  of value  judgement  for aggregation  of  results, overuse  of  aggregation, 
and  improper  matching  of  the  capability of  the  analysis  to  the  use  intended  are 
just a few  of  the factors that have  caused  most  of  the  analyses  we  have  reviewed 
to  be  less  than  useful. 
We  have  developed  a  structure  for  addressing  the  analysis  of  risks  and 
benefits of  alternate systems  that starts at the top  (namely,  specifying the  uses 
and  target  audiences  of  the  analysis)  and  works  downward  to:  determine  1)  the 
precision of  results needed  for  a decision,  2)  whether  it is possible  to  achieve 
the  precision  needed,  and  3)  how  the results may  be  presented meaningfully to the 
target  audience  whether  they  be  the  technical  community,  policy  and  decision 
makers,  or  the  general  public.  This  approach  only requires data to  be  acquired  to 
a  level  that either resolves  the  problem  or  makes  evident  to  the  target  audience 
the  value  judgements  that cannot  be  resolved  by  any  quantitative analysis.  For 
those  aspects  of  the  analysis  that  are  usefully quantified,  this  approach  leads 
to  a multiplicity of  sublevel  risk  analyses  which  are  retained  for  the  audience 
in  an  understandable manner.  Identification of all value  judgements  and  interval 
estimates  of  risk  are  used  in  a manner  that  makes  uncertainty both  visible  and 
manageable. 
- 2  -We  will  first discuss  the  problems  we  have  observed  with  existing studies 
of  alternative energy  source  risks  and  benefits.  Next  we  will  present  the major 
components  of  our  structure for  getting  around  many  of  these  problems. 
1.3  Major  Deficiencies  In  Existing  Studies 
In  the original  study: 
11Assessment  of  Comparative  and  Non-Comparative  Factors  In 
Alternate  Energy  Systems",  Chapter  Three  on  qualitative  risks  analysis  began 
with  the  following  statement: 
All  of  the  studies  reviewed  here,  comparing  risks from  alternative energy 
sources,  have  been  attempted  on  a  quantitative  basis.  In  all  cases,  value 
judgements  were  used  to  aggregate  data  from  an  array  of  sources  with  different 
levels  of  variability,  incommensurate  measurement  scales  and  different reliance 
on  the  degree  of  subjective  and  objective  information  available.  Such  value 
judgements  are only meaningful  for those  involved  in  specific decisions  when  such 
judgements  are .made  visible  to  the  decision  maker.  The  need  to  aggregate  data 
and  the  associated  value  judgements  are  requirements  of  a  quantitative 
comparison  of  risks from  alternative energy  sources.  However,  on  a qualitative 
basis the differences  in  risks from  energy  sources  and  how  they  impact  on  differ-
ent  risk  recipients  can  be  displayed  with  minimal  need  for  aggregation  or  value 
judgement.. 
As  a  point  of  departure  for  describing  the  difficulties  in  quantitative 
analyses,  a qualitative analysis provides  a baseline for discussion.  A first cut 
qualitative analysis  is presented  here for this purpose.  While  the analysis made 
is  reasonably  comprehensive,  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  break  down  each  source 
of  energy  into  details .•. 
In  addition  Table  3.1.  summarized  the  qualitative  comparison,  shown  here 
as  Table  1.1  as  a  reference  point. 
The  problem  is  to  provide  a means  to  combine  the  common  sense,  but  limited 
decision making  usefulness,  of  the qualitative approach  and  sufficient quantifi-
cation to  lead  to  reasonable  and  persuasive decisions. This  can  only be  accompli-
shed  by  a  broader  framework  for  risk  analysis  than  has  been  generally  used  to 
date. 
Another  of  the  fundamental  findings  of  the  previous  report  was  that there 
are a multitude of different uses  for  analyses of  alternative energy  systems,  and 
that no  single analytical approach  to quantification that purports to address  all 
- 3  -uses  was  of  any  value.  Specific  analyses  addressing  specific,  narrow  decisions 
had  a  much  better  track  record.  This  implies  that  any  framework  for  risk  and 
benefit  analysis  must  be  explicit  as  to  the  use  made  of  it,  and  as  a result the 
analysis within  the framework  must  be  tailored to the application.  The  guidelines 
developed  here  attempt to provide such  a framework,  whereby  the approaches  within 
the  framework  are  tailored to the  specific use  at the minimum  level  of  quantifi-
cation  needed  to  resolve  decisions  among  alternative energy  system  choices. 
1.4  How  Should  Proper  Risk  Analyses  Be  Accomplished? 
In  addressing  the  question  of  how  risk  assessment  should  be  accomplished, 
Detlof  von  Winterfeldt(1)  has  laid  down  four  theses for conducting  assessments: 
1.  The  first question  in  any  risk assessment  should  be:  risk assessment 
for  whom  and  for  what  purpose?  Failure  to  answer  this  question  can 
lead  to  the  most  common  pitfall  of  analysis  - addressing  the  wrong 
problem. 
2.  Risk  assessment  should  aid  specific institutions  in  solving real  and 
complex  decision  problems.  Risk  assessments  for  pure  informational 
or  comparative  purposes  are  likely  to  be  irrelevant  for  decision 
making  purposes. 
3.  Solving  complex  decision  problems  requires  a comprehensive  approach 
which  carefully defines  the  available  alternatives  and  assesses  the 
direct  and  indirect costs,  risks  and  benefits  of  these  alternatives 
in  the  light  of  the  decision  making  institution.  Thus,  if  risk 
assessment  is to  serve  specific decision  aiding  purposes,  it must  be 
seen  as  a  part  of  a  more  comprehensive  analysis,  rather  than  as  a 
separate  too 1. 
4.  Decision  analysis  is the only comprehensive  and  practical methodolo-
gy  for  aiding  complex  decisions.  However,  decision  analysis  needs  to 
- 4 -be  adapted  to  the  political  and  institutional  realities of  decision 
making  on  problems  of  technological  risks. 
While  many  will  disagree with  specific aspects  of  these theses,  the  author 
considers  them  as  basic  guides  to  the  problem.  The  methodology  described  here 
provides  guidelines  to  meet  these  objectives  in  terms  of  evaluating  alternative 
energy  systems. 
1.5  Risk  and  Benefits 
Any  framework  for decision must  address  both  risks  and  benefits  as  well  as 
the  costs  of  implementing  alternative energy  system  choices.  However,  those  who 
assess  the  risks  have  a  different  array  of  professional  skills  than  those  who 
assess  costs  and  benefits.  Therefore,  it is  usually  necessary  to  separate  the 
risk assessment  from  the  benefit and  cost assessments;  and  then  use  the aggregate 
analyses  in  the  decision framework.  One  of  the  dangers  of  this  specialization  is 
that the  specialists  are  often  not  told what  analyses  are  to  be  made  explicitly, 
and  how  these  analyses  will  be  used  in  the  broader  balancing  of  the  decision 
framework.  Without  explicit  direction,  it  should  not  be  surprising  that  the 
assessors,  be  it risk  or  benefit  or  cost  assessors,  develop  large  and  elegant 
assessments  that  may  have  little  use  in  resolving  the  ultimate  decision;  or, 
conversely,  the  decision  maker  may  attempt  to  use  the  assessments  in  inappro-
priate ways.  Thus,  any  framework  for decisions must  take  into account  the need  to 
explicitly  provide  detailed  guidance  to  the  technical  risk,  benefit,  and  cost 
assessors. 
The  guidelines  developed  here  recognize  the  separation of  risk  and  benefit 
assessments,  but  retains the  direction and  coordination of  separate  assessments. 
While  the  framework  combines  the  risk  and  benefit  analyses,  they  are  addressed 
separately  in  this  report. 
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 1.6  Definitions 
Several  basic  definitions  are  given  here  as  they  differ from  other  inter-
pretations.  Other  definitions  may  be  found  in  the  Glossary. 
A.  RISK 
Risk  is  the  downside  of  a  gamble.  One  cannot  consider  risk  without  the 
broader  gamble  in  which  it  is  imbedded.  Although  a  gamble  may  be  involuntary, 
there  is  always  a  benefit,  including  reductions  of  adverse  conditions,  against 
which  the  risk  is undertaken.  If one  loses  sight of  the  larger  gamble,  one  tends 
to  become  risk  averse.  That  is,  one  can  over emphasize  the  importance  of  risks if 
one  only  addresses  the  risks  alone. 
Nevertheless,  the  above  definition  is  consistent  with  definitions  only 
focusing  on  risk  such  as:  "the  potential  for  harm"(Z)  or  more  formally:  "the 
probability  that  a  particular  adverse  event  occurs  during  a  stated  period,  or 
results  from  a particular challenge"(3). 
B.  RISK  ANALYSIS 
Risk  Analysis  is a policy analysis  tool,  using  a knowledge  base  consisting 
of  scientific and  science policy information,  to aid  in  resolving  decisions.  With 
this  definition  a  good  or  useful  risk  analysis  may  be  differentiated  from  an 
inadequate  one.  The  measure  of  usefulness  is whether  the  analysis aids  in  resolv-
ing  the  decisions  addressed.  Any  risk  analysis,  regardless of  its elegance,  that 
does  not  fulfill  the  requirement  fails. 
Risk  analysis  should  be  based  upon  reliable scientific and  economic  infor-
mation,  and  should  explicitly differentiate between  hard  scientific  information 
and  science  policy.  The  judgement  of  experts  in  the  face  of  uncertainty  is  in 
the  realm  of  science  policy,  not  science.  Risk  analysis  should  identify  and 
clarify  judgements,  scientific  and  otherwise;  but  such  value  judgements  should 
not  be  made  in  the  course  of  the  analysis  by  the  analyst.  Although  the  implica 
- 7  -tions  of  making  alternative value  judgements  can  be  made  explicit  in  the  analy-
sis,  the  judgements  should  only  be  made  by  those  responsible  for  establishing 
policy.  These  "decision makers",  whether  operating  in  an  autocratic or democrat-
ic  mode  or  any  of  the  many  variations  in  between,  are  the  ones  responsible  for 
making  policy judgements;  and  their needs  for aids  in  making  such  judgements  will 
vary  with  the  situation. 
Risk  analysis  must  be  responsive  to  this  spectrum  of  needs  if it is  to  be 
useful  as  a policy  tool.  It then  follows  that  no  single  risk  analysis  or  risk 
analysis  methodology  can  serve  all  purposes. 
C.  TOP-DOWN  RISK  ANALYSIS 
Top-down  risk  analysis  is a methodology  for determining  the  most  appropri-
ate  type  risk  analysis  for  a  given  situation,  for  making  visible  the  decision 
parameters  and  value  judgements  involved,  for  identifying  viable  alternative 
strategies for  resolution of  issues,  for  identifying scientific and  other  infor-
mation  critical  to  the decision  process  as  well  as  defining the  needed  precision 
of  such  information,  and  for  communicating  the  decision  process  to  those 
affected.  The  top-down  risk  analysis  approach  tailors  the  risk  analysis  to 
resolve  the  issues  at  hand,  and  this  aspect  of  the  approach  does  not  itself 
analyse  the  risks.  The  top-down  analysis  will  show  whether  a risk  analysis  can 
help  resolve  policy  issues;  and,  if not,  will  identify the  value  conflicts that 
prevent  issue  resolution  by  other  than  political  means. 
In  contrast,  bottom-up  risk  analysis  starts from  basic  science  information 
and  attempts  to  use  this  information  for  pol icy  analysis  by  way  of  various 
prescriptive  methodologies.  In  nearly  all  cases,  problems  arise  from  large 
uncertainties  in  the  scientific  information  base.  These  problems  are  addressed 
by  retaining  and  aggregating  the  ranges  of  uncertainty,  most  often  in  a  semi-
qualitative  manner,  or  by  use  of  the  value  judgement  of  experts  or  groups  of 
- 8 -experts.  In  the  first case,  the  uncertainties  are  often  too  large  for  arriving 
at meaningful  conclusions;  and  in  the  second  case  science  policy  is  substituted 
for  science.  This  does  not  imply  that all bottom-up  analyses  are  not  useful; but 
often  the  resources  enta i 1  ed  in  making  such  ana lyses  are  very  1  arge;  and  the 
results  often  inconclusive,  especially when  such  an  analysis  attempts  to  serve 
all  policy  purposes. 
The  .risk  analysis  that  uses  a  top-down  risk  approach  as  a  part  of  the 
overall  analysis  need  only  use  information  necessary  to  resolve the  decision  (if 
it  is  resolvable),  and  the  information  used  must  be  only  as  precise  as  is 
necessary.  This  means  that  a  risk  analysis  using  this  approach  will  be  quite 
different from  the bottom-up  approach,  so  separate identification is needed.  For 
this  reason  the  following  terms  are  used: 
Top-Down  Risk  Analysis  - The  process  whereby  the  risk  analysis methodology 
is  tailored to  the  policy  needs,  and  its feasibility determined. 
Bottom-up  Risk  Analysis  - Taking  each  event  that can  occur  in  a system  and 
analyzing  the  pathway~  leading  to  the  range  of  possible consequences,  and 
aggregating  these  over  the  total  spectrum  of  events  and  their  associated 
probabilities. 
Joint Risk  Analysis  - The  total  risk analysis,  combining  both  the  top-down 
and  bottom-up  analyses  into  a useful  presentation  for  decision  making  and 
presentation. 
D.  DECISION  FRAMEWORK 
The  framework  whereby  the  decison  parameters  of  a  risk,  benefit  and  cost 
analysis  among  alternatives  may  be  structured,  tailored  to  the  need,  analyzed, 
and  presented  meaningfully  and  usefully  to  those  responsible  for  making  policy 
decisions.  The  decision  framework  provides  a means  relating the  analyses  conduc 
- 9  -ted  to  policy decisions  required.  Both  top-down  and  bottom-up  risk analyses  are 
conducted  within  the  framework. 
1.7  The  Joint Approach  To  Risk  Analysis 
The  joint  approach  to  risk  analysis  presented  here  provides  means:  to 
determine  the  specific uses  for  which  an  analysis  of  alternative energy  choices 
is to  address,  to  identify the  specific decisions  to be  addressed,  for  isolating 
those  specific criteria which  will  be  relevent to the decision  (top-down  aspect), 
to  concentrate  resources  on  scientific analyses  that  address  the  relevent  cri-
teria so  isolated (bottom-up  aspect).  Essentially the  top-down  aspect  determines 
the  re  1  evant  decision  parameters  and  provides  the  gu i dence  for  the  bottom-up 
aspect  which  involves  carrying  out  the  scientific  and  technical  studies.  The 
results of  the  technical  studies  are  then  brought  back  into  the  decision  frame-
work  of  the  top-down  aspect  for  presenting  the  decision  alternatives  and  their 
implications  to  the  decision  makers. 
1.8 Steps  In  A Joint Risk  Analysis 
The  joint risk  analysis  consists  of  two  parts,  divided  into  19  steps  (as 
shown  in  Table  1.2):  a  top-down  risk  analysis  and  a  limited  bottom-up  analysis 
aimed  at  filling  the  requirements  called  out  in  the  top-down  analysis.  The 
details of  Part A and  B for the top-down  risk analysis  are  shown  in  Table  1.3.  We 
will  explore,  step  by  step,  how  this  structure can  be  used  to  address  the  risks 
and  benefits of  alternative energy  systems.  It is  important  to  note  that the  use 
of  the  generic  structure  of  the  decision  framework  as  means  to  assure  that 
useful,  meaningful  analysis of  risks  and  benefits of  alternate energy  systems  is 
emphasized  in  this report,  and  that the  particular steps  and  the  detailed  imple-
mentation  of  the  these  steps  is  flexible  in  application.  The  particular  steps 
shown  are  those  that  have  been  shown  to  be  useful  in  past  applications,  and  are 
- ~ 0  -not  fixed  in  concrete.  The  purpose  of  the  framework  is  more  of  a  checklist  to 
insure  that all  issues  are  identified  and  addressed • 
.  Chapters  2,  3,  &  4.  will  address  the  steps  in  the  joint analysis,  as  shown 
in  Table  1.2,  in  brief form.  Chapters  5,  6,  7,  &  8 will  address  specific aspects 
of  the  methodology  in  further  detail  as  well  as  other  related  issues:  uses, 
benefits,  and  special  problems  in  applying  analytical methodologies  to  alternate 
energy  systems. 
- 11  -TABLE  1.2 
GENERIC  STEPS  IN  A JOINT  RISK  ANALYSIS 
I.  TOP-DOWN  RISK  ANALYSIS  (Steps  1-13) 
Part  A.  - DEVELOP  A FRAMEWORK  AND  IDENTIFY  KEY  VALUE  ISSUES  AND  CONFLICTS 
Part  B.  - SPECIFY  THE  FRAMEWORK  OF  THE  ANALYSIS 
II.  BOTTOM-UP  RISK  ANALYSIS  (Steps  14-16) 
Part  C.  - DATA  ACQUISITION 
Step  14.  - CONDUCT  REQUIRED  STUDIES  TO  OBTAIN  REQUIRED  INFORMATION: 
Step  15.  - ACQUIRE  THE  DATA: 
Part  D.  - IMPLEMENT  THE  ANALYSIS 
Step  16.  - CONDUCT  THE  ANALYSIS 
III.  IMPLEMENT  THE  DECISION  FRAMEWORK  (Steps  17-19) 
Part  E.  - MERGE  THE  RESULTS  OF  THE  BOTTOM-UP  ANALYSIS  INTO  THE  FRAMEWORK 
Step  17.  -REDUCE  THE  CONCLUSIONS  TO  THE  IMPLICATIONS  OF  ALTERNATIVE 
POLICY  OPTIONS  BASED  UPON  THE  ANALYSIS 
Part  F.  PRESENT  THE  RESULTS  OF  THE  ANALYSIS 
Step  18.  - EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY  AND  POLICY  ANALYSIS  DOCUMENT 
Step  19.  - TECHNICAL  BACKUP  DOCUMENTS 
- 12  -TABLE  1.3 
GENERIC  STEPS  IN  A TOP-DOWN  RISK  ANALYSIS 
Part  A.  - DEVELOP  A FRAMEWORK  AND  IDENTIFY  KEY  VALUE  ISSUES  AND  CONFLICTS 
Step  1.  DETERMINE  THE  USE  FOR  WHICH  THE  ANALYSIS  IS  TO  BE  MADE 
Step  2.  IDENTIFY  A  MINIMUM  SET  OF  CRITICAL  VARIABLES 
Step  3.  GENERATE  A SET  OF  COMBINATIONAL  SCENARIOS  FOR  THE  INTERSECTION 
OF  THE  VARIABLE  CONDITIONS  (STATES  OF  NATURE) 
Step  4.  DEVELOP  A SET  OF  ALTERNATIVE  STRATEGIES  FOR  SOLUTION  (ALTERNATIVES) 
Step  5.  DEVELOP  A DECISION  MODEL  PROBLEM  STRUCTURE 
Step  6.  IDENTIFY  THE  CRITICAL  DECISION  MAKERS 
Step  7.  HAVE  EACH  (OR  GROUP  OF)  DECISION  MAKER  DETERMINE  HIS  CHOICE 
OF  ALTERNATIVES  FOR  EACH  SCENARIO  OR  IDENTIFY  THE  INFORMATION 
NEEDED  TO  MAKE  SUCH  A CHOICE 
Step  8.  CLASSIFY  EACH  SCENARIO  INTO  ONE  OF  THREE  CLASSES 
Step  9.  FIND  MEANS  TO  RESOLVE  VALUE  CONFLICTS,  IF  POSSIBLE.  IF  NOT, 
STOP 
Part  B.  - SPECIFY  THE  FRAMEWORK  OF  THE  ANALYSIS 
Step  10  FINALIZE  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  ANALYSIS 
Step  11.  DEVELOP  THE  DATA  REQUIREMENTS  FOR  THE  BOTTOM-UP  ANALYSIS 
Step  12.  IDENTIFY  THE  LIMITATIONS  DUE  TO  UNCERTAINTIES,  AND  ESTIMATE 
THE  ROBUSTNESS  OF  THE  JOINT  ANALYSIS 
Step  13.  PROVIDE  A REPORT  ON  THE  TOP-DOWN  ANALYSIS,  PROVIDING 
SPECIFICATIONS,  LIMITATIONS,  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS. 
- 13  -PART  I. 
STEPS  IN  A GENERIC  JOINT  RISK  ANALYSIS 
The  steps  addressed  in  Table  1.2  are  considered  here  in  more  detail  to 
provide  guidance  in  the  use  of  the  overall  methodology  and  decision  framework. 
When  feasible we  have  used  a specific case  as  an  illustration of  the process.  The 
illustration  is  not  real,  and  is  only  used  as  a vehicle  for  illustration of  the 
methodology.  The  subject  notation  follows  that  of  Table  2.1,  and  is  broken  out 
into  a similar  structure containing  three Chapters. 
TOP-DOWN  RISK  ANALYSIS  (Steps  1-13) 
The  objective of  the top-down  analysis  is to determine  the  specific bottom-
up  analyses  that will  most  effectively aid  in  resolving  the  issues  that  policy 
makers  identify  as  being  important.  The  purpose  is  to  constrain  and  focus  the 
resources  used  in  the  bottom-up  analyses~ leading  to efficient use  of  scientific 
methodolgy  and  meaningful  results. 
Chapter  2.  DEVELOP  A FRAMEWORK  FOR  THE  ANALYSIS  AND  IDENTIFY  KEY  VALUE 
ISSUES  AND  CONFLICTS  - (Steps  1-9) 
Chapter  3,  SPECIFY  THE  FRAMEWORK  OF  THE  ANALYSIS  - (Steps  10-13) 
BOTTOM-UP  RISK  ANALYSIS  AND 
IMPLEMENTING  THE  DECISION  FRAMEWORK  (Steps  14-19) 
The  bottom-up  risk  analysis  and  the  means  to  implement  the  framework  are 
both  shown  in  Chapter  4. 
Chapter  4.  IMPLEMENTING,  ANALYZING  AND  PRESENTING  THE  RESULTS 
•  14  • CHAPTER  2 
2.0  DEVELOP  A FRAMEWORK  FOR  THE  ANALYSIS  AND 
IDENTIFY  KEY  VALUE  ISSUES  AND  CONFLICTS 
The  first  nine  steps  involve  identifying  the  critical  decision  variables 
which  nearly  always  are  associated  with  major  value  issues.  These  value  issues 
often  involve  apparent  value  conflicts which,  if not  reconcilable,  no  amount  of 
risk  analysis  will  contribute to  a decision.  In  this case,  political means  must 
be  used  to  resolve  such  value  issues,  although  the  analysis  can  contribute  to 
better understanding  of  such  issues. 
These  steps  are  aimed  at  extracting  these  issues  in  a  systematic manner, 
making  them  visible,  and  determining  the  extent  of  real  and  apparent  value 
conflicts  among  decision  makers  and  stake  holders,  and  resolving  these  to  the 
extent  possible  before  proceeding  further.  The  initial  effort  is  directed  at 
identifying the  uses  of  the  analysis,  and  the critical variables for each  use  of 
levels  cited,  at  least  for  the  exemplary  case  used  in  this  report.  This  wi 11 
provide  insight  into  the  nature  of  the  crucial  variables  and  their variability 
over  the  array of  uses. 
2.1  STEP  1.  Establish  Uses  And  Objectives 
The  first  step  identifies  the  particular  uses  and  objectives  of  the  risk 
analysis  to  be  conducted.  In  the  evaluation  of  alternate  energy  systems,  the 
objective  will  depend  upon  the  type  of  the  decision  to  be  made  for  specific 
applications.  Table  2.1  lists  the  types  of  alternative  energy  system  analysis 
applications  cited  in  the  original  study.  The  risk  and  benefit analysis for  each 
application  type  will  be  somewhat  different.  There  seems  to  be  a  pervading 
notion  that there  is only  one  type  of  risk or  benefit analysis.  This  is far from 
the case;  for example,  there are  a spectrum  of  different risk  analyses  based  upon 
how  they  are  to  be  used.  Table  2.2  provides  a categorization  of  some  different 
- 15  -TABLE  2.1 
CLASSIFICATION  OF  RISK  ANALYSES  BY  SCOPE  OF  THE  APPLICATION 
MICRO  TO  MACRO  ClASSIFICATION 
SITE  SPECIFIC  STUDIES 
UTILITY  PLANNING  STUDIES 
POWER  GRID  PLANNING  STUDIES 
NATIONAL  ENERGY  SUPPLY  PLANNING 
GLOBAL  PLANNING 
INTERNATIONAL  ENERGY  PLANNING 
SPECIAl  PURPOSE  APPLICATIONS 
ENERGY  SUBSYSTEM  INVESTMENT 
EVALUATION  OF  POTENTIAL  PROBLEMS  IN  NEW  ENERGY  SOURCES 
TO  SUPPORT  OR  REJECT  AN  ENERGY  OPTION 
•  16  • TABLE  2.2. 
DIFFERENT  USES  OF  RISK  ANALYSES  REQUIRING  DIFFERENT  APPROACHES 
I. REGULATORY  ANALYSES 
A.  KINDS  OF  ANALYSES  CONDUCTED  BY  REGULATORY  AGENCIES 
1).  Screening  Analyses  - To  Determine  If A Risk  Exists  And  Is 
High  Enough  To  Be  Considered  For  Regulatory  Control. 
2).  Regulatory  Impact  Analysis  - To  Justify Regulatory  Actions 
And  Satisfy Administrative  Law  Requirements. 
3).  Compliance  Analyses  - To  Demonstrate  Regulatory  Violations. 
4).  Responding  Analyses  - In  Response  To  Judicial  And  Legislative 
Challenges. 
B.  ANALYSES  MADE  BY  OTHERS  IN  RESPONSE  TO  EXISTING  REGULATIONS 
1).  Environmental  Impact  Statements 
2).  Permitting  Requirements 
3).  Compliance  Monitoring 
C.  ANALYSES  MADE  BY  OTHERS  TO  DEFEND  AGAINST  UNWARRANTED  REGULATORY  ACTION 
1).  Response  To  Requests  For  Comments  By  Regulators  -Industry 
response  to  agency  actions  above. 
2).  Support  Of  Judicial  Actions 
a.  Response  To  Improper  Agency  Actions 
b.  Defense  Against  Enforcement  Proceedings 
II. MANAGEMENT  SUPPORT  ANALYSES 
A.  MARKETING 
1).  Absolute  Risk  - Demonstrate  that  a product  or  process  is 
safe  or  harmless  on  an  absolute  risk  basis,  that  is,  the  risk 
on  an  absolute  basis  is  below  some  standard  or  regulation  implying 
an  acceptable  level  of  risk. 
2).  Relative  Risk  - Demonstrate  that a product  or  process  is 
relatively safer  and  less  harmful  than  alternative  and  competative 
products  or  processs. 
•  17  • TABLE  2.2.  Continued 
DIFFERENT  USES  OF  RISK  ANALYSES  REQUIRING  DIFFERENT  APPROACHES 
B.  PLANNING 
1).  Research  And  Development 
a.  Risk  Reduction  - Identify areas  of  high  risk  (or  relatively 
high  risk)  in  particular products  or  processes  to: 
1.  Forestall  the  need  for  regulation. 
2.  Reduce  exposure  to  future  liability claims. 
3.  Develop  defensive  strategies to  bound  risk  liability. 
4.  Identify  new  markets  for  risk  control  technology. 
b.  Improved  Analysis  Capability 
2).  Cost-Effective  Use  Of  Resources  - Focus  resources  on  the 
most  risk  reduction  for  a dollar. 
3).  Evaluation  Of  Alternative  - Systems  or  processes 
C.  RISK  MANAGEMENT 
1).  Prevent  Risks  from  Occurring  - by  anticpating  and  controlling 
them. 
2).  Reducing  Exposure  - for  health  and  safety and  financial 
risks  for  a given,  existing process  or  product.  Conduct  analyses 
for: 
a.  System  Safety  - Reduction  of  risk within  a system. 
b.  Product  Safety  and  Liability.- Reduce  exposure  to  legal 
proceedings. 
c.  Third  Party Assumption  Of  Risk 
1.  Insurance  - As  a means  to  hedge  against  risks 
2.  Malpractice  - Laws  to  limit  liability 
III. PUBLIC  EDUCATION 
A.  INCREASE  PUBLIC  AWARENESS 
1).  Seek  Rational  Public  Responses  - a knowledgeable  public 
will  hopefully  act  on  information  rather  than  preset beliefs. 
2).  Fulfill  Regulatory  Requirements  For  Public  Disclosure  -a 
good,  simplified  and  accurate  disclosure  can  also  be  a useful 
educational  tool. 
B.  ANXIETY  FACTORS 
1).  Bring  Perceived  Risks  More  Closely  Into  Alignment  With  Objective 
Risks  - anxiety  reduction;  may  also  be  a defensive  strategy 
2).  Frighten  People  Into  Action  Or  Ageement  - an  offensive  strategy 
attempting  to  stir fear  and  anxiety 
- 18  -uses.  The  uses  and  their interface with  different users will  be  addressed  in  more 
detail  in  Chapter  5. 
users: 
A risk  analysis  is  undertaken  by  a sponsor  for  influencing  three  types  of 
1.  Policy  Makers  And  Risk  Managers  - Establishing  controls  both  in 
industry  and  government. 
2.  Technical  Community  - Scientists,  engineers,  technicians,  economists, 
ecologists,  etc. 
3.  Public  - The  public  at  large. 
The  sponsor  is  usually  one  of  these  users,  but  may  not  be.  It is important 
to  identify the  biases  that  a  sponsor  may  have  in  influencing  any  of  the  user 
community.  An  analysis  may  be  classifed  as  defensive,  offensive,  and,  perhaps, 
neutra  1.  A defensive  risk  analysis  attempts  to  demonstrate  that  an  estimated 
level  of  risk  is  acceptable,  while  an  offensive  risk  analysi~ tends  to  demon-
strate that  an  estimated  level  of  risk  is  unacceptable.  Conversely,  a  neutral 
risk  analysis  is  one  where  no  predisposition  exists  as  to  the  acceptability of 
findings. 
In  the  non-neutral  cases,  it is  important  to  recognize  that the  position 
of  the analyst  is only  respectable and  honourable  if there  is  an  understanding  by 
all  concerned  that  the  risk  analyst  is  acting  for  a client,  and  is  entitled to 
concentrate  on  those  aspects  which  favor  his  client,  just  as  a  lawyer  acts  in 
court.  One  should  not  allow  risk  analysts to  be  subtly influenced  by  the  purpose 
of  his  paymasters,  while  appearing  to  serve  the  public  as  a disinterested party. 
In  any  case  the  analyst  must  use  scientific rigor  in  scientific areas,  and  must 
explicitly make  science  and  science  policy judgements  he  has  made  visible to  all 
parties for  their examination. 
- 19  -EXAMPLE 
For  the  purposes  of  illustrating the application of  top-down  and  joint risk 
analysis to selection of alternative energy  systems  in  consideration of  the  risks 
and  benefits  involved,  an  example  has  been  selected.  The  use  and  goals  of  the 
example  are  as  follows: 
USE  - A National  Authority  Wishing. To  Make  An  Explicit  Policy  Decision  On 
The  Best  Mix  Of  Energy  Systems  For  Increasing Its Electrical  Energy  Capaci-
ty By  a Percentage  X Of  Its Present  Capacity  Over  The  Next  Y Years. 
(We  have  not  been  specific  in  the  example  as  to  the  amount  of  increase  or 
the  time  span  of  the  increase to  avoid  the  problems  of  forecasting demand, 
a separate  problem  with  its  own  range  of  uncertainties  and  risks) 
GOAL  - To  have  a  decision  document  outlining  the  policy  implication  in 
terms  of  the  risks  and  benefits  of  alternate  energy  options  that  the 
national  authorities may  use  as  an  aid  in  setting the  future  policy,  and, 
A.  To  have  the  analysis  supporting  the  policy_options  to  be  defensi-
ble  on  technical  grounds,  and, 
B.  To  provide  the  public  with  an  understanding  of  the  risks  and 
benefits  of  the  alternatives,  and  the  rationale  for  decisions  made 
by  the  national  authorities. 
(In  this  case  we  are  assuming  a  somewhat  autocratic  form  of  government 
where  the decision making  power  is vested  in  an  identified authority acting 
in  the  best  interests of  those  governed  however  that authority  is  vested. 
In  other  cases  public  participation  in  the  decision  may  be  necessary,  but 
not  for  our  example.  Rather  public  approval  by  the  majority  of  those 
governed  of  the  alternatives  selected  is  sought.) 
- 20  -2.2  STEP  2.  Identify A Minimum  Set  Of  Critical  Variables 
For  evaluation of  alternate energy  systems,  the  benefits,  risks  and  costs 
must  be  evaluated  and  balanced  in  a  decision.  Section  4.0  deals  with  possible 
benefits of  energy  production  and  the  interchangeability of  energy  sources.  For 
a particular type of  use  only a few  of  these benefits will  apply.  The  minimum  set 
of  critical  variables  are  most  likely  some  combination  of  the  three  variables 
cited below: 
1.  Fuel  Availability And  Cost 
Long  Term  Strategic Availability 
Cost  Esculation 
2.  Lifecycle  Costs 
Operational  (excluding  Fuel) 
Capital 
Financial  Responsibility 
3.  Risks 
Normal  Operation  - The  systems  operating  as  it is designed  to  oper-
ate. 
Abnormal  Operation  - Occassional  or  periodic  excursions  for  which 
the  system  is  designed  to  withstand. 
Rare  Event  Conditions  - Infrequent events for which  the system  may  or 
may  not  be  designed  to  withstand. 
There  are  apparently  more  than  three  variables  as  shown  above,  namely, 
seven;  but,  for the  initial set of  variables,  one  or  more  of  the  subvariables  in 
each  of  the  critical variables will  usually dominate.  If not  the  case,  then  more 
than  three critical variables will  be  necessary.  These  variables  are  at best only 
partially controllable  by  the  sponsor. 
- 21  -In  order  to  identify  the  minimum  set  of  critical  variables,  an 
understanding  of  the  types  of  variables  involved  is necessary. 
2.2.1.  Types  Of  Variables 
For  risk  analysis  aspects,  we  are  primarily concerned  with  risk variables. 
These  variables  will  be  of  different  kinds,  and  will  have  varying  degrees  of 
uncertainty  associ-ated  with  them.  Three  kinds  of  variables  must  be  considered, 
situational,  conditional,  and  operational  variables. 
Situational  Variables  - Those  variables,  internal  to  the  system,  whose 
values  are  determined  by  the  specific  situations  associated  with  the 
extent of coverage  for which  the system  is designed.  For  example,  siting of 
an  energy  source  depends  upon  the  part  i cu 1  ar  sites  ava i 1  ab 1  e  and  their 
characteristics.  Different  energy  systems  will  have  different  siting re-
quirements,  each  with  its own  parameters  that must  be  covered  in  the  design 
of  the  system.  Another  example  is the  relative toxicity of  releases to  the 
environment.  Radiation  can  cause  cancer  at  low  exposure  levels  while  ni-
trogen  dioxide  causes  increased-probability  of  respiratory  infection  at 
low  levels.  Control  of these variables  is primarily through  restriction of 
specific  ranges  of  a  variable  or  a  situation  by  regulatory  limits  (for 
example,  limiting the use  of a chemical)  when  it is possible to  do  so.  What 
is  unknown  is  the  specific  situation  one  will  encounter  in  advance.  See 
Table  2.3  for  examples. 
Conditional  Variables  - Those  variables, external  to the system,  which  can 
affect the  behavior  of  the  alternative system  risks.  Environmental  condit-
ions,  system  failures  caused  by  external  factors,  etc.  are  examples  of 
conditional  variables.  Depending  on  the  controllabilty  of  these 
variables,  design  limits  are  set  to  cope  with  these  variables  by  adding 
margins  of  safety in  the  design  limits.  These  margins  of  safety must  take 
into  account.  See  Table  2.4  for  examples. 
Operational  Variables  - Those  variables  which  are  directly  controllable 
through  the  operation  of  the  process  being  analyzed  to  the  extent  that the 
relationship  among  variables  can  be  specified.  An  example  is  controlling 
the  combustion  process  and  stack  releases  from  a coal  boiler.  Again  the 
variation  is  not  due  to  1  ack  of  information,  but  rather  the  range  of 
possible  conditions  that  can  occur  in  actual  situations.  The  costs  of 
d~fferent control  methods,  and  means  for  monitoring  the  operational  per-
formance  for  the  process  may  limit  some  control  options,  but  regulatory 
performance  standards  are  one  approach  to  operational  control.  See  Table 
2.5  for  examples. 
2.2.2.  Degree  Of  Control  Of  Variables 
Each  of  these  classes  of  variables  have  some  measure  of  controllability. 
There  are three different degrees  of control  that can  be  exercised:  controllable, 
- 22  -TABLE  2.3 
SITUATIONAL  VARIABLES 
THOSE  VARIABLES,  INTERNAL  TO  THE  SYSTEM,  WHOSE  VALUES  ARE  DETERMINED  BY 
THE  SPECIFIC  SITUATIONS  ASSOCIATED  WITH  THE  EXTENT  OF  COVERAGE  FOR  WHICH 
THE  SYSTEM  IS  DESIGNED. 
EXAMPLES 
SITING  OF  AN  ENERGY  SOURCE  DEPENDS  UPON  THE  PARTICULAR  SITES 
AVAILABLE  AND  THEIR  CHARACTERISTICS.  DIFFERENT  ENERGY  SYSTEMS  WILL 
HAVE  DIFFERENT  SITING  REQUIREMENTS,  EACH  WITH  THEIR  OWN  PARAMETERS 
THAT  MUST  BE  COVERED  IN  THE  DESIGN  OF  THE  SYSTEM. 
THE  RELATIVE  TOXICITY  OF  RELEASES  TO  THE  ENVIRONMENT,  RADIATION  CAN 
CAUSE  CANCER  AT  LOW  EXPOSURE  LEVELS  WHILE  NITROGEN  DIOXIDE  CAUSES 
INCREASED  PROBABILITY  OF  RESPIRATORY  INFECTION  AT  LOW  LEVELS. 
CONTROL 
CONTROL  OF  THESE  VARIABLES  IS  PRIMARILY  THROUGH  RESTRICTION  OF  SPECIFIC 
RANGES  OF  A VARIABLE  OR  A SITUATION  BY  REGULATORY  LIMITS  (FOR  EXAMPLE, 
LIMITING  THE  USE  OF  A CHEMICAL)  WHEN  IT  IS  POSSIBLE  TO  DO  SO.  WHAT  IS 
UNKNOWN  IS  THE  SPECIFIC  SITUATION  ONE  WILL  ENCOUNTER  IN  ADVANCE. 
EXAMPLES  OF  SITUATIONAL  VARIABLES  FOR  ALTERNATE  ENERGY  SOURCES 
SITING 
POPULATION  DENSITY 
WATER  AVAILABILITY 
TRANSPORTATION  &  TRANSMISSION  DISTANCES 
SITE  AVAILABILITY 
CLIMATIC  CONDITIONS 
WET/DRY,  HOT/COLD,  BENIGN/EXTREME,  Etc, 
FUEL  AVAILABILITY 
FOREIGN  OR  DOMESTIC 
FUEL  CONTENT 
COAL  - SULFUR  AND  HEAT  CONTENT 
NUCLEAR  - NATURAL  OR  ENRICHED 
- 23  -TABLE  2.4 
CONDITIONAL  VARIABLES 
THOSE  VARIABLES,  EXTERNAL  TO  THE  SYSTEM,  WHICH  CAN  AFFECT  THE  BEHAVIOR 
OF  THE  ALTERNATIVE  SYSTEM  RISKS. 
EXAMPLES 
ENVIRONMENTAL  CONDITIONS, 
SYSTEM  FAILURES  CAUSED  BY  EXTERNAL  FACTORS 
SABOTAGE 
CONTROL 
MISSILES  (OTHER  THAN  MILITARY) 
WAR 
DESIGN  LIMITS  ARE  SET  TO  COPE  WITH  THESE  VARIABLES  BY  ADDING  MARGINS 
OF  SAFETY  IN  THE  DESIGN  LIMITS.  THESE  MARGINS  OF  SAFETY  MUST  TAKE  INTO 
ACCOUNT: 
RANDOM  FLUCTUATIONS,  FAILURES,  AND  STRESSES 
WEAROUT  AND  FAULTY  COMPONENTS 
HUMAN  ERROR  . 
ENVIRONMENTAL  FACTORS 
VIOLATION  OF  RULES 
EXAMPLES  OF  CONDITIONAL  VARIABLES  FOR  ALTERNATIVE  ENERGY  SYSTEMS 
ENVIRONMENTAL  FACTORS 
EVENTS  - STORMS,  FLOODS,  EXTREME  WEATHER  CONDITIONS, 
EARTHQUAKE,  VOLCANOS 
DEGREE  OF  REGULATION 
SABOTAGE 
CHANGES  IN  ENERGY  DEMAND 
FUEL  COST  ESCALATION 
TRAINING  LEVEL  OF  PERSONNEL 
DEGREE  OF  ANTI-NUCLEAR  SENTIMENT  IN  NATION 
ORDINARY  ACCIDENTS 
MAJOR  RARE  EVENT  ACCIDENTS 
- 24  -TABLE  2.5 
OPERATIONAL  VARIABLES 
THOSE  VARIABLES  WHICH  ARE  DIRECTLY  CONTROLLABLE  THROUGH  THE  OPERATION 
OF  THE  PROCESS  BEING  ANALYZED  TO  THE  EXTENT  THAT  THE  RELATIONSHIP  AMONG 
VARIABLES  CAN  BE  SPECIFIED. 
EXAMPLES: 
THE  COMBUSTION  PROCESS  AND  STACK  RELEASES  FROM  A COAL  BOILER. 
THE  POWER  OUTPUT  VERSUS  PLANNED  RELEASES  FOM  A NUCLEAR  REACTOR 
CONTROL 
THE  SYSTEM  VARIATION  MAY  BE  DUE  TO  LACK  OF  INFORMATION  OR  THE  RANGE 
OF  POSSIBLE  CONDITIONS  THAT  CAN  OCCUR  IN  ACTUAL  SITUATIONS  CAN  ONLY 
BE  MODELLED.  THE  COSTS  OF  DIFFERENT  CONTROL  METHODS  AND  MEANS  FOR 
MONITORING  THE  OPERATIONAL  PERFORMANCE  FOR  THE  PROCESS  MAY  LIMIT  SOME 
CONTROL  OPTIONS,  BUT  REGULATORY  PERFORMANCE  STANDARDS  ARE  ONE  APPROACH 
TO  OPERATIONAL  CONTROL. 
EXAMPLES  OF  OPERATIONAL  VARIABLES  FOR  ALTERNATIVE  ENERGY  SYSTEMS 
ELECTRICAL  CONVERSION  SYSTEM 
CONTROL  PARAMETERS  FOR  A GIVEN  TYPE  OF  REACTOR 
CONTROL  PARAMETERS  FOR  A GIVEN  TYPE  OF  COMBUSTOR 
CONTROL  OF  RELEASES 
NORMAL  OPERATION 
ABNORMAL  OPERATION 
SAFETY  SYSTEMS 
ORDINARY  ACCIDENTS 
LARGE  RARE  EVENT  RISKS 
- 25  -avoidable,  uncontrollable.  These  are  further  defined  as: 
Controllable  - Parameters  are  under  control  of  designers  and  operators. 
Avoidable  - Applied  limits  on  parameters  may  be  used  to  avoid  exposure. 
Uncontrollable  - Parameters  independent  of  designers  and  operators. 
Table  2.6  illustrates  how  designers  may  cope  with  the  three  types  of 
variables  and  their  degrees  on  controllability  in  each  case.  The  bold  entries 
illustrate the  design  concepts,  and  the  entries provide  further detail.  In  each 
case  the  design  concepts  provide  guidance  as  to  how  risks  may  be  controlled  in 
design,  and  provide  insight on  how  the  risks  associated with  each  variable might 
be  addressed  in  subsequent  bottom-up  analyses.  Table  2.7  provides  some  examples 
of  critical  variables  and  the  degree  to  which  they  are  contollable. 
2.2.3.  Order  Of  Addressing  Variables 
It  is most  appropriate to  address  situational  variables first.  The  situa-
tion  determines  the  lim1ts  and  conditions  that  have  to  be  met  by  t~e  system. 
Since  every  situation  will  be  different  in  some  respect  from  all  others,  the 
selection of  alternatives and  the risks  and  benefits associated with  the  alterna-
tives will  vary  accordingly.  Once  the  situation  is  determined,  the  selection of 
operational  and  conditional  variables  can  be  made.  If  one  starts  from  system 
design,  operational  variables  should  be  addressed  before  conditional  ones; 
otherwise  the  order  should  be  reversed.  The  operational  variable  for  each 
a  1  tern  at i ve  energy  sys tern  wi 11,  of  course,  be  different.  Therefore, 
consideration  of  situational  and  conditional  variables  will  generally  preceed 
consideration of  operational  variables.  This  is especially the case  when  seeping 
the  analysis. 
2.2.4.  Selection  Of  Situational  Variables 
The  selection of  variables for  the  generic  problem,  used  as  an  example,  is 
a difficult one  because  of  the wide  variations  in  conditions  among  nations.  This 
- 26  -V
A
R
I
A
B
L
E
S
 
S
I
T
U
A
T
1
0
N
A
L
 
{
I
r
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
t
o
 
P
r
o
b
l
e
m
)
 
C
O
N
D
I
T
I
O
N
A
L
 
{
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
t
o
 
P
r
o
b
l
e
m
)
 
O
P
E
R
A
T
I
O
N
A
L
 
(
M
a
n
a
g
e
s
 
I
 
r
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
C
o
n
d
i
 
t
i
o
f
"
6
 
T
o
 
R
e
a
c
h
 
G
o
a
l
s
)
 
T
A
B
L
E
 
2
.
 
6
 
D
E
G
R
E
E
 
O
F
 
C
O
N
T
R
O
L
 
O
F
 
V
A
R
I
A
B
L
E
 
T
Y
P
E
S
 
C
O
N
T
R
O
L
L
A
B
L
E
 
D
e
s
i
g
n
 
t
o
 
c
o
v
e
r
 
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
 
r
a
n
g
e
 
o
f
 
s
i
t
u
a
t
i
o
f
"
6
 
:
 
D
e
s
i
W
'
 
C
o
Y
e
r
a
g
e
 
D
e
s
i
g
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
m
a
r
 
g
i
 
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
a
f
e
t
y
 
t
o
 
c
o
p
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
R
a
n
d
o
m
 
F
 
l
u
c
t
u
a
t
i
o
f
"
6
 
W
e
a
r
o
u
t
 
&
 
F
a
i
l
~
.
r
e
 
H
u
m
a
n
 
E
r
r
o
r
 
E
 
n
v
i
r
o
r
m
 
e
n
t
a
l
 
F
a
c
t
o
r
s
 
V
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
R
u
l
e
s
 
D
e
s
i
i
J
l
 
L
i
m
i
t
s
 
R
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
s
 
a
m
o
n
g
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
k
n
o
w
n
 
w
e
!
l
 
e
n
o
u
g
h
 
t
o
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
s
 
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
D
e
s
i
~
 
C
a
p
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
A
V
O
I
D
A
B
L
E
 
E
x
c
l
u
d
e
 
c
a
s
e
s
 
o
u
t
s
i
d
e
 
o
f
 
r
a
n
g
e
 
w
h
e
n
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
L
i
m
i
t
s
 
c
:
1
 
C
o
Y
e
r
a
g
e
 
C
u
r
t
a
i
l
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
d
u
r
i
 
~
 
e
x
t
r
e
m
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
o
f
:
 
E
 
n
v
i
r
o
r
m
 
e
n
t
a
l
 
S
t
r
e
s
s
,
 
H
t
r
n
 
a
n
 
L
 
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
f
"
6
,
 
R
u
l
e
 
V
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
P
r
e
v
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
a
v
o
i
d
 
w
e
a
r
 
o
u
t
 
Q
.
C
.
 
t
o
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
S
h
u
t
d
o
w
n
 
O
u
t
s
i
d
e
 
D
e
s
i
~
 
L
i
m
i
t
s
 
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
 
1
 
i
m
i
t
s
 
o
f
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
m
a
r
 
g
i
 
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
a
f
e
t
y
 
t
o
 
c
o
p
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
L
i
m
i
t
s
 
U
N
C
O
N
T
R
O
L
L
A
B
L
E
 
M
u
s
t
 
e
x
t
e
n
d
 
r
a
n
g
e
 
t
o
 
c
o
v
e
r
 
a
l
l
 
c
a
s
e
s
,
 
b
u
t
 
m
a
y
 
b
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
e
d
 
e
.
g
.
 
N
o
r
m
a
l
 
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
E
x
t
r
e
m
e
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
R
a
n
g
e
 
C
o
~
r
a
g
e
 
R
e
c
o
v
e
r
y
 
S
y
s
t
e
m
 
C
a
r
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
R
e
q
J
i
r
e
d
 
E
x
t
r
e
m
e
 
E
x
c
t
r
s
i
o
n
s
 
B
e
y
o
n
d
 
D
e
s
i
i
J
l
 
L
i
m
i
t
 
C
o
m
 
p
:
>
u
n
d
 
M
a
r
 
g
i
 
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
a
f
e
t
y
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
 
s
o
m
e
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
d
u
n
d
a
n
c
y
 
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
R
e
d
t
n
d
a
n
c
y
 TABLE  2.7 
EXAMPLES  OF  TYPES  OF  VARIABLES  AND  THEIR  DEGREE  OF  CONTROLLABILITY 
SITUATIONAL 
CONDITIONAL 
OPERATIONAL 
SITING 
POPULATION  DENSITY  A 
WATER  AVAILABILITY  C-U 
TRANSPORTATION  &  TRANSMISSION  DISTANCES  C-U 
SITE  AVAILABILITY  U 
FUEL  AVAILABILITY 
FOREIGN  OR  DOMESTIC  U-C 
CLIMATIC  CONDITIONS 
WET/DRY,  HOT/COLD,  BENIGN/EXTREME,  Etc,  U 
FUEL  CONTENT 
COAL  - SULFUR  AND  HEAT  CONTENT  A 
NUCLEAR  - NATURAL  OR  ENRICHED  C 
ENVIRONMENTAL  FACTORS 
STORMS,  FLOODS,  EXTREME  WEATHER  CONDITIONS,  U-A 
EARTHQUAKE  U-A 
DEGREE  OF  REGULATION  C-U 
SABOTAGE  U 
CHANGES  IN  ENERGY  DEMAND  U 
FUEL  COST  ESCALATION  U 
TRAINING  LEVEL  OF  PERSONNEL  C 
DEGREE  OF  ANTI-NUCLEAR  SENTIMENT  IN  NATION  A-U 
ORDINARY  ACCIDENTS  U-A 
MAJOR  RARE  EVENT  ACCIDENTS  U 
ELECTRICAL  CONVERSION  SYSTEM 
CONTROL  PARAMETERS  FOR  A GIVEN  TYPE  OF  REACTOR  C 
CONTROL  PARAMETERS  FOR  A GIVEN  TYPE  OF  COMBUSTOR  C 
CONTROL  OF  RELEASES 
NORMAL  OPERATION  C 
ABNORMAL  OPERATION  C 
SAFETY  ASPECTS 
ACCIDENTS  A-U 
LARGE  RARE  EVENT  RISKS  U-A 
U=UNCONTROLABLE  A=AVOIDABLE  C=CONTROLLABLE  - ORDER  IMPLIES  PRECEDENCE 
- 28  -means  that it is  necessary  to  first consider  a  variety of  situations;  and, 
then  having  identified the  applicable  situations,  identify  the  critical  uncon-
trolled variables  for  that situation.  In  order  to  illustrate this process  three 
situational  variables  are  addressed,  each  assigned  three  levels  of  precision. 
These  are  shown  in  Table  2.8. 
2.2.5.  Selection  of  Conditional  Variables 
For  the  generic  example  described  here,  consideration of  conditional  vari-
ables  procedes  the  operational  variables.  Depending  on  the  situational variables 
selected  above  and  the  particular  scenarios  that  are  adopted  (see  the  next 
section),  a set of  key  conditional  varibles  is  selected  in  a manner  similar  to 
those  above.  An  example  of  these  are  shown  in  Table  2.9.  and  are  especially 
selected for  a particular scenario. 
2.3  STEP  3.  Generate  a set of  combinational  scenarios  (States  Of  Nature) 
Each  critical  variable  is  broken  down  into  about  three  classifications 
such  as  high,  medium  and  low.  The  classification separations  are  designed  as  to 
be  meaningful  to  the  decision.  Using  these  designations  the  intersection of  the 
value  conditions  for  each  critical  variable  is formed.  For  three  variables with 
three value  conditions there will  be  27  such  intersections. The  intersections for 
the  situational  variables  described  in  Table  2.8  are  shown  in  Table  2.10.  A 
verbal  description of  each  intersection,  including  its implications,  is termed  a 
scenario.  A scenario  is developed  for  each  intersection. 
An  example,  based  upon  the  previous  case,  follows: 
- 29  -TABLE  2.8 
CRITICAL  SITUATIONAL  VARIABLES 
1.  SITE  AVAILABILITY 
HPOP  ONLY  HIGH  POPULATION  DENSITY  SITES  AVAILABLE 
MPOP  MODERATE  POPULATION  DENSITY  SITES  AVAILABLE 
LPOP  LOW  POPULATION  DENSITY  SITES  AVAILABLE 
2.  FUEL  AVAILABILITY 
DOM  DOMESTIC  SOURCES  ADEQUATE 
PART  PARTIAL  DOMESTIC  SOURCES 
ALL  ALL  FUEL  IMPORTED 
3.  CLIMATIC  CONDITIONS 
EXTR  EXTREME 
MOD  MODERATE 
BEN  BENIGN 
- 30  -TABLE  2.9 
CRITICAL  CONDITIONAL  VARIABLES 
FOR  SITUATIONAL  SCENARIO  #26 
F.  FUEL  COST  ESCALATION 
LOW 
MODERATE 
HIGH 
PRESENT  SITUATION 
RISING  SLIGHTLY  FASTER  THAN  INFLATION 
HIGH  ENERGY  PRICES  DUE  TO  CARTEL  CONTROLS 
D.  EXPECTATION  OF  DISRUPTION  (ACCIDENTS,  SABOTAGE,  FUEL  AVAILABILTY) 
LOW 
MODERATE 
HIGH 
LARGE  ACCIDENTS  WILL  NOT  OCCUR,  FUEL  HIGHLY 
AVAILABLE,  AND  NO  SABOTAGE  EXPECTED  IN  ANY 
WIDE  SPREAD  PATTERN 
LARGE  ACCIDENTS  WILL  NOT  OCCUR,  BUT  HIGH 
VISIBILILITY  ACCIDENTS  WILL  OCCUR,  OR  FUEL 
AVAILABLITY  MAY  BE  LIMITED  TO  SOME  EXTENT, 
OR  SABOTAGE  OCCURS  ON  A SELCTIVE  BASIS. 
LARGE  ACCIDENTS  OCCUR,  OR  FUEL  AVAILABILITY 
LIMITED  SEVERELY,  OR  SABOTAGE  OCCURS  ON 
A WIDEPREAD  BASIS. 
A.  DEGREE  OF  ANTI-NUCLEAR  SENTIMENT  IN  NATION 
LOW 
MODERATE 
HIGH 
NO  ORGANIZED  OPPOSITION  TO  NUCLEAR,  UNLIKELY 
TO  BE  ORGANIZED 
ORGANIZED  OPPOSITION  TO  NUCLEAR  DEVELOPS, 
BUT  DOES  NOT  BECOME  A MAJOR  POLITICAL  ISSUE. 
MAJOR  OPPOSITION  FORMS  TO  NUCLEAR,  AND  BECOMES 
A MAJOR  POLITICAL  FACTOR . 
•  31  • TABLE  2.10 
SCENARIOS  DERIVED  FROM  THE  SITUATIONAL  VARIABLES 
27  SCENARIOS 
SITE  AVAILABILITY 
FUEL  AVAILABILITY 
DEGREE  OF  CLIMATIC  STRESS 
1.  EXTR  DOM  HPOP 
2.  EXTR  DOM  MPOP 
3.  EXTR  DOM  LPOP 
4.  EXTR  PART  HPOP 
5.  EXTR  PART  MPOP 
6.  EXTR  PART  LPOP 
7.  EXTR  FOR  HPOP 
8.  EXTR  FOR  MPOP 
9.  EXTR  FOR  LPOP 
10.  MOD  DOM  HPOP 
11.  MOD  DOM  MPOP 
12.  MOD  DOM  LPOP 
13.  MOD  PART  HPOP 
14.  MOD  PART  MPOP 
15.  MOD  PART  LPOP 
16.  MOD  FOR  HPOP 
17.  MOD  FOR  MPOP 
18.  MOD  FOR  LPOP 
19.  BEN  DOM  HPOP 
20.  BEN  DOM  MPOP 
21  BEN  DOM  LPOP 
22.  BEN  PART  HPOP 
23.  BEN  PART  MPOP 
24.  BEN  PART  LPOP 
25.  BEN  FOR  HPOP 
26.  BEN  FOR  MPOP 
27.  BEN  FOR  LPOP 
- 32  -EXAMPLE 
An  example  of  a scenario  for  intersection  #1  in  the  example  case  is: 
Situational  Scenario  #1  - EXTR/DOM/HPOP 
A country  (or  part of  a country)  that has  extreme  climatic conditions,  has 
domestic  fuel  available  and  only  high  population  density sites available. 
In  this  case,  if  the  domestic  fuel  were  coal,  oil  or  natural  gas  in 
plentiful  supply,  the  choice  of  an  alternative energy  is  source  is  almost 
self-selected for  short  term  solutions  to  the  energy  problem  cited  in  the 
example. 
It is obvious  that different scenarios  may  apply  to  specific countries  or 
parts  of  a  country.  Moreover,  two  countries  with  different  situational  scenar-
ios,  require  different  sets  of  conditional  and  operational  variables. 
Therefore,  it should  not  be  surprising that the  results of  the  analysis  for  the 
two  countries would  be  entirely different.  The  required  analyses  are  different, 
and  the  results  are  different.  The  identification  of  these  diffences,  and  an 
understanding  of  the  reasons  for  the  differences  are  very  important  results  of 
the  top-down  approach. 
EXAMPLE 
For  the  exampl~  shown  previously,  we  will  use  Scenario  #26  which  may  be 
described  as  follows: 
Situational  Scenario  #26  - BEN/FOR/MPOP 
A country  (or part of  a country)  with  benign  climatic conditions,  depending 
totally on  imported  fuels,  and  having  medium  density  sites  available.  The 
• 33  • particular  conditional  variables  for  this  scenario  are  those  shown  in 
Table  2.9.  They  are  primarily uncontrolled  variables. 
For  the  conditional  variables we  will  have  another set of  intersections  and 
scenarios.  For  three  variables  with  three  levels,  we  again  have  twenty-seven 
scenarios.  For  example,  the  27  intersections  for  situational  scenario  #26  are 
shown  in  Table  2.11.  In  this case,  the  scenarios for these  uncontrollable varia-
bles  are  somewhat  more  descriptive of  conditions.  These  scenarios  now  become  the 
critical  values  for  the  particular situation  previously selected. 
EXAMPLE 
The  conditional  scenario  for  the  first  intersection  is: 
Conditional  Variable  Scenario  #1 
(For  Situational  Variable  Scenario  #26) 
Fuel  Cost  Escalation  High 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  High 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  High 
OPEC  members  agree  on  production  quotas  and  fue 1  prices  soar.  Coal  and 
uranium  costs  rise very  sharply.  Very  heavy  anti-nuclear  sentiment  with  a 
11Green  Party
11  coalition possible,  with  sabotage  attempts  and  civil disobe-
dience  highly  probable. 
A major  nuclear  event  likely  to  occur  - may  or  may  not  involve  loss  of 
life,  but  has  high  coverage  by  the  media. 
All  27  of  the  scenarios  are  described  in  Appendix  A. 
- 34  -TABLE  2.11 
SCENARIOS  DERIVED  FROM  THE  CONDITIONAL  VARIABLES 
FOR  SITUATIONAL  SCENARIO  #26 
27  SCENARIOS 
F.  FUEL  COST  ESCALATION 
D.  EXPECTATION  OF  DISRUPTION 
A.  DEGREE  OF  ANTI-NUCLEAR  SENTIMENT 
1.  A-HIGH  D-HIGH  F-HIGH 
2.  A-HIGH  0-HIGH  F-MOO 
3.  A-HIGH  0-HIGH  F-LOW 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
A-HIGH  D-MOO 
A-HIGH  0-MOO 
A-HIGH  D-MOD 
F-HIGH 
F-MOD 
F-LOW 
A-HIGH  D-LOW 
A-HIGH  D-LOW 
A-HIGH  D-LOW 
F-HIGH 
F-MOO 
F-LOW 
A-MOO 
A-MOD 
A-MOO 
A-MOO 
A-MOO 
A-MOO 
A-MOO 
A-MOO 
A-MOO 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
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D-HIGH  F-HIGH 
D-HIGH  F-MOD 
D-HIGH  F-LOW 
D-MOO 
D-MOD 
0-MOO 
D-LOW 
0-LOW 
D-LOW 
F-HIGH 
F-MOO 
F-LOW 
F-HIGH 
F-MOO 
F-LOW 
D-HIGH  F-HIGH 
0-HIGH  F-MOO 
D-HIGH  F-LOW 
0-MOO 
D-MOO 
D-MOD 
D-LOW 
0-LOW 
D-LOW 
F-HIGH 
F-MOO 
F-LOW 
F-HIGH 
F-MOO 
F-LOW We  will  not  know  what  scenario  will  occur,  and  it is  possible  to  assign 
some  initial  measure  of  probability  to  each  scenario.  This  will  provide  some 
perspective  on  whether  or  not  some  of  the  scenarios  can  be  e  1  imi nated  from 
consideration  because  it  is  either  impossible  or  highly  improbable  that  the 
situation  occurs.  Eventually  we  will  use  the  bo~tom-up risk  analysis  to  assign 
some  expected  probability of  occurrence  for those  that remain.  The  scenarios  are 
analogous  to  the  states of  nature  in  a decision  problem. 
2.4  STEP  4 Develop  A Set  Of  Alternative Strategies  (Alternative Strategies) 
The  alternate energy systems  shown  in  qualitative form  in  Table  1.1  are  the 
set  of  alternatives  to  be  considered  in  the  analysis  for  alternative  energy 
systems.  These  are  shown  at  the  gross  1  eve 1,  but  can  be  broken  down  to  more 
specific  designs  as  well.  The  alternatives  are  similar  to  the  alternative 
strategies  in  a decision  problem. 
As  an  extension  of  the  example,  Table  2.12  provides  a more  limited  set of 
energy  alternatives for  consideration. 
2.5  STEP  5 Develop  A Decision  Model  Structure. 
Each  of  the  scenarios  (Si),  considered  as  an  uncontrollable  state-of-
nature,  can  be  evaluated  for  each  of  the  alternative  strategies  (Aj).  This 
provides  a  decision  model  structure for  the  problem,  at  least  in  terms  of  the 
states-of-nature (i  = 1,2,  .•.•. 27)  and  alternative strategies (j =A,  B,  ••.••• 
I)  for  the  example  shown.  This  decision  model  structure is  illustrated  in  Table 
2.13  which  also  shows  a  probabilty  assignment  (pi)  for  each  scenario.  If one 
were  to  assign  a value  or  utility to  each  intersection (Vij),  this process  would 
be  analagous  to  assigning  utility in  a decision  problem.  Since  such  assignments 
represent  value  judgements,  we  choose  not  to  do  this.  Rather  we  would  like to 
assign  the  preferred  alternative  for  each  scenario.  This  also  represents  a 
- 36  -COAL 
TABLE  2.12 
EXAMPLE 
ALTERNATIVE  ENERGY  SYSTEMS 
(LIMITED  TO  COAL  AND  NUCLEAR  HERE) 
A.  LARGE  - HIGH  DEGREE  OF  CONTROL  OF  RELEASES 
B.  SMALL  - HIGH  DEGREE  OF  CONTROL  OF  RELEASES 
C.  LARGE  - LOW  DEGREE  OF  CONTROL  OF  RELEASES 
D.  SMALL  - LOW  DEGREE  OF  CONTROL  OF  RELEASES 
NUCLEAR 
E.  LARGE  - ENRICHED  FUEL 
F.  SMALL  - ENRICHED  FUEL 
G.  LARGE  - UNENRICHEO  FUEL 
H.  SMALL  - UNENRICHED  FUEL 
COMBINATION 
I.  VARIOUS  MIXES 
- 37 -STATES-OF-
NATURE 
sl 
52 
53 
54 
524 
525 
526 
527 
TABLE  2.13 
ClASSICAL  DECISION  STRUCTURE  FOR  RISK  ANALYSIS 
PROS. 
pl 
p2 
p3 
p4 
p. 
1 
p24 
p25 
p26 
p27 
vla 
v2a 
v3a 
v4a 
v24a 
v25a 
v26a 
v27a 
vlb 
v2b 
v3b 
v4b 
v24b 
v25b 
v26b 
v27b 
ALTERNATIVE  STRATEGIES 
vlc  vld  vle  vlf  vlg 
v2c  v2d  v2e  v2f  v2g 
v3c  v3d  v3e  v3f  v3g 
v4c  v4d  v4e  v4f  v4g 
v24c  v24d  v24e  v24f  v24g 
v25c  v25d  v25e  v25f  v2s9 
v26c  v26d  v26e  v26f  v26g 
v27c  v27d  v27e  v27f  v27g 
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vlh 
v2h 
v3h 
v4h 
v24h 
v25h 
v26h 
v27h 
A. 
1 
vli 
v2; 
V3; 
v4; 
v24i 
v2s; 
v26i 
v27i value  judgement,  but  in  terms  of  a preference for  an  alternative as  opposed  to  an 
assigned  cardinal  utility or  value.  The  choice  is from  a nominal  scale of  alter-
natives  rather than  ordinal  or  cardinal  scales. The  analyst should  not  make  these 
value  choices.  They  should  be  made  by  the  decision  makers. 
2.6  STEP  6 Identify The  Critical  Decision  Makers 
The  array of  decision  makers  in  the  sponsoring  organization  and  the  users 
must  be  identified.  This  will  include,  initially,  the  policy makers  and  risk 
managers  involved,  but  eventually will  have  to  include  other stakeholders  in  the 
decision  such  as  the  public  and  the  technical  community.  It may  not  always  be 
possible  to  gain  access  or  attention  from  all  decision  makers.  In  these  cases, 
the  best  the  analyst  can  do  is to  examine  previous  decisions,  ascertain what  can 
be  found  about  the  values  of  the  decision  makers,  and  sample  the  attitudes  and 
beliefs  of  groups  of  decision  makers  (for  example,  the  public  or  particular 
groups  of  stakeholders).  This  is particularly the  case  for  energy  system  analy-
sis,  where  it may  not  be  possible to  get  direct  input  from  all  the  stakeholders 
and  users.  In  this case  generic  studies  of  the  beliefs,  attitudes  and  anxieties 
of  different  groups  can  be  ascertained  to  some  extent.  Studies,  such  as  those 
conducted  by  Otway  et  al(l),  Slavik  and  Fischoff(2),  Twersky  and  Kahnemen( 3), 
etc.,  can  serve  to  identify opposing  value  systems;  and,  perhaps,  indicate which 
alternatives might  be  favored  by  such  groups  for  each  scenario.  For  the  purpose 
of  the  example,  it  wi 11  be  assumed  that  government  policy  makers  act  for  the 
public  and  make  coherent  decisions  for  them  either  as  representatives  of  the 
pub 1  i c  (democratic  approach)  or  impose  them  tJndemocrat i ca lly.  This  does  not 
imply  universal  acceptance  by  the  population  affected. 
2.7  STEP  7 Each  Decision  Maker  Is  Asked  To  Identify His  Choice  Of  Alternatives 
Each  decision  maker  or  each  coherent  group  of  decision  makers  should  be 
asked  to  determine  his  or  its  choice  of  alternatives  for  each  scenario  or, 
- 39  -if  a  choice  cannot  be  made,  to  identify the  information  needed  to  make  such  a 
choice.  The  process  of  making  the  choices  is  not  burdensome  if  the  number  of 
critical  values  is  small,  for  example,  twenty-seven,  and  the  scenarios  decrip-
tive of  what  might  occur  in  verbal  terms.  Table  2.14  provides  a  space  at  the 
right  of  each  scenario  for  such  entry,  and  Appendix  C.  provides  the  complete 
array of  27  scenarios. 
Each  participant  is  asked  to  select  the  appropriate  alternative for  each 
scenario.  This  represents  selecting one  alternative for  each  scenario  in  Table 
2.13  rather  than  assigning  values  or  utilities  to  all  the  Vij's.  It is  at this 
juncture that the  methodolgy  departs  from  classical  decision  theory  approaches. 
The  decision  maker  is  asked  to  reduce  his  selection to  one  alternative for  each 
scenario,  if possible.  If not,  he  is  asked  to  indicate the  multiple  choices  for 
that  scenario,  and  specifically what  information  is  necessary  to  resolve  it to 
one  alternative;  or,  if he  is  indifferent  among  those  selected  alternatives,  to 
so  indicate it and  leave  the  multiple  choices  as  they  stand.  An  illustration of 
this  process  is  shown  in  Table  2.14.  OK  means  that  one  alternative  has  been 
selected for  a given  scenario.  IND  indicates indifference among  multiple altern-
ative selections,  and  ST  indicates  that  a  study  is  required  to  provide  further 
information  to resolve the  ambiguity  among  the multiple alternatives.  The  infor-
mation  required to resolve the decision  among  the alternatives must  be  specified; 
and,  if  possible,  the  selection  criteria  that  will  be  used  to  evaluate  the 
results of  study  ascertained.  The  compilation  of  the  studies  identified will  be 
the  specification  for  the  bottom-up  risk  analyses  required.  The  studies  will 
generally  require  the  identification  of  a  new  set  of  variables,  situational, 
conditional  or  operational  as  is  necessary  to  conduct  the  studies.  These  varia-
bles  will  become  the  critical  variables  for  the  next  steps  in  the  analysis. 
- -10  -TABLE  2.14 
EXAMPLE  OF  USE  OF  THE  SELECTIVE  DECISION  STRUCTURE  FRAMEWORK 
FOR  A DECISION  PARTICIPANT 
STATES-OF-NATURE  PROB.  ALTERNATIVE  STRATEGIES 
s. 
1 
s24 
s2s 
s26 
s27 
P·  1 
p24 
p25 
p26 
p27 
A25a 
OK  = Single  Selection  IND  = Indifferent 
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A24d  A24e 
A27f 
A. 
19 
ST 
A26h 
ST  = Study  Required 
A. 
1 
OK 
IND 
OK 
OK 
ST 
OK 
OK 
OK 2.8  STEP  8.  Classify Each  Scenario  Into  One  Of  Three  Classes 
After  all  the  decision  makers  have  classified  their  choices  for  the  scenarios, 
each  scenario  is  classified  into  one  of  three  classes: 
I.  All  participants  agree  to  the  selection of  the  best  alternative 
IIo  Apparent  conflicts  among  participants  as  to  choice  result,  i.e,  two 
or more  participants would  select different alternatives for  a given 
scenario. 
III.  Further  information  is required for selection.  For  this condition it 
is possible  to  go  back  and  ask  some 
11What  if
11  questions  in  order  to 
see  if  a  decision  point  can  be  agreed  upon.  That  is,  a  decision 
condition can  be  established a priori  against which  further  informa-
tion  can  be  judged  a  postiori  after  it  has  been  obtained.  If such 
agreement  cannot  be  obtained,  it is  important  to  establish  the  pre-
cision  of  the  information  required  to  make  such  decisions. 
If case  I. above  occurred for each  scenario,  then  the  bottom-up  cost,  risk, 
benefit  analysis  would  only  have  to  proceed  to  a  precision  necessary: 
1)  to  provide  the  liklihood  of  scenario  outcomes,  and 
2)  to  resolve  the  critical  parameters  to  the  gross  level  used  (High, 
Medium,  Low,  etc.)  in  the  values  for  the  critical  variables. 
For  case  III.  where  further  information  is  required,  the  needed  precision 
can  be  established,  and  the  information  can  be  obtained  in  the most  cost  effec-
tive manner  via  the  bottom-up  analyses  once  the  problem  structure  is  defined. 
2.9  STEP  9  Find  Means  To  Resolve  The  Value  Conflicts 
For  case  II  above,  if  apparent  value  conflicts  arise,  that  is,  decision 
makers  differ about  which  alternative energy  system  to  adopt  should  a particular 
scenario  occur,  these  value  conflicts must  be  resolved  before  any  risk  analysis 
can  be  undertaken.  In  general,  the  value  conflicts  involved  will  be  social  value 
- 112  -conflicts  rather  than  judgements  about  scientific  issues  at  this  level  of  the 
joint risk  analysis procedure.  If such  value  conflicts are  more  than  just appar-
ent  conflicts that cannot  be  resolved,  then  it will  be  apparent  that  any  subse-
quent  risk  analysis  will  have  little impact  on  the  decisions  to  be  made,  except 
as  the  analysis  serves  to  better  define  the  value  differences  and  sharpen  the 
decision  arguments.  A.V.  Cohen,  in  his  review(4)  of  the  interim  report  of  this 
study  has  commented:  "quantification  of  relevant  parameters  is  always  useful, 
since  a  disagreement  around  objective  truth  with  margins  of  error  stated,  or 
differences  in  interpretation of  data  openly  declared,  is better than  arguments 
from  entrenched  and  qualitative  positions.  I  do  see  that  this  may  only  be 
meaningful  within  certain kinds  of  rational decision making  structures".  It must 
also be  recognized that many  policy makers,  particularly those  in  public offices, 
may  not  want  to  disclose  their  value  systems  to  constituents  for  political 
reasons.  Too  often  bureaucratic  organizations  attempt  to  hide  such  value  judge-
ments  behind  planned  obfuscation  and  purposeful  ambiguity.  This  is  especially 
true for  sensitive issues  and  equity problems.  Never-the-less  the  framework  here 
will  make  these  judgements  quite  visible,  and  the  analyst  must  take  steps  to 
avoid  embarrassing  the  decision  makers  unexpectedly. 
Value  conflicts  are  resolved  by  policy,  political  and  organizational  pro-
cesses,  not  technical  ones.  If  there  is  only  one  key  decision  maker  then,  of 
course,  this  is  a moot  point,  as  in  the  case  of  the  example  used  here. 
If the  opposing  views  are  from  groups  whose  values  have  only  been  ascer-
tained  indirectly,  value  conflicts  may  not  be  avoided,  although  educational 
presentations  can  help  minimize  conflict.  If  major  value  conflicts  remain,  it 
must  be  recognized  at  the  outset  that  the  choices  of  alternative  will  be  a 
political solution as  opposed  to a rational  balancing of  risks  and  benefits.  The 
- 43  -politics  will  depend  upon  national  policy,  the  role  and  power  of  regulatory 
agencies,  and  the  form  of  government. 
Further  risk  analysis  may  be  useful  only  if the  sponsors  understand  that 
the  risk  analysis will  not  resolve  the  value  conflicts,  but  can  help  sharpen  the 
arguments  in  the manner  proposed  be  A.  V.  Cohen(4).  Whenever  those with  decision 
making  power  may  be  in  agreement  among  themselves,  but  have  external  opposition 
groups,  a  risk  analysis  to  help  establish  the  preferred  alternative  for  the 
decision  making  group  may  be  still  useful  internally to  sharpen  the  subsequent 
political  debate. 
- 44  -CHAPTER  3 
3.0.  SPECIFY  THE  FRAMEWORK  OF  THE  ANALYSIS 
The  results of  Part  A.  are  now  used  to layout the framework  for the bottom-
up  analyses  that  have  to  be  undertaken  and  the  framework  for  using  this  infor-
mation  in  the  decision  process. 
3.1.  Step  10  Finalize The  Structure  Of  The  Analysis 
The  structure of  the  analysis  has  two  aspects:  a)  laying  out  the  require-
ments  for  a decision  structure and  b)  specifying the bottom-up  analyses that must 
be  undertaken.  The  first  aspect  involves  analyzing  the  decision  structure  al-
ready  developed  in  further detail,  assuming  that either all  value  conflicts have 
been  resolved  or  it is  shown  that  the  analysis  will  be  useful  in  spite of  such 
value  conflicts.  The  second  aspect  involves  identification,  grouping  and  speci-
fying  the  studies  identified  in  Part  A. 
3.1.1.  Establishing  Decision  Structure Requirements 
3.1.1.1.  Sequencing  Decisions 
The  various  aspects  of  the  decision  among  alternatives can  be  sequenced  to 
simplify  the  process.  In  the  case  for  the  example  given  here,  the  decision 
sequence  can  be  broken  into  several  steps  in  the  form  of  a decision  tree.  This 
tree  is  shown  in  Figure  3.1. 
The  first  step  is  to  determine  whether  coal,  nuclear  or  both  should  be 
selected,  the  second  is  to  determine  the  size of  individual  plants,  the  third  is 
to  determine  the  appropriate  degree  of  environmental  control  or  fuel  type,  and 
the next  is to  consider  any  secondary variables that must  be  addressed.  Table  3.1 
provides  an  illustration  of  the  first  level  of  decision  for  coal,  nuclear  or 
both.  The  cases  shown  for  these  three  alternatives  are  agreed  to  by  all  in  the 
example  (Note  that the  reader  may  not  agree  with  these  choices,  but  agreement  is 
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FIGURE  3.1 
DECISION  SEQUENCE  TREE 
FOR  EXAMPLE  PROBLEM 
PLANT  CONTROL/ENRICHED 
CAPACITY 
HIGH  DEGREE  OF L. 
<
ENV.  CONTROL 
LARGE 
OTHER  VARIABLES 
~  LOW  DEGREE  OF  < 
~  ENV.  CONTROL 
COAL' 
~  HIGH  DEGREE  OF  ~ 
~ ~  ENV.  CONTROL 
SMALL 
~  LOW  DEGREE  OF <. 
ENV.  CONTROL 
~ENRICHED/REACTOR TYPE  < 
LARGE 
/  ............... UNENRICHED/REACTOR  TYPE  < 
NUCLEAR 
"'  ~ENRICHED/REACTOR TYPE  <:::.. 
BOTH 
SMALL 
~  UNENRICHED/REACTOR  TYPE  < 
HIGH  DEGREE  OF/ENRICHED  ~ 
~  ENV.  CONTROL 
LARGE 
/ 
~LOW  DEGREE  OF/UNENRICHED  <. 
ENV.  CONTROL 
~  HIGH  DEGREE  OF/ENRICHED  < 
~  _.,.-- ENV.  CONTROL 
SMALL 
~LOW  DEGREE  OF /UNENRI CHED  <.._ 
ENV.  CONTROL 
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SELECTED  DECISION  MAKER  OUTCOMES  FOR  THE  SAMPLE  EXAMPLE 
FOR  SITUATIONAL  SCENARIO  #26 
(A  BENIGN  CLIMATE,  DEPENDANCE  ON  FOREIGN  FUEL,  MEDIUM  POPULATION  DENSITY) 
27  SCENARIOS 
F.  FUEL  COST  ESCALATION  r 
D.  EXPECTATION  OF  DISRUPTION-, 
A.  DEGREE  OF  ANTI-NUCLEAR  SENTIMENT 
J  ~  J 
ALTERNATIVE  OR  STUDY 
REQUIRED 
1.  A-HIGH  D-HIGH  F-HIGH  COAL 
2.  A-HIGH  D-HIGH  F-MOD  COAL 
3.  A-HIGH  D-HIGH  F-LOW  COAL 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
A-HIGH  D-MOD 
A-HIGH  D-MOD 
A-HIGH  D-MOD 
A-HIGH  D-LOW 
A-HIGH  D-LOW 
A-HIGH  D-LOW 
F-HIGH  STUDIES  #1  & #2 
F-MOD  COAL 
F-LOW  COAL 
F-HIGH  STUDY  #2 
F-MOD  STUDY  #2 
F-LOW  STUDY  #2 
A-MOD 
A-MOD 
A-MOD 
D-HIGH  F-HIGH  STUDIES  #1  &  #2 
D-HIGH  F-MOD  COAL 
A-MOD 
A-MOD 
A-MOD 
A-MOD 
A-MOD 
A-MOD 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
A-LOW 
D-HIGH  F-LOW  COAL 
D-MOD 
D-MOD 
D-MOD 
D-LOW 
D-LOW 
D-LOW 
F-HIGH  STUDIES  #1  &  #2 
F-MOD  COAL 
F-LOW  COAL 
F-HIGH  STUDY  #2 
F-MOD  STUDY  #2 
F-LOW  BOTH 
0-HIGH  F-HIGH  STUDY  #1 
D-HIGH  F-MOO  STUDY  #1 
D-HIGH  F-LOW  COAL 
D-MOD 
D-MOO 
D-MOD 
D-LOW 
D-LOW 
0-LOW 
F-HIGH  NUCLEAR 
F-MOD  BOTH 
F-LOW  BOTH 
F-HIGH  NUCLEAR 
F-MOD  BOTH 
F-LOW  BOTH 
Study  #1  =  Probability Of  Disruption 
And  Its  Impact 
Study  #2  = Expectation  and  Impact 
Of  Anti-Nuclear  Movement 
- 47  -assumed  for purpose  of  illustration).  However,  several  cases  are  dependent  upon 
studies  that  have  to  carried out  prior to  making  a decision: 
Study  #1 
Determine  the  probability of  a further serious  nuclear  accident  any  place 
in  the  world  such  as  those  at  Three  Mile  Island  and  Chernobyl,  and  the 
impact  of  such  an  event  on  nuclear  power  in  the  country  (Scenario  #26). 
Determine  the  probability  of  accidents,  disruption,  possible  impact  and 
recovery  for  a  nuc 1  ear  ace i dent  within  the  country.  This  will  i nvo 1  ve 
selection  of  specific  reactor  types  and  conducting  whatever  probablistic 
risk  analyses  (PRA's)  that may  be  appropriate. 
Study  #2 
Determine  the  likelihood,  intensity,  and  impact  of  developing  a  major 
anti-nuclear movement  within  the  country  as  a major  political  factor.  Are 
there  steps  that  can  be  taken  that  can  minimize  the  growth  of  such  move-
ments? 
3.1.1.2.  Simplify  The  Decision  Structure 
All  scenarios  with  the  same  alternative  actions  may  be  grouped  together, 
allowing  the  factors  that  influence  the  alternative  to  be  evaluated  together. 
This  has  been  done  for  the  example  being  follwed  in  Table  3.2. 
3.1.1.3.  Make  An  Initial  Evaluation  Of  Scenario  Probabilities 
In  order  to  estimate  the  meaningfulness  of  the  scenarios,  a  first  cut 
analysis  of  the  probability  of  the  scnari os  must  be  made.  There  are  several 
different  approaches  that may  be  undertaken  for  this  purpose: 
Qualitative - Scenario  Specific 
Each  scenario  is  assigned  a  likelihood  of  occurrence  from  the  qualitative 
descriptions  in  a table  such  as: 
- 48  -TABLE  3.2 
SELECTED  DECISION  MAKER  OUTCOMES  FOR  THE  SAMPLE  EXAMPLE 
FOR  SITUATIONAL  SCENARIO  #26 
(A  BENIGN  CLIMATE,  DEPENDANCE  ON  FOREIGN  FUEL,  MEDIUM  POPULATION  DENSITY) 
27  SCENARIOS 
F.  FUEL  COST  ESCALATION 
D.  EXPECTATION  OF  DISRUPTION-, 
A.  DEGREE  OF  ANTI-NUCLEAR  SENTIMENT 
l  l  ! 
ALTERNATIVE  OR  STUDY 
REQUIRED 
1.  A-HIGH  D-HIGH  F-HIGH  COAL 
2.  A-HIGH  D-HIGH  F-MOD  COAL 
3.  A-HIGH  D-HIGH  F-LOW  COAL 
5.  A-HIGH  D-MOD  F-MOD  COAL 
6.  A-HIGH  D-MOD  F-LOW  COAL 
11.  A-MOD  D-HIGH  F-MOD  COAL 
12.  A-MOD  D-HIGH  F-LOW  COAL 
14.  A-MOD  D-MOD  F-MOD  COAL 
15.  A-MOD  D-MOD  F-LOW  COAL 
21  A-LOW  D-HIGH  F-LOW  COAL 
22.  A-LOW  D-MOD  F-HIGH  NUCLEAR 
25.  A-LOW  D-LOW  F-HIGH  NUCLEAR 
18.  A-MOD  D-LOW  F-LOW  BOTH 
23.  A-LOW  D-MOD  F-MOD  BOTH 
24.  A-LOW  D-MOD  F-LOW  BOTH 
26.  A-LOW  D-LOW  F-MOD  BOTH 
27.  A-LOW  D-LOW  F-LOW  BOTH 
4.  A-HIGH  D-MOD  F-HIGH  STUDIES  #1  & #2 
10.  A-MOD  D-HIGH  F-HIGH  STUDIES  #1  &  #2 
13.  A-MOD  D-MOD  F-HIGH  STUDIES  #1  &  #2 
19.  A-LOW  D-HIGH  F-HIGH  STUDY  #1 
20.  A-LOW  D-HIGH  F-MOD  STUDY  #1 
7.  A-HIGH  D-LOW  F-HIGH  STUDY  #2 
8.  A-HIGH  D-LOW  F-MOD  STUDY  #2 
9.  A-HIGH  D-LOW  F-LOW  STUDY  #2 
16.  A-MOD  D-LOW  F-HIGH  STUDY  #2 
17.  A-MOD  D-LOW  F-MOD  STUDY  #2 
•  49  • Probabilitt Level  Probabilitt Associated 
Very  High  Above  0.5 
High  Above  0.1 
Moderate  Above  0.05 
Low  Below  0.05 
Very  Low  Below  0.001 
The  associated  probabilities  are  suggestive,  and  are  only  to  help  in  as-
signment  of  qualitative  levels.  Scenarios  with  very  low  and,  perhaps,  low 
likelihood  assignments  may  be  eliminated  from  further  concern. 
Qualitative- Conditional  Variable  Likelihood 
Each  of  the  conditions  of  the  critical  variables  are  assigned  descriptive 
levels  of  likelihood  such  as  those  used  above.  The  intersection descript-
ions  for the 27  intersections are derived from  the combination  of  variables 
in  a descriptive sense  (e.g., Low/High/High)  and  ranked.  Scenarios  at the 
bottom  of  the  ranking  may  be  eliminated. 
Quantitative  - Scenario  Specific 
Each  scenario  is  assigned  a  numerical  probability.  The  sum  of  the  27 
assignments  is  used  to  normalize  each  individual  probability.  Very  low 
values  may  be  eliminated  as  above. 
Quantitative  -Conditional  Variable  Likelihood 
Each  of  the conditions  of  the critical variables  are  assigned  quantitative 
levels  of  probability.  These  must  add  to  unity  for  the  three  choices  for 
each  variable.  The  intersection probabilities for  the  27  intersections are 
derived from  multiplying  the  three probabilities from  the  three variables, 
and  normalizing  to  unity  with  the  sum  of  the  intersections  as  a divisor. 
Scenarios  at  the  bottom  of  the  probability list may  be  eliminated. 
- 50  -Assignments  using  the  last  method  are  shown  in  Tables  3.3  and  3.4.  The  latter 
Table  also  shows  the  probability  assignments  by  the  decision  alternative  grou 
pings.  On  this  basis,  the  probabilities for  the  nuclear  choice  and  for  Study  #1 
alone  are  so  small  as  to  be  eliminated.  However,  this  is  not  necessary  since  the 
nuclear  option  must  be  addressed  in  the  BOTH  case  and  in  the  cases  which  need 
both  Study  #1  and  #2.  Since  study #1  is needed  in  any  case  where  both  studies  are 
required,  it must  also  be  done. 
Never-the-less,  at  this  point  in  the  top-down  risk  analysis,  a  number  of 
limitations  on  alternative  solutions  can  often  be  ascertained.  In  the  example 
shown,  the  low  probability  of  conditions  for  the  nuclear  option  alone  almost 
preclude  the  deployment  of  large  nuclear  power  plants as  the  sole  option.  Either 
coal  or  both  coal  and  small  nuclear plants remain  viable options for the particu-
lar country  situation.  The  moderate  population  density  situation  and  the  condi-
tional  variables may  limit the option for  large nuclear plants, but  small  nuclear 
plants with  minimal  potential for  large  accidents might  be  acceptable  solutions. 
Studies  #1  and  #2  should  be  directed  at  these  limited  options. 
3.1.2.  Specify  The  Bottom-up  Analysis  That  Must  Be  Undertaken 
The  following  bottom-up  analyses  are  required: 
3.1.2.1.  CRITICAL  VARIABLES 
Study  #1 
Determine  the  probability of  a further serious  nuclear  accident  any 
place  in  the world  such  as  those  at Three  Mile  Island  and  Chernobyl, 
and  the  impact  of  such  an  event  on  nuc 1  ear  power  in  the  country 
(Scenario  #26).  Deter~ine the  probability of  accidents,  disruption, 
possible  impact  and  recovery for  a nuclear  accident within  the  coun-
try.  This  will  involve  selection of  specific reactor  types  and  con-
ducting  a  whatever  probablistic  risk  analyses  (PRA•s)  that  may  be 
- 51  -PROBABILITY 
ASSIGNMENT 
F. 
0.1 
0.4 
0.5 
D. 
0.6 
0.39 
0.01 
A. 
0.1 
0.6 
0.3 
TABLE  3.3 
EXAMPLE  OF  VARIABLE  PROBABILITY  ASSIGNMENTS 
FOR  SITUATIONAL  SCENARIO  #26 
VARIABLES 
FUEL  COST  ESCALATION 
LOW  PRESENT  SITUATION 
MODERATE  RISING  SLIGHTLY  FASTER  THAN  INFLATION 
HIGH  HIGH  ENERGY  PRICES  DUE  TO  CARTEL  CONTROLS 
EXPECTATION  OF  DISRUPTION  (ACCIDENTS,  SABOTAGE,  FUEL  AVAILABILTY) 
LOW  LARGE  ACCIDENTS  WILL  NOT  OCCUR,  FUEL  HIGHLY 
AVAILABLE,  AND  NO  SABOTAGE  EXPECTED  IN  ANY 
WIDE  SPREAD  PATTERN 
MODERATE  LARGE  ACCIDENTS  WILL  NOT  OCCUR,  BUT  HIGH 
VISIBILILITY  ACCIDENTS  WILL  OCCUR,  OR  FUEL 
AVAILABLITY  MAY  BE  LIMITED  TO  SOME  EXTENT, 
OR  SABOTAGE  OCCURS  ON  A SELCTIVE  BASIS. 
HIGH  LARGE  ACCIDENTS  OCCUR,  OR  FUEL  AVAILABILITY 
LIMITED  SEVERELY,  OR  SABOTAGE  OCCURS  ON 
A WIDEPREAD  BASIS. 
DEGREE  OF  ANTI-NUCLEAR  SENTIMENT  IN  NATION 
LOW  NO  ORGANIZED  OPPOSITION  TO  NUCLEAR,  UNLIKELY 
TO  BE  ORGANIZED 
MODERATE  ORGANIZED  OPPOSITION  TO  NUCLEAR  DEVELOPS, 
BUT  DOES  NOT  BECOME  A  MAJOR  POLITICAL  ISSUE. 
HIGH  MAJOR  OPPOSITION  FORMS  TO  NUCLEAR,  AND  BECOMES 
A MAJOR  POLITICAL  FACTOR. 
- 52  • TABLE  3.4 
PROBABILITY  VALUES  FOR 
SELECTED  DECISION  MAKER  OUTCOMES  FOR  THE  SAMPLE  EXAMPLE 
FOR  SITUATIONAL  SCENARIO  #26 
(A  BENIGN  CLIMATE,  DEPENDANCE  ON  FOREIGN  FUEL,  MEDIUM  POPULATION  DENSITY) 
27  SCENARIOS 
F.  FUEL  COST  ESCALATION 
D.  EXPECTATION  OF  DISRUPTION! 
. A.  DEGREE  OF  ANTI-NUCLEAR  SENTIMENT 
PROBABILITY  SCENARIO  CONtiTIONS 1 ! 
ALTERNATIVE  OR 
NUMBER  STUDY  REQUIRED 
•  0025*  1  •  A-HIGH  D-HIGH  F-HIGH  COAL 
.. 0020  2.  A-HIGH  D-HIGH  F-MOD  COAL 
.0005  3.  A-HIGH  D-HIGH  F-LOW  COAL 
.0787  5.  A-HIGH  D-MOD  F-MOD  COAL 
.0197  6.  A-HIGH  D-MOD  F-LOW  COAL 
•  0040  11 .  A-MOD  D-HIGH  F-MOD  COAL 
.0010  12.  A-MOD  D-HIGH  F-LOW  COAL 
.1570  14.  A-MOD  D-MOD  F-MOD  COAL 
•  0394  15 •  A-MOD  D-MOD  F-LOW  COAL 
.0002  21  A-LOW  D-HIGH  F-LOW  COAL 
0.31 
.0328  22.  A-LOW  D-MOD  F-HIGH  NUCLEAR 
.0505  25.  A-LOW  D-LOW  F-HIGH  NUCLEAR 
0.08 
.0606  18.  A-MOD  D-LOW  F-LOW  BOTH 
.0262  23.  A-LOW  D-MOD  F-MOD  BOTH 
.0066  24.  A-LOW  D-MOD  F-LOW  BOTH 
.0262  26.  A-LOW  D-LOW  F-MOD  BOTH 
.1010  27.  A-LOW  D-LOW  F-LOW  BOTH 
0.13 
.0984  4.  A-HIGH  D-MOD  F-HIGH  STUDIES  #1  & #2 
.0505  10.  A-MOD  D-HIGH  F-HIGH  STUDIES  #1  &  #2 
.0197  13.  A-MOD  D-MOD  F-HIGH  STUDIES  #1  &  #2 
0.12 
.0008  19.  A-LOW  D-HIGH  F-HIGH  STUDY  #1 
.0009  20.  A-LOW  D-HIGH  F-MOD  STUDY  #1 
0.002 
.1510  7.  A-HIGH  D-LOW  F-HIGH  STUDY  #2 
.1210  8.  A-HIGH  D-LOW  F-MOD  STUDY  #2 
.0303  9.  A-HIGH  D-LOW  F-LOW  STUDY  #2 
.0303  16.  A-MOD  D-LOW  F-HIGH  STUDY  #2 
.0242  17.  A-MOD  D-LOW  F-MOD  STUDY  #2 
0.36 
1.00 
* Probabilities To  Three  Significant Figures  Are  Only  To  Show  The  Method 
And  Overstate  The  Precision  and  Accuracy  Gf  The  Estimates  By  Orders  Of  Magnitude 
- 53  -appropriate.  Emphasis  should  be  on  small  nuclear  plants with  minimal 
capacity for  sustaining  large  accidents. 
Study  #2 
Determine  the  likelihood,  intensity,  and  impact  of developing  a  ma-
jor  anti-nuclear  movement  within  the  country  as  a  major  political 
factor.  Are  there  steps  that  can  be  taken  that  can  minimize  the 
growth  of  such  movements?  Will  small  nuclear  plants  without  acci-
dent  potential  be  accepted  where  large  plants  would  not? 
3.1.2.2.  Probability Determination  Refinement 
Based  upon  the  above  studies  and  other  data,  refine  the  probabili-
ties  of  the  decision  conditions  shown  in  Table  3.4.  These  refined 
probabilities will  specify the  conditions  leading  to  the  three fuel 
cycle  options:  NUCLEAR,  BOTH,  COAL,  although  the  option  for  nuclear 
alone  may  already  be  eliminated. 
3.1.2.3.  OTHER  VARIABLES 
In  order  to  determine  costs  and  benefits  in  addition  to  risks,  there will 
be  a number  of  additional  studies required for the options.  These  include: 
Specific  Design  Options  - Performance  and  costs  of  various  methods 
of  achieving  the  coal  and  nuclear  options,  including  plant  size and 
design  concepts. 
Environmental  Impacts  - Normal  and  abnormal  releases  (See  Step  #2) 
and  the  cost-effectiveness  of  reduction  of  detriment  for  coal  and 
nuc 1  ear.  The  cost-effectiveness  of  part  i cu 1  ate  and  sulfur  remova 1 
for the coal  option must  be  addressed  along  with  global  conditions of 
acid  rain  and  carbon  dioxide  build  up. 
Capital  Investment  And  Operating  Costs  - Investment  and  operating 
costs  under  different  fuel  costs  associated  with  the  different  de 
- 54  -signs  under  different fuel  cost  conditional  scenarios. 
Financial  Responsibility  And  Sources 
The  role of  finance  and  financial  responsibility,  specifically the  respec-
tive  financial  positions  of  providers  of  finance,  public  or  private,  and  end 
users  may  be  a fundamental  factor  in  determining  the  actual  viability of  proposed 
alternatives.  The  financing  arrangements  for  different  alternatives  involve  an 
array of  unbalanced  financial  risk factors.  Some  of  the  risk factors  that must  be 
evaluated  for  providers  are: 
o  Capacity  of  the  provider  for  an  alternative to  perform  as  intended. 
o  Relative  importance  assigned  by  the  provider  to  rendering  perform-
ance  for  the  energy  alternatives  selected  among  all  other  projects 
being  financed  by  the  provider. 
o  Total  capital  resource  pool  available  and  reserves. 
o  Nature  and  quality of  the  performance  of  the  provider. 
o  Timing  and  schedule  of  performance 
Essentially financial  risk  factors  may  be  understood  as  a  definition  and 
conversion  of  value.  In  any  given  instance  the  means  by  which  the  provider, 
public  or  private,  achieves  an  ability to  perform  its function  will  depend  upon 
both  its own  financial  condition  and  the  financial  structure supporting  a speci-
fic  performance  characterized  as  an  alternate energy  alternative. 
The  converse  of  value  issues for  the  provider  may  be  characterized for  the 
end-user  (energy  system  owner)  as  re 1  i ance  factors  which  may  be  enhanced  or 
diminished  by  the presence or  absence  of certain derivative opportunities such  as 
1)  the  capacity  to  save,  2)  the  capacity  to  participate  in  and/or  generate 
capital  markets  which  may  promote  or  suppress  demand  for  energy,  and  3)  the 
capacity  to  diversify expenditures  in  terms  of  maximization  of  choice.  Positive 
reinforcement  of  these three end-user capabilities by  external markets  and  by  the 
- 55  -TABLE  3.5 
DATA  REQUIREMENT  STEPS  FOR  THE  BOTTOM-UP  RISK  ANALYSIS 
a  Identify The  Specific  Kind  Of  Information  Required  For  Each  Critical 
Variable. 
b  Determine  The  Levels  Of  Precision  And  Accuracy  Required  For  Resolution. 
c  Determine  The  Kinds  Of  Uncertainty  Present  In  Each  Variable  And 
How  These  Errors  Propagate. 
d  Determine  What  Measurements  Can  Be  Made  Versus  Cost  In  Terms 
Of  Time  And  Resources. 
e  In  The  Absence  Of  Direct  Measurements,  What  Models  Are  Needed 
And  How  May  They  Be  Verified? 
f.  Establish  The  Kinds  Of  Margins  Of  Safety That  Will  Be  Required, 
And  Estimate  The  Impact  Of  These  Safety Margins  On  Cost  And  Benefits. 
g  Adopt  Cost-Effective  Strategies  For  Obtaining  The  Needed  Precision 
In  Terms  of  Interval  Estimates  Of  Risk. 
- 56  -providers  of  finance  themselves  will,  in  turn,  diversify  financing  methods 
a~ailable for R & 0,  production  and  marketing  of alternative energy  technologies. 
Others  As  Required  By  The  Situation 
3.2  Step  11.  Develop  The  Data  Requirements  For  The  Bottom-up  Analysis 
The  steps  involved  in  obtaining  needed  information  are  shown  in  Table  3.5, 
and  discussed  here  in  further  detail.: 
3.2.1.  Identify The  Specific  Kind  Of  Information  Required  For  Each  Criti-
cal  Variable. 
The  specific kinds  of  information  needed  for each  critical variable as  well 
as  all  other  variables  that  must  be  addressed  must  be  identified  in  sufficient 
detail  to  facilitate  subsequent  data  acquisition  steps.  For  example,  using  the 
variables from  the  illustration, the  follwing  descriptions of  needed  information 
might  be  developed. 
EXAMPLE  INFORMATION  REQUIREMENTS 
CRITICAL  VARIABLES 
Fuel  Cost  Escalation  - For  coal  determine  the  probable  cost  ranges  for 
different grades  of coal  under  the three cases  for  this variable,  and  make 
any  interpolations  that make  sense  from  the  analysis  (i.e.,  breaking  down 
the  variable  to  more  than  the  three  cases  shown).  Determine  the  political 
and  economic  factors  that make  each  case  viable.  Determine  the  probability 
of  these  factors  for  each  case  in  at  least  a qualitative sense.  Determine 
if there  are  any  leading  indicators for these factors along  with  their lead 
time. 
Note  that this  is primarily a political/economic  study. 
Expectation  Of  Disruption- There  are  three  different  aspects  to  this 
variable:  1)  If one  or  more  large  accidents  occur  in  nuclear  power  plants 
- 57  -around  the  world,  what  will  be  the  probable  impact  on  small  nuclear  power 
plant  operations  within  the  country  (also  taking  into  account  the  next 
critical  variable)  should  the  BOTH  option  be  implemented,  and  what  is  the 
likelihood  of  such  events;  2)  what  is  the  likelihood  and  range  of  conse-
quences  of  significant  accidents  in  the  country  (also  taking  into  account 
the  next  critical  variable)  should  the  BOTH  option  be  implemanted;  and  3) 
what  is  the  vulnerability of  both  the  COAL  and  BOTH  options  to  sabotage, 
terrorism,  and  civil  disobedience,  and  what  are  the  likely consequences. 
Note  that  these  studies  are  partly technical  and  partly political. 
The  technical  studies  must  address  the  vulnerability  of  small  nuclear 
power  plants  of  the  type  chosen  for  the  BOTH  option  to:  a)  accidents 
resulting in  increased  risks to the  population,  and  b)  service disruption. 
A techn i ca 1 assessment  must  be  made  of  the 1  ike 1  i hood of ace i dents in other 
countries,  using  existing  information  sources. 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  - Determine  the  existing  level  of  anti-
nuclear  sentiment  and  the  factors  that would  make  this  sentiment  increase 
or  decrease.  What  would  the  impact  be  of  increased  or  decreased  activity 
on  BOTH  option.  What  is the  likelihood  of  an  incease  on  the  BOTH  option. 
Note  that this  is  a social/political  study. 
OTHER  VARIABLES 
Specific  Design  Options  - determine  the  performance  and  costs  of  various 
methods  of achieving the coal  and  nuclear options,  including plant size and 
design  concepts.  The  nuclear facilities should  address  small  sized plants 
with  designs  for  which  waste  heat  removal  in  the  event  of  an  accident  is 
not  critical. The  coal  facilities should  address  the types  of coal  to burn, 
the  combustion  processes,  and  the  stack  cleaning  requirements. 
Primarily  a technical  design  study. 
- 58  -Environmental  Impacts  - The  studies  for  the  expectation  of  disruption 
variable  address  accidents  both  within  and  without  the  design  basis.  The 
environmental  impacts  addressed  here  are  for  normal  and  abnormal  releases 
that  take  place  within  the  design  basis,  and  consider  the  cost-effective-
ness  of  reduction  of  detriment  for  coal  and  nuclear.  The  cost-effective-
ness  of  particulate and  sulfur removal  for  the  coal  option  must  be  addres-
sed  along  with  global  conditions  of  acid  rain  and  carbon  dioxide  build  up 
as  well  as  normal  and  abnormal  releases  from  nuclear  plants. 
Both  a technical  design  study  and  risk  analysis  of  normal  and  abnor-
mal  events. 
Capital  Investment  And  Operating  Costs  - Ascertain  the  investment  and 
operating  costs  under  different fuel  costs  associated  with  the  different 
designs  under  different fuel  cost  conditional  scenarios. 
Primarily  an  economic  study. 
3.2.2.  Determine  The  Levels  Of  Precision  And  Accuracy  Regu~red For  Resolu-
tion. 
In  any  of  these  studies  the  precision  in  the  variables  should  not  be  more 
than  that required  to  make  the  necessary  decisions.  Conversely  it is  not  always 
possible  to  achieve  the  degree  of  precision required for  a decision.  Even  if the 
precision  is  achieved,  the  required  accuracy  may  not  be  achievable.  (See  the 
Glossary  for  definitions  of  precision  and  accuracy). 
In  a decision for this type  of  framework,  values  for  technical  and  monetary 
variables  can  usually be  determined  more  precisely than  values  for  political  and 
social  variables.  Thus,  if social  and  political  variables play  an  important  role 
in  the  decision,  values  for  technical  and  economic  variables  need  not  be  more 
precise  than,  at most,  an  order  of  magnitude  more  precise  than  the  political or 
- 59  -social  variables.  Greater  precision  for  technical  and  economic·  variables,  be-
cause  they  can  be  measured  or  counted  more  precisely,  wi 11  not  aid  in  the 
decision  process;  and  may  detract  from  it by  using  resources  more  effectively 
applied  elsewhere.  This  is  especially  true  when  accuracy  of  the  values  are 
questionable or  involve wide  ranges  of  uncertainty.  For  example,  there is little 
sense  in  estimating  the  cost  of  an  alternative to  six significant figures,  if a 
fifty percent  overrun  can  be  reasonably  expected. 
Table  3.6 provides  a list of  types  of variables,  giving  appropriate  levels 
of  precision,  and  is  aimed  at providing  a first order  idea  of  the  needed  levels 
of precision. Of  course,  there be  may  specific situations where  greater precision 
can  be  justified. 
In  cases  where  the  desired  level  of  precision  is  not  attainable,  value 
judgements  and  forms  of quasi-quantification are  used.  The  imprecision  and  inac-
curacy  involved  will  be  very  large.  These 
11Swing
11  variables  determine  the  level 
for  the  other  variables.  The  error  in  the  swing  variable  estimates  may  easily 
encompass  the  error  in  the  other  variables  combined,  making  it unneccesary  and 
undesirable to state the other variables with  much  greater precision than  for  the 
swing  variables. 
3.2.3.  Determine  The  Kinds  Of  Uncertainty Present  In  Each  Variable And  How 
These  Errors  Propagate. 
There  are  three  main  types  of  uncertainty  that  must  be  addressed  as  a 
minimum:  measurement  uncertainty,  model  uncertainty,  and  value  diversity,  the 
latter somewhat  different from  the first two. 
3.2.3.1 Measurement  Uncertainty 
Addresses  the  inability to measure  process,  control  and  cause-effect 
variables  whether  situational,  conditional  or  operational.  Actual  mea-
surement  is  involved,  resulting  in  a  level  of  precision  of  measurement 
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NEEDED  PRECISION  OF  VARIABLES  IN  DECISION  FRAMEWORK 
VARIABLE 
SOCIAL 
POLITICAL 
PROBABILITY 
LEVEL  OF  PRECISION 
1 in  10  to  1  in  20 
1  in  10  to  1  in  20 
1 in  20  above  .01 
COMMENTS  AND  EXAMPLES 
Equity  questions,  economic  allocation 
problems,  non-economic  benefits 
allocation of  rights,  effectiveness 
of  political  opposition 
1  in  10  from  .000001  to  .01 
Orders  of  Magnitude  below  .000001 
TECHNICAL 
Operational  1  in  100 
Conditional  1  in  100 
Situational  1  in  20 
ECONOMIC  (Estimates  for  Future) 
Costs  1  in  100 
Prices  1  in  10 
- 61  -
Process  paramters,  higher  precision 
may  be  required  in  actual  design, 
but  not  for  the  decision  process. 
Environmental  and  risk  parameters 
are  rarely measured  accurately 
beyond  this  level. 
These  parameters  are  usually more 
descriptive than  normative 
Accuracy  of  estimates  often  less 
than  this  level  of  precision. 
Precision  is relative to  a base 
or  present  price. (resolution  error),  and  errors  due  to  inaccuracy  in  measuremnt  (random, 
bias  and  systematic  error). 
a)  Error  Ranges  And  Propagation 
The  range  of  error  is expressed  by  upper  and  lower  bounds.  Interval 
estimates  are  provided  by  statistical  confidence  limits  and  a  best  esti-
mate,  which  may  be  any  measure  of  central  tendency  (mean,  mode,  median 
etc.).  Depending  on  the  decision  framework,  measurement  errors may  propa-
gate  additively or  multiplicatively.  For  additive cases  the  largest error 
in  an  addend  will  dominate.  For  the  multiplicative case,  the  square  root 
of  the  sum  of  the  variances  is  used  to  determine  the  overall  error range. 
b)  Measurement  Of  Probabilities 
Measurement  of  probabilty  is  a special  problem,  especially for  rare 
events.  When  events  are  frequent  enough  to  provide  an  estimate  of  the 
frequency  of  similar  events,  then  the  measurement  process  based  upon  the 
various  definitions of  probability provide  useful  information.  All  proba-
bility measurements  are  based  upon  a 
11degree  of belief" in  the behavior of 
the  systems  under  study.  Three  approaches  whereby  one  attempts  to  estimate 
probability are  given  in  increasing order  in  terms  of the degrees  of  belief 
required  in  each  case: 
i)  a  priori  information  - prior  knowledge  about  the  behavior  of  a 
system  for which  one  has  a degree of belief that similar behavior  can 
be  expected  to occur  in  the  future,  e.g.,  knowing  in  advance  that  a 
particular coin  toss  is  "fair
11
• 
ii)  likelihood  of  occurrence  (Frequentist Approach)  - study  of  his-
toric or  experimental  data  to  determine  the  behavior  of  a system  in 
order  to  evaluate  its future  behavior,  e.g.,  observing  the  outcomes 
of a roulette wheel  to determine  possible imbalance.  Here  there  is a 
- 62  -degree  of  belief about  the validity of  the experiments  as  well  as  for 
the  continuance  of  simi 1  ar  behavior.  Moreover,  there  is  always  an 
assymtotic  assumption  error  involved  in  such  measurements.  The  ex-
pected  value  of  random  variable  assymtotically  approaches  the  ex-
pected  value  of  the  variable  as  the  number  of  measurements  increase, 
but  never  reaches  the  expected  value  (except  by  chance  alone).  When 
the  error  is  small  it is  "accepted"  as  negligible. 
iii)  subjective  estimates  - in  the  absence  of  historical  data,  use 
any  available information  to estimate probabilities,  and  subjective-
ly  evaluate  the  meaningfulness  of  the  information  used,  e.g.,  bet-
ting  on  a  particular  football  game.  Here  the  degree  of  belief  in-
volves  the  validity of  available  information  as  well  as  the  kinds  of 
degrees  of  belief involved  in  the  two  cases  above.  Bayesnian  methods 
are  tradionally applied  in  these  approaches. 
c)  Problems  In  Measuring  Rare  Event  Probabilities 
Is  it possible to  address  rare events  through  use  of  historical  data 
alone?  Sparse  data  makes  it  virtually  impossible  to  gain  significant 
information  about  rare events  in  this manner.  What  has  been  attempted  in 
the  past  is  to  look  at  either  events  of  higher  probability  and  smaller 
consequences  whose  cause  and  effect  relationships  are  hypothesized  to  be 
similar to  the  rare  events  to  be  studied,  or  to  look  at other rare events 
that have  occurred  and  hypothesize  that the  same  processes  are  involved  as 
those  of  concern.  In  the first case,  a profile of  frequency  of  occurrence 
versus  the  magnitude  of  the  consequence  is  made  using  historic  data,  and 
extrapolation  from  these  data  to  rare events  are  attempted.  In  the  latter 
case,  the  data base  is  increased  since the  number  of  events  is  larger,  but 
the  validity of  grouping  these  events  is  questionable.  For  example,  the 
-.63 -number  of  nuc 1  ear  reactor  ace i dents  versus  reactor  years  of  operation 
sometimes  group  ship  propulsion  reactors  with  electrical  generation  reac-
tors,  or  operating  data  for  small  and  large  pressurized  water,  boiling 
water  and  other types  of  power  reactors  are  aggregated  without  close  exam-
ination  of  the  validity  of  such  approaches.  The  need  to  evaluate  the 
possibi 1  ity  of  future  catastrophes  from  existing  and  new  technological 
systems  exists.  For  rare  events  whose  potentia  1 consequence  magnitudes 
are only  limited by  man's  imagination,  the usual  methods  of  probability and 
statistics do  not  work. 
3.2.3.2e  Model  Uncertainty 
In  the  absence  of  good  measurements,  models  are  used  to  project 
results.  In  many  cases  the  validity  of  models  cannot  be  established  by 
measurement,  for  example,  extrapolating  dose-effect measurements  made  in 
anima 1  s  at  high  doses  to  effects  at  very  1  ow  doses  in  man.  Un 1  ess  the 
models  can  be  verified  by  actual  testing,  they  remain  as  hypothetical 
constructs.  In  all  cases  the  range  of  uncertainty  ;n  models  spans  the 
range  from  lower  to  upper  limits of verification.  For  example,  the extrap-
olation from  high  radiation  doses  to  low  doses  in  man  has  zero  as  a  lower 
limit,  and  the  statistical  evidence  from  actual  exposures  in  man  privides 
an  upper  limit  (e.g.  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki,  uranium  miner  data,  etc.). 
a)  Error  Ranges  And  Propagation 
Unless  the range  of  uncertainty can  be  narrowed  by  actual  test veri-
fication,  all  values  within  the  range  are  equally likely.  Different models 
may  be  developed  to explain  behavior  in  the  uncertainty range;  but without 
verification, all  plausible models  are  equally likely.  The  reasonableness 
of  models  and  judgement  of  the  modellers  may  provide  some  feel  for  what 
models  are  prudent  to  use,  but  only  represent  value  judgements,  not  hard 
- 64  -science.  The  uncertainty  involved  in  the  choice  of  reasonable,  alternative 
models  is what  is addressed  by  model  uncertainty.  The  propagation  of  error 
may  be  additive or multiplicative. For  additive cases  the  largest error  in 
an  addend  will  dominate.  For  the  multiplicative  case,  there  is  no  way  to 
measure  the  variance  in  the  choice  of  alternative models  since  there  is  no 
11right
11  model  without  verification,  and  the  square  root  of  the  sum  of  the 
variances  may  not  be  used  to  determine  the  overall  error range.  The  total 
range  of  uncertainty  by  choice  of  models  must  be  used,  and  the  range 
narrowed  only  by  demonstrating  the  implausibilty of  a model.  For  multipli-
cative  error  propagation,  the  ranges  themselves  are  multiplicatively re-
1  a  ted. 
b)  Modelled  Probability Measurement  Methods 
For  rare events,  it has  been  traditional  to  use  a combination  of  the 
measurement  approaches  cited  above  to  form  two  models  for  dbtaining  these 
probabilities. 
i)  modelled  estimates  - a  study  of  the  behavior  of  similar systems 
for  which  data  is  available  which,  with  reasoned  modification,  is 
used  as  a model  for the  system  under  analysis,  e.g., the estimate of 
rupture  of  steam  boilers  in  general  to  provide  an  estimate  of  the 
probability of  rupture  of  nuclear  reactor boilers.  Here  the  belief 
structure involves  the  confidence  one  has  in  comparing  such  systems, 
e.g.,  does  radiation  damage  increase failures  in  boilers? 
ii)  system  structure  models  - the  failure  of  systems  may  be  rare 
because  of  redundancy  so  analysis  of  the  failure  probability  of 
component  parts  and  their  interconnection  is  used  to  synthesize  an 
estimate  of  system  behavior,  e.g.,  event  trees  and  fault  trees  in 
nuclear  reactors.  The  belief structures  involve  the  degree  of  know 
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a  system,  and  the  degree  to  which  all  important  system  combinations 
can  be  ascertained.  Such  systems  are  always  open-ended  since  the 
combinational  possibilities  are  astronomical  in  number. 
The  propagation  of  multiplicate  errors  in  such  models  may  be  somewhat 
better  than  for  other  modelled  parameters  since  the  binomial  and  Poisson 
among  other  distributions  provide  means  of  ascertaining  variances,  al-
though  this  has  yet  to  be  verified. 
3.2.3.3.  Value  Diversity In  Interpretation Measurements  and  Models  - Given 
a  particular measurement  or  model  result,  there  is  wide  diversity  in  how 
this  information  is  interpreted.  For  example,  a  liter  bottle  containing 
500  ml.  of water  may  be  cosidered  half full  or  half empty  depending  on  ones 
framework.  Value  diversity in  interpretation of  information  addresses  the 
diversity of  values  involved  in  such  value  judgments.  Some  of  the  value 
choices  in  the  risk  analysis  involve  diversity about: 
a)  Framing  of  The  Problem  Presentation 
As  in  the  case  above,  the  manner  in  which  a  problem  is  framed  may 
have  a  major  impact  on  the  interpretation  of  results  of  measurements  and 
other  information.  Twersky  and  Kahnemen (  1)  have  provided  substantat i ve 
evidence of  the framing  of  the problem  on  interpretation of results.  Since 
this will  always  occur  to  some  extent,  one  has  to  recognize  the  existence 
of  value  diversity from  framework  formation  ana  be  on  guard  against  such 
traps.  The  way  to  address  this problem  is  to  start with  the  use  for  which 
the  study  is to  be  made,  and  then  test to  see  if alternate frameworks  will 
provide  substantial  value  diversity. 
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There  are  several  aspects  in  the  manner  in  which  people  interpret 
probabilities.  The  most  obvious  one  is whether  one  is  an  objectivist or  a 
subjectivist  in  terms  of  belief  system.  This  difference  is  addressed  in 
most  textbooks  on  probability,  and  will  not  be  addressed  further here.  But 
this difference must  be  recognized. 
A much  more  significant  problem  in  risk  analysis  is  how  people  ad-
dress  the  probability of  events,  especially rare events.  One  aspect of  the 
problem  can  be  addressed  by  whether  absolute or relative risk estimates are 
used.  Absolute  risk  and  relative risk  may  be  defined  as  follows: 
Absolute  Risk  - an  estimate  of  the  likelihood  of  an  event  with  a 
specific consequence  in  terms  of  its probability of  occurrence.  Both 
point  and  interval  estimates  may  be  made. 
Relative Risk  - an  estimate of  the relative likelihood of  an  event  as 
compared  to  the  likelihood  of  other  events  external  to  the  analysis 
of  a  similar magnitude  or  a  similar  comparison  of  event  magnitudes 
for  events  with  the  same  likelihood. 
Comparative  Risk  - An  estimate  of  the  probability of  several  events 
in  ~system by  comparing  them  to each  other. Since  the events  are  all 
compared  to  each  other,  many  of  the  uncertainties  are  eliminated. 
However,  the  system  has  no  relation  to  absolute  risk  unless  one  of 
the  estimates  is "pegged"  to a reference external  to  the  system  in  a 
relative risk manner. 
For  a go/no-go  type  of  decision,  one  would  like to have  a meaningful 
absolute risk estimate.  For  selection of one  of  a set of  alternatives only 
relative risk  estimates  are  required.  As  will  be  seen  relative risk  and 
comparative  risk  evaluations  can  be  quite  useful  in  decision  making. 
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events,  they  may  or  may  n~t be  useful  for  decision  making,  depending  upon 
where  the  risk  estimates  and  their  ranges  of  uncertainty  lie.  Absolute 
risk  decisions  are  usually made  against  some  reference  level  of  probabili-
ty.  Whether  or  not  very  low  absolute  values  of  probability are meaningful 
in  terms  of  such  abstract  references,  especially  with  large  ranges  of 
uncertainty  is  doubtful,  except,  perhaps,  for  the  expert.  As  noted  in  the 
first  report, 
11Assessment  of  Comparative  and  Non-Comparative  Factors  In 
Alternate Energy  Systems .. ,  for  a single rare event,  one  standard  deviation 
(standard error)  is the square  root of  the expected  value  of  probability of 
occurrence.  The  square  root  of  a small  probability is,  therefore,  always 
larger than  the  expected  value.  The  standard  deviation  is  narrowed  as  the 
number  of  events  increases  (by  the  square  root  of  the  number  of  events): 
but,  if the  number  of  events  becomes  large,  the  events  may  no  longer  be 
considered  rare. 
Relative  risk  involves  comparing  a  risk  against  meaningful  refer-
ences.  Benchmarks  are  one  form  of  reference that do  not  necessarily  imply 
acceptability.  They  are  risks of  a similar nature that people  have  experi-
enced,  and  provide  a reference  to  real  conditions.  There  may,  of  course, 
be  uncertainty  in  the  reference  risk  estimate;  and,  if  this  range  of 
uncertainty is very  different from  that of  the estimate of  the  rare events, 
then  the  comparison  may  not  be  valid. 
c.  Dealing  With  Different  Levels  Of  Uncertainty  Among  Variables 
Even  when  the  magnitude  of  the  variables  are  identical,  either for 
the  probability of  occurence  or  the  magnitude  of  consequences,  different 
ranges  of  uncertainty  among  variables  can  lead  to  differing  interpreta-
tions  of  comparisons.  For  example,  is  a probability estimate  of  0.05  with 
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of  .06  with  a similar  error range  of  +.005?  This  is  a standard  problem  in 
applied  probability,  and  must  not  be  ignored. 
d.  Risk  Neutrality,  Aversion  And  Proneness 
As  demonstrated  by  Twersky  and  Kahnemen(1)  and  Rowe( 2)  individuals 
behave  differently in  how  they  compare  probablistic conditions  with  condi-
tions  of  certainty or  with  conditions  that  have  less  uncertainty than  the 
primary  conditions.  Three  kinds  of  behavior  have  been  identified.  The 
definitions  used  here  are  from  Smith(3): 
Risk  Neutral  - Indifferent  toward  a  fair  bet.  F·ive  dollars  with 
certainty and  a 50  percent  chance  of  ten  dollars  are  equally  attrac-
tive.  Tries  to  simply  maximize  expected  return.  Does  not  buy  insur-
ance  or  lottery tickets because  both  have  negative expected  returns. 
Risk-Averse  - Turns  down  fair  bets.  Prefers  five  dollars  to  a  50 
percent  chance  at  ten  do 11 ars.  Wi 11  sacrifice  expected  return  to 
reduce  risk.  Buys  insurance,  but  not  lottery tickets. 
Risk-Seeking  - (Risk  Prone)  Accepts  fair bets.  Prefers  a  50  percent 
chance  at ten  dollars to a sure five dollars. Will  sacrifice expected 
return  to  increase  risk.  Buys  lottery tickets,  but  not  insurance. 
Rowe( 2)  has  shown  that the range  of behavior toward  risks in  the probabili-
ty  range  of  a  0.01  to  0.001  chance  per  year  extend  over  four  orders  of 
magntude  in  comparing  the  gamble  at these probabilites versus  consequences 
occurring  with  certainty.  This  is  an  extremely  important  consideration  in 
the  evaluation  of  risks. 
e.  Degree  Of  Margins  Of  Safety  To  Be  Used 
In  dealing with  uncertainty in  risk estimates,  it may  be  important  to 
assure that the  actual  risk may  be  below  a specified value.  This  is done  by 
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choosing  models  that provide  conservative  (higher)  estimates  of  risk.  One 
way  to deal  with  these  uncertainties  is to use  margins  of safety.  Critical 
questions  must  be  addressed  in  using  this  approach: 
o  What  are  the  proper  uses  for  margins  of  safety? 
o  Who  establishes the  margins  of  safety? 
o  What  levels  of  safety are  needed? 
o  How  do  the  margins  of  safety  build  up  in  terms  of  an  overall 
margin  of  safety? 
o  How  much  do  the  margins  of  safety cost? 
Table  3.7,  in  addressing  the first item,  lists some  uses  of  margins 
of  safety  that  can  be  appropriately  app 1  i ed  in  risk  analysis.  The  1  ast 
question  is critical.  There  is nothing  wrong  with  using  margins  of  safety 
if we  determine  how·  much  it will  cost before  we  apply  them.  To  apply  such 
margins  without  regard to their implications  is ludicrous,  but  we  do  it all 
the  time.  The  problem  is  not  the  margins  of  safety  themselves,  but  the 
absence  of  even  a rudimentary  cost benefit  analysis  of  their application. 
In  dealing with  uncertainty,  whether  dealing with  risks or  any  other 
variable,  a point estimate of the value of  a variable by  itself provides  no 
information  on  the  uncertainties  involved.  An  interval estimate  is prefer-
red,  using  a range  of  risk estimates  to provide  both  the  level  of  risk  and 
a measure  of  its variability simultaneously.  This  dual  presentation of the 
risk estimate (i.e.,  level  and  variability)  is necessary to  provide  credi-
bility  to  the  analysis.  However,  in  this  case  for  use  of  margins  of 
safety,  the  interval  is  always  expressed  in  terms  of  the  increased  assur-
ance  that  the  real  risk  lies  below  a  given  estimate.  It  is  a  one  sided 
range  above  the  best  estimate  which  is the  lower  limit of  the  range.  The 
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BASIS  FOR  USE  OF  MARGINS  OF  SAFETY  IN  RISK  ANALYSIS 
1.  Ranges  of  Sensitivity  In  Exposed  Populations 
A.  Used  to  account  for  different sensitivities  in  population 
to  risks,  including  age,  sex,  genetic,  and  general  state of 
health factors. 
B.  Generally  not  more  than  a factor  of  2 or  3.  Factor  of  three 
has  been  used  in  radiation  protection*. 
2.  Inability to  Measure  Precisely or  Accurately 
A.  Exposure  Pathways  - Dispersion,  mixing,  deposition,  dilution, 
uptake,  metabolic  fate,  dose  levels  in  air,  water,  tissue,  etc. 
B.  Potency  - Dose/effect  relationships,  epidemiological  studies, 
animal  testing,  converting  animal  studies  to  man,etc. 
C.  Performance  - Measurement,  monitoring,  and  sampling  of  system 
performance  in  test  and  in  service. 
D.  Synergistic  And  Interactive Relationships. 
E.  Can  be  orders  of  magnitude,  depending  upon  measurement  capability 
and  limits  of  detection;  both  accuracy  and  precision  affected. 
3.  Lack  of  Information 
A.  Data  not  available  due  to  lack  of  resources  - Money,  time, 
capital  investment,  acquisition  sources,  data  validation  and 
storage,  data  analysis. 
i.  Data  is  beyond  reach  in  terms  of  reasonable  resources. 
ii.  Data  can  be  obtained,  but  requires  time  to  acquire 
which  is  too  long. 
iii.  Data  must  be  obtained  for  specific sites and  conditions 
as  needed. 
iv.  A trade  off must  be  made  in  terms  of  the  fineness 
of  the  data  versus  the  generic  use  level  desired, 
and  the  resources  involved. 
B.  Data  not  available  due  to  restrictions  - Confidentiality 
of  information,  regulatory restrictions  (privacy),  trade  secrets, 
etc. 
C.  At  the  limits  of  knowledge 
i.  Complexity  is  too  large  to  handle. 
ii.  Processes  and  conditions  not  repeatable or  too  rare 
to  obtain  data. 
iii.  Signal  to  noise  ratio too  low,  i.e.,  variance  of 
the  signal  too  large  compared  to  the  variations  in 
ambient  and  competing  information. 
D.  Many  orders  of  magnitude  in  uncertainty  involved,  but  can 
often  be  adjusted  to  the  decision  to  be  made  and  vice  versa. 
4.  Margin  For  Operational  Variations 
A.  Accounts  for  short  term  excursions  and  minor  abnormalities 
in  operational  practice. 
B.  Seldom  more  than  a factor  of  two. 
*Originally used  by  the  U.S.  Federal  Radiation  Council  to  take  into 
account  500  millirem  individual  exposure  to  the  population  at 170  millirems 
in  1960.  (ICRP  uses  .5  and  .1  mSV,  but  with  a different explanation). 
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each  variable  addressed: 
a)  realistic assumptions 
b)  conservative  assumptions 
c)  worst  case  assumptions 
These  will  be  defined  below.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  range 
between  the  realistic  and  worst  case  is  a  direct measure  of  the  level  of 
conservatism  used  to  encompass  the  range  of  uncertainty associated with  a 
variable for  which  margins  of  safety have  been  used .• 
3.2.4.  Determine  What  Measurements  Can  Be  Made  Versus  Cost  In  Terms  Of 
Time  And  Resources. 
This  step  is a basic analysis of the difficulty of gaining further informa-
tion  on  a  variable  versus  the  cost  in  getting  it.  One  wants· to  use  the  best 
scientific  means  available  and  affordable  to  get  the  data.  The  earlier report 
11Assessment  of  Comparative  and  Non-Comparative  Factors  In  Alternate  Energy  Sys-
tems ..  provides  a review  of  the  problems  in  acquiring  and  using.such  data. 
3.2.5.  In  The  Absence  Of  Direct  Measurements,  What  Models  Are  Needed  And 
How  May  They  Be  Verified? 
When  direct measurements  cannot  be  made,  models  are  used.  The  uncertainty 
in  the use  of  the models  must  be  established  a~d verified to the extent feasible. 
The  choice  of  models  which  tend  toward  the  conservative  practice of  overestima-
ting risks  is analagous  to using  margins  of  safety. This  means,  that  an  interval 
estimate  of  model  uncertainty is appropriate.  One  can,  in  this case  show  models 
which  are  less  conservative  than  the  realistic estimate  as  well  as  conservative 
and  worst  cases  to  show  the  total  range  of  uncertainty.  The  only  selection 
criteria for making  one  model  more  appropriate than  others  is the  reasonableness 
of the model  and  the degree of conservatism  involved.  Conservatism  is expensive, 
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used. 
3.2.6.  Establish The  Kinds  Of  Margins  Of  Safety That  Will  Be  Required,  And 
Estimate  The  Impact  Of  These  Safety Margins  On  Cost  And  Benefits. 
All  of  the  conservatisms  and  margins  of  safety to be  used  should  be  deter-
mined.  The  manner  in  which  these  conservatisms  propagate  must  be  examined,  and 
the  total  margins  of  safety  in  the  analysis  determined  to  the  extent  possible. 
The  cost  of  the  margins  of  safety may  then  be  determined  by  going  back  to  the 
decision framework,  and  determining  how  the choice of  alternatives will  change  as 
margins  of  safety are  varied.  It is important  to realize that increasing a margin 
of  safety  does  not  decrease  the  actua 1  risk  that  may  be  experienced  for  an 
a  1  tern  at  i ve,  but  only  increases  the  confidence  that  the  estimate  bounds  the 
actual  risk.  The  cost  of  selecting  a  more  costly  alternative  is  traded  off 
against  the  increased  confidence  in  the  risk  estimate.  This  increased  cost  is 
sometimes  erroneously  equated  with  increased  credibility. 
The  important  thing to note  is,  that for  this decision framework,  the  cost 
of  margins  of  safety are obtained directly by  determining  whether  a change  in  the 
margin  of  safety,  without  a  change  in  the  basic  data,  will  cause  a  different 
alternative to be  selected.  If no  changes  are  forced,  then  the margins  of  safety 
do  not  affect cost. 
3.2.7.  Adopt  Cost-Effective  Strategies  For  Obtaining  The  Needed  Precision 
In  Terms  of  Interval  Estimates  Of  Risk. 
The  cost of  acquiring  data  along  with  ranges  of  uncertainty about  the  data 
is  usually traded-off  against  the  value  of  the  additional  data  in  resolving  the 
decision.  In  this framework  the  cost of  more  precise data  is  only  justified when 
the  reduced  uncertainty in  a critical decision  variable will  possibly affect the 
choice  among  alternatives. 
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The  Robustness  Of  The  Joint Analysis 
All  of  the  uncertainties addressed  in  the the  previous  step must  be  identi-
fied,  and  an  error  analysis  made  on  how  the  uncertainties  propagate.  If changes 
in  data,  such  as  getting more  precise  and  accurate measurements,  better verified 
models,  and  narrower  margins  of  safety,  or  means  for  minimizing  the  impact  of 
differing  interpretations of  data  can  be  identified which  would  make  the  choice 
among  alternatives  more  reasonable,  these  limitations  should  be  identified.  It 
may  not  be  possible  to  obtain  these  requirements  because  of  time,  cost  and 
measurement  limitations. These  limitations should  be  identified.  Having  identi-
fied  them,  the  complement  procedure  is  to  indicate  how  well  the  analysis  to  be 
undertaken,  including  the  uncerta1nties,  will  help  in  resolving  the  decision 
among  alternatives.  This  is  called  the  robustness  of  the  analysis.  A robust 
analysis  need  not  be  precise,  but  sufficiently adequate  to  assure that an  altern-
ative may  be  decisively selected. 
3.4  Step  13.  Provide  A Report  On  The  Top-down  Analysis,  Providing 
Specifications,  Limitations,  And  Recommendations. 
Once  the  first  twelve  steps  are  completed,  a  report  should  be  prepared 
summarizing  the  findings  and  specifying  the  bottom-up  risk  analysis  require-
ments.  In  some  cases  the top-down  analysis may  in  itself provide  adequate  inform-
ation  to make  a decision  among  alternatives.  If this  is the  case,  this will  be  a 
final  report.  Otherwise  it will  be  an  interim report,  and  will  also  be  a specifi-
cation  for  the  subsequent  analyses.  In  any  case  the  structure  of  the  report 
should  be  similar to  the  presentation  of  results  discussed  in  the  next  Chapter. 
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4.0  IMPLEMENTING,  ANALYZING  AND  PRESENTING  THE  RESULTS  OF  THE  ANALYSIS 
In  this Chapter  we  examine  the  remaining  steps  in  carrying out  the  generic 
analysis.  This  covers  acquiring  and  analyzing  the  data.  And  reconciling  the 
results  and  presenting  them. 
4.1  (Part  C.)  Data  Acquisition 
4.1.1.  Step  14.  - Conduct  Required  Studies  To  Obtain  Required  Information: 
This  step  is straight forward.  It involves  scheduling time  and  resources  to 
conduct  the  necessary  studies. 
4.1.2.  Step  15.  - Acquire  The  Data: 
Acquire  the  data,  using  the  best  scientific  approaches  available,  within 
the  resources  allocated.  Determine  the  measurement  errors  entailed  in  results 
of  the  measurements.  Depending  on  data  needs  this  can  be  a  long  and  expensive 
process.  Thus,  it  is  important  to  ascertain  that  the  data  acquired  wi 11  be 
useful  in  selecting  an  alternative as  specified  in  the  previous  steps. 
4.2  (Part  D.)  Implement  The  Analysis 
4.2.1.  Step  16.  - Conduct  The  Analysis 
4.2.1.1.  Separation  Of  Risk  Parameters 
In  conducting  the  analysis  for  critical  parameters  involving  risk,  the 
separation  of  different  risk  mechanisms  is  desirable.  Since  only  a  few  cate-
gories exist, the  risks from  these mechanisms  should  not  be  aggregated,  but  left 
as  separate  results for the  decision makers.  The  framework  has  been  set  up  with 
this  in  mind.  In  analyzing  the  results,  significant risk factors for a proposed 
or  ongoing  activity may  occur  from  any  one  of  three  different  mechanisms:  1) 
normal  operations,  2)  abnormal  operations,  and  3)  rare  events  as  indicated  in 
the  critical  variables  for  risk. 
Normal  operations  refer  to  the  everyday  operational  procedures  that  are 
carried out  in  any  undertaking  and  take  into  account  the  variations  that 
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manner  in  which  the  system  is  designed  to  work  for  all  parts  of  the  fuel 
cycle.  Risks  from  normal  operations  involve  releases  of  pollutents  and 
radiation  to  the  environment  and  the  general  public  and  to  workers. 
Abnormal  operation  takes  into  account  special  conditions  that  may  rarely 
occur,  lead  to higher  risk exposure  than  for normal  operations,  and  involve 
excursions  beyond  normal  procedures.  The  abnormal  conditions  may  arise 
from  changes  in  demand,  equipment  breakdown,  environmental  stress and  hum-
an  error.  Never-the-less,  these  conditions  may  be  anticipated,  and  have 
been  incorporated  into  system  design.  A design  basis  accident  in  a nuclear 
system  is  an  example  of  an  extreme,  but  abnormal  event. 
Rare  Events  are both  expected  and  unexpected  conditions,  leading to  a range 
of  exposures  to risks.  In  the  expected  case  the  events  are  anticipated  to 
be  so  rare,  as  to,  hopefully,  not  occur  within  the  life of  the  system.  In 
nuclear  energy  systems  these  would  be  called  accidents  beyond  the  design 
basis  accident.  Unanticipated  events  are  surprises,  hopefully  rare,  but 
for  which  the  system  has  not  been  specifically designed  to  cope. 
There  are  sever a  1  different  consequences  that  must  be  addressed  for  abnormal 
operations  and  rare  events  which  will  have  different  probabilities,  and  should 
not  be  aggregated  prematurely.  These  are: 
Vulnerability  To  Disruption  - Loss  of  power  production  for  short  or  long 
periods  as  a  result of  accidents  or  sabotage  or  civil  disturbances.  This 
includes  both  operating  losses  and  loss  of  capital  investments. 
Injury,  Illness and  Fatalities- Events  leading to direct trauma  or disease 
leading  to  to  injury,  illness and  premature  death.  The  event  may  lead  to a 
range  of  number  of  people  affected,  both  workers  and  the  general  public. 
Classifcation  by  magnitude  of  consequence  is  desirable. 
Irreversible Environmental  Damage  - Events  leading to severe  environmental 
damage  that may  be  irreversible in  either the  short  or  long  run.  Both  the 
time  element  and  the  amount  of  damage  must  be  considerd. 
4.2.1.2.  Uncertainty,  Interval  Estimates  And  Error  Propagation 
For  each  mechanism,  the  uncertainty in  the  historic data  and  the  scenarios 
used  to  describe  particular  exposure  situations,  make  a  point  estimate  of  risk 
inadequate.  Interval  estimates  are  needed  for  each  variable  and  their  combina-
tion.  Interval  estimates for measurement  uncertainty,  model  uncertainty,  and  use 
of margins  of  safety all have  different characteristics, and  the  way  they  combine 
additively or  multiplicatively -also  is different  in  each  case. 
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Interval  estimates  for  uncertainty  in  the  measurement  are  made  up  of  the 
usual  ·limits  for  any  measurement.  The  range  of  the  interval  can  be  the  actual 
range  of  measurement  uncertainty or  it may  involve  the  use  of  statistical confi-
dence  limits  around  a most  likely value  to  account  for  random  error  in  measure-
ment. 
Probabalistic  risk  analysis  is  a  useful  tool  for  ascertaining  probabili-
ties that  can  be  directly measured.  However  for  rare  events,  the  uncertainty 
ranges  may  be  so  wide  as  to  be  useless.  On  the otherhand  relative risk estimates 
are  very  useful  for  system  safety studies such  as  finding  weak  links  or  determi-
ning  where  to spend  additional  safety resources most  effectively.  Some  approach-
es  for  the  development  of  interval  estimates  for  measurement  uncertainty  in 
variables  are  provided  in  Table  4.1. 
b.  Model  Uncertainty 
There  are  two  aspects  to model  uncertainty:  1)  the  uncertainty  in  specific 
models  and  2)  the  uncertainty in  choice of  appropriate models.  In  the first case, 
the  model  used  will  itself  provide  a  measure  of  the  uncertainty  limits  in  the 
form  of  measurement  uncertainty.  However,  for  the  more  important  case,  the 
choice  of  models,  the  only  criteria for  limiting model  uncertainty derives  from 
the  limits  that  can  be  verified  by  actual  testing  and  tests  of  reasonableness. 
The  tests of  reasonableness  are  useful  for excluding  models  that one  is sure  are 
inapplicable. 
For  rare  events  the  use  of  modelled  estimates  and  system  structuring  to 
determine  the  probab i 1  i ty  of  events  i nvo 1  ve  mode 1  s  s i nee  they  are  themse 1  ves 
models.  There  are  a number  of  assumptions  which  may  be  unverifiable: 
o  Completeness  of  identifying  all  possible events  or  faults  on  a tree 
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GUIDELINES  FOR  INTERVAL  ESTIMATES  FOR  MEASUREMENT  UNCERTAINTY 
BEST  ESTIMATE  Maximum  likelihood  estimator 
UPPER  LIMIT  Highest  value  measured 
LOWER  LIMIT  Lowest  value  found  or  the  resolution  of  measurement 
technique 
STATISTICAL  ASPECTS  Confidence  limits  around  a  measure  of  central 
tendency.  for  probability  based  upon  a  frequentist 
approach,  the  standard  deviation  of  a rare event  is 
1 
(np(l-p)  )~  where  p  is  the  best  estimate  of 
probability of  occurrence. 
ADDITIVE  PROPAGATION  Add  best  estimates  and  show  the  largest  confidence 
limits.  Variables  whose  value  and  ranges  of 
uncertainty  are  a small  fraction  of  the  uncertainty 
in  the  least  certain  variables  may  be  deleted  from 
further  consideration  after stating why. 
MULTIPLICATIVE  PROP.  Confidence  limits  are  derived  using  a  standard 
deviation derived  from the square  root  of  the  sum  of 
the  variances  or  other  simi 1  ar  statistics  for  the 
upper  and  lower  bound  estimates. 
INTERVAL  Use  statistical confidence  limits to extent possible 
with  the  most  likelihood  estimator  as  a mid-point. 
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o  For  system  structuring:  Does  the  system  behave  as  its  parts  would 
predict? 
o  For  modelled  estimates:  Are  the  models  used  applicable  to  the  case 
understudy? 
o  Taking  into  account  multiple,  simultaneous  failues  in  a fault tree, 
including  intermittent events. 
Table  4.2  provides  some  for  making  interval  estimates  of  the  uncertainty 
due  to  selection of  models  which  cannot  be  directly verified. 
Note  that  mode 1  uncertainty  from  the  part  i cu 1  ar  mode 1  s  chosen  must  be 
additionally addressed  to  that of  model  choice  uncertainty. 
c.  Use  Of  Margins  Of  Safety 
Margins  of  safety are  used  to  provide  degrees  of  conservatism  whereby  the 
degree  of  confidence  that actual  risk  lies below  an  estimate  is  increased.  This 
is  a one  sided  measure.  It may  be  used  for  any  of  the  reasons  suggested  in  Table 
3.6.  Table  4.3  provides  some  considerations  for  establishing  interval  estimates 
of  the  degree  of  safety afforded. 
It is  important  to  leave  an  audit  trail  of  any  variables  discarded,  i.e., 
it is  important  to  state negative  as  well  as  positive results explicitly. 
4.2.1.3 Steps  In  Environmental  Risks  Determination 
Most  readers will  be  familiar with  the bottom-up  approach  to  risk  analysis. 
For  example,  the  process  of  estimating  the  risk  to  humans  from  a  number  of 
eff  1  uents  from  energy  producing  sys terns  i nvo 1  ves  sever a  1  generic  steps.  Con-
sider  as  illustrative  effluents  radiation  from  a  nuclear  power  plant,  toxic 
hydrocarbons  in  coal  emissions  and  stack  cleaning  residues,  and  nitrogen  dioxide 
from  fuel  combustion  of  natural  gas. 
1)  Source  Term. 
Amount  of  each  substance  released  to  the  environment.  For  a  particular 
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GUIDELINES  FOR  INTERVAL  ESTIMATES  FOR  MODEL  CHOICE  UNCERTAINTY 
BEST  ESTIMATE 
UPPER  LIMIT 
LOWER  LIMIT 
The  v  a  1  ue  judgement  of  the  analyst  or  a  group  of 
experts  is often  employed  to  select the  model  which 
is  thought  to  be  most  realistic. 
The  model  which  provides  highest  value  below  that 
level  which  can  be  experimentally  verified. 
The  model  which  provides  the  lowest  value  found  and 
may  include  zero.  For  example,  in  extrapolating 
effects measured  at  high  doses  to effects postulated 
at  low  doses,  the  possibility of  no  effect cannot  be 
excluded. 
STATISTICAL  ASPECTS  There  are  no  statistical aspects  as  to model  choice. 
As  long  as  models  are  deemed  reasonable  they  are  all 
equally  likely until  verified. 
ADDITIVE  PROPAGATION  Add  the  results  of  using  the  models  that  provide 
lowest,  best  and  highest  estimates  each, 
respectively.  Variables  whose  value  and  ranges 
uncertainty  are  a small  fraction  of  the  uncertainty 
the  least  certain  variables  may  be  deleted  from 
further  consideration  after stating why. 
MULTIPLICATIVE  PROP.  Multiply  the  results  of  using  the  models  that 
provide  the  lowest,  best  and  highest  estimates, 
respectively. 
INTERVAL  The  range  of  the  lowest  and  highest  results.  The 
best  estimate  may  also  be  given  as  a  point  in 
between  the  limits. 
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GUIDELINES  FOR  INTERVAL  ESTIMATES  TO  EXPRESS  MARGINS  OF  SAFETY 
BEST  ESTIMATE  The  most  realistic estimate.  Does  not  use  margins  of 
safety.  Can  represent  a  50  percent  assurance  that 
actual  risk  lies below  the  estimate. 
UPPER  LIMIT  Worst  case  estimate  where  one  is  sure  the  actua 1 
lies below  the  estimate. 
LOWER  LIMIT  The  most  realistic  estimate  without  margins  of 
safety.  The  same  as  the  best  estimate. 
MID-RANGE  ESTIMATE  - A conservative  estimate  using  adequate  margins  of 
safety  to  provide  a  very  high  confidence  that  the 
actual  risk  lies below  the  estimate. 
STATISTICAL  ASPECTS  There  are  no  statist  i ca 1  aspects  except  for 
expressing the degree  of  confidence  one  has  that the 
actual  risk  lies below  a given  estimate.  The  degree 
of  confidence  here  is  not  statistically based,  but 
acts  somewhat  like confidence  limits. 
ADDITIVE  PROPAGATION  Add  the  results  using  the  realistic,  conservative 
and  worst  case  estimates  respectively.  Variables 
whose  value  and  ranges  of  uncertainty  are  a  small 
fraction  of  the  uncertainty  in  the  least  certain 
variables  may  be  deleted  from  further  consideration 
after stating  and  documenting  why. 
MULTIPLICATIVE  PROP.  Multiply  the  results  of  using  the  realistic, 
conservative  and  worst  case  estimates, 
respectively.  The  resulting  values  for  each  case 
form  the  new  range. 
INTERVAL  The  range  between  the  realistic  and  worst  case 
estimates  with  the  conservative  estimate  as  a point 
in  between  the  limits. 
- 81  -energy  this  involves  the  measurement  of  the  manufacture  and  natural  production 
(if it occurs)  of  the  emissons  for  each  part of  the  fuel  cycle.  For  a specific, 
continuous  release the  concentration  and  amount  of  each  substance,  as  well  as  its 
physical  and  chemical  form  must  be  determined.  For  an  accidental  release,  the 
probabilities  of  the  accidents  and  the  probable  amount  of  release  is  needed  in 
addition  to  the  concentration  and  amount. 
2)  Pathways. 
Release  pathways  to  the  environment  via  air,  water,  food,  direct  contact 
must  all  be  estimated  leading  to  intake  by  exposed  humans  through  inhalation, 
ingestion  and  dermal  absorbtion. 
3)  Metabolic  Pathways  and  Fate. 
Metabolic  behavior  of  the  substances  in  the  body  must  be  established. The  toxici-
ty of  metabolic  products  must  also  be  determined. 
4)  Dose  Estimate. 
Estimation  of  the  concentration  at specific organ  sites along  with  a time  profile 
of the dose  to each  organ.  Persistance of  the  substances  in  the environment,  and 
existing ambient  levels  must  be  added  to  the  dose  from  the  pathway. 
5)  Dose-Effect  Relationship. 
Conversion  of  the  dose  to  a  designated  individual  (real  or  hypothetical 
such  as  a maximum  exposed  individual)  via  relationships between  dose  and  effect 
established by  epidemeolgical  studies, tests in  man,  tests in  animals,  and  cellu-
lar  level  tests.  Extrapolation  from  animal  to  man  and  from  high  doses  at which 
tests  are  made  to  the  low  doses  at which  exposure  takes  place require models  for 
extrapolation  which  cannot  often  be  verified  as  to  their  validity  for  such 
extrapolation.  Cancer  from  radioactive  iodine  or  toxic  organic  chemicals  use 
non-threshold  relationships  while  nitrogen  dioxide  has  a  No  Observable  Effect 
Level  (NOEL)  in  humans  and  animals  for  increased  susceptibilty  to  respiratory 
- 82  -diseases.  Cancer  can  be  fatal,  while  the  upper  respiratory  diseases  are  seldom 
fatal. 
6)  Individual  Risk  Estimate. 
Estimates  of  the  risk  to  the  maximum  and/or  average  exposed  individuals, 
taking  into account  cumulative  effects,  time  profile of  the  exposure,  and  sensi-
tive  members  of  the  population,  are  then  derived  from  the  dose-response  rela-
tionships. 
7)  Population  Risk  Estimates. 
The  population  risk is determined  by  integrating the  individual  estimation 
of  risk  over  the  population  based  upon  the  dose  to  each  member.  Because  of  the 
difficulty of  carrying  out  such  measurements,  often  the  average  exposed  indivi-
dual  risk  is estimated,  and  simply multiplied  by  the  number  of  people  exposed  to 
get  a crude  estimate  of  the  population  risk. 
This  type  of  approach  means  acquiring  very  1  arge  amounts  of  data  and 
measurements  at the detailed level  at each  step,  and  then  progressively aggregat-
ing  the  analysis  as  one  procedes  from  the  first  to  last  step.  This  is  a  slow, 
very  expensive  process.  What  do  you  have  when  you  get  hone?  Because  of  large 
uncertainties  there  are  often  meaningless  results.  For  example,  Table  4.4  pro-
vides  an  estimate  of  the model  uncertainty ranges  in  the models  used  in  carrying 
out  each  step above  for three different effluents  illustrated. These  uncertainty 
ranges  do  not  address  measurement  uncertainty,  use  of margins  of  safety, or  value 
diversity in  interpretation of  results. These  uncertain ties are  associated with 
how  closely the  models  describe  the  actual  situation,  and  they  do  not  take  into 
account  any  uncertainty  in  the  use  of  particular models.  The  model  ranges  used 
represent  the  interval  between  reasonable  best  and  upper  estimates.  That  is, the 
range  has  actually been  limited by  cutting off the  lower  end  of  the  interval.  For 
this bottom  up  model,  the  error propagate  multiplicatively.  The  progression  is 
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 explained  in  the previous  section for model  choice uncertainty.  The  low  multipli-
cative range  represents  the  best  estimate  interval,  the  high  range  is  the  upper 
limit  interval. 
It is  interesting to  note  the  wide  difference  in  model  choice  uncertainty 
for these three substances.  More  is known  about  radiation effects than  for either 
toxic  chemicals  or  combustion  gases,  and  better models  are  available for  radia-
tion effects.  Radiation  should  not  be  penalized  because  its risks can  be  estima-
ted  with  less  model  (and  measurement)  uncertainty then  the  other effluents. 
4.3  (Part  E.)  Merge  The  Results  Of  The  Bottom-up  Analysis  Into  The  Framework 
4.3.1 Step  17.  -Reduce The  Conclusions  To  The  Implications  Of  Alternative 
Policy Options  Based  Upon  The  Analysis 
The  data from  the bottom-up  analyses  are merged  into the  decision  framework 
in  terms  of  the  particular  studies  that  were  required  to  address  indecision  of 
selection  of  alternatives.  In  this  case  the  interval  estimates  are  used  to 
provide  insight  into  the  levels  of  uncertainty.  The  width  of  the  uncertainty 
intervals is a direct measure  of  the  uncertainty.  The  difficulties  in  developing 
these  levels  arises  in  the  manner  in  which  the  uncertainties  are  combined.  This 
must  be  done  on  a  case  by  case  basis.  However,  since  the  results  for  normal, 
abnormal  and  rare event  cases  are  all evaluated separately,  the uncertainties and 
general  levels  of  probability will  be  approximately  the  same  order  of  magnitude 
for  each  case.  This  is  a major  reason  for  keeping  these  cases  separate. 
Should  the  intervals  of  uncertainty overlap  the  critical  decision  values, 
then  the  bottom-up  analysis will  apparently not  have  helped  in  the  resolution of 
the  decision  at first glance.  However,  one  can  trade-off margins  of  safety to 
determine  how  much  of  these margins  must  be  reduced  to provide  a decision one  way 
or  the  other. 
- 85  -The  primary  use  of  the  bottom-up  analysis  is  to  provide  the  input  of  the 
studies needed  for the  decision  framework,  and  for  determining  the  probabilities 
of  the  critical  conditional  variables  and/or  scenarios. 
4.4.  (Part  F.)  Present  The  Results  Of  The  Analysis 
The  presentation of the results of the analysis  is critical. A final  report 
should  have  at  least two  and  possibly three parts  to  it. The  first is the body  of 
the  report  which  is  addressed  primarily  to  the  technical  community.  It  should 
provide  means  to  allow  any  competent  technical  person  to  be  able  to  repeat  and 
verify  the  results  of  the  analysis.  The  analysis  should  show  the  analytical 
conclusions,  present  error  and  uncertainty  ranges  of  results,  identify  where 
margins  of safety have  been  used  and  how  they  aggregate,  and  indicate any  techni-
cal  value  judgements  that  have  been  made.  These  latter judgements  address  such 
items  as  the  criteria  used  for  establishing  realistic,  conservative  and  worst 
case  assumptions,  definitions of normal  and  abnormal  operations  and  rare events, 
and  interpretations of  measurements. 
The  second  part  is  aimed  at policy makers  and  risk managers  and  the general 
public,  although  a  separate  presentation  for  the  public  may  be  warranted.  This 
second  part  shou 1  d  generally  be  an  executive  summary  of  the  first  part,  but 
without  any  more  of  the  technical  material  than  absolutely necessary. 
4.4.1.  Step  18.  - Executive  Summary  And  Policy Analysis  Document 
The  executive  summary  is  the  primary  policy  analysis  document.  It should 
address  all  the critical parameters  in  the decision framework.  The  results should 
be  shown  in  terms  of  the  decision  framework.  Normal,  abnormal,  accident  and  rare 
event  conditions  should  be  addressed  separately to  the  extent  that  they  need  be 
addressed  in  the  framework.  Absolute  probability  and  risk  estimates  should  be 
put  into  perspective  by  comparing  them  to  similar  benchmark  risks  for  which 
people  are  familiar  and  can  directly relate.  In  this manner  all  relative  risk 
• 86  -. estimates  among  alternatives  need  only  be  considered  on  a  relative  basis,  and 
absolute  risk  may  be  derived  by 
11pegging
11  one  of  the  alternatives to  a familiar 
absolute  benchmark.  In  many  cases  the presently used  alternative may  serve  as  the 
benchmark  and 
11peg ..  for  the  abso 1  ute  risk.  Whatever  the  benchmark,  it  shou 1  d 
also  be  presented  in  terms  of  an  interval  estimate as  well  to make  valid compari-
sons  over  the  whole  uncertainty  intervals. 
Once  the  absolute  estimate  is  put  into  perspective,  the  relative  risk  of 
alternatives  may  be  described.  This  may  be  done  in  semi-quantitative  terms  by 
comparing  the  interval  range  of  risks with  each  other.  Gross  descriptors  of  the 
risk  comparison  may  be  defined  in  qualitative  terms;  e.g.,  higher,  same,  much 
lower,  etc.  each  representing  a  range  of  comparison  of  risk  intervals  which 
easily may  encompass  two  orders  of  magnitude.  These  formal  descriptors  provide 
for  a measure  of  comparative  risk  with  their  relative  uncertainties  taken  into 
account.  Table  4.5  provides  an  example  of  one  set of  gross  descriptors  we  have 
used  in  another  type  risk  analysis,  that  might  be  appropriate  for  alternative 
energy  systems. 
The  important  point  is  that  the  executive  summary  should  provide  informa-
tion  in  terms  the  decision  maker  and  the  public  can  understand. 
4.4.2.  Step  19.  - Presentation  Of  Technical  Backup  Documents 
The  details  of  the  study  and  framework  for  analysis  must  be  put  together 
into  a technical  report for  the  technical  community  to  use.  It must  provide  the 
framework  itself,  the  supporting  analyses  with  all  the  uncertainties designated, 
and  with  all  assumptions  explicitly shown.  It should  provide  an  audit  trail  so 
that a competent  technical  person  can  retrace all  of  the  steps.  Technical  appen-
dices  can  be  used  to  detail  the  specific bottom-up  analyses  undertaken. 
- 87  -TABLE  4.5 
SOME  GROSS  COMPARISON  LEVELS  USING  INTERVAL  ESTIMATES 
GROSS  COMPARATIVE  RISK  NUMBER  OF  DIFFERENCE 
DESCRIPTORS  ESTIMATES*  FACTORS 
SAME  2 of  3  Less  than -5 
SLIGHTLY  HIGHER  (OR  LOWER)  2 of  3  Greater  than  5 
HIGHER  (OR  LOWER)  All  3  Between  5 and  100 
MUCH  HIGHER  (OR  LOWER)  All  3  Between  100  and  10,000 
VERY  MUCH  HIGHER  (OR  LOWER)  A  11  3  Greater  than  10,000 
*Refers to the three estimates made:  realistic, conservative,  and  worst  case,  or 
lower,  mid-range,  upper  limit  as  appropriate. 
- 88  -PART  II .. 
OTHER  FACTORS  IN  IMPLEMENTING  THE  FRAMEWORK 
There  are  a variety of  other factors  involved  in  carrying out  the  decision 
framework.  This  part  deals  with  a  number  of  these. 
Chapter  5.  Matching  Users  and  Uses  Of  Risk  Analysis 
Chapter  6.  Benefit  Considerations 
Chapter  7.  Special  Issues  For  Alternative  Energy  Systems 
- 09  -CHAPTER  5 
5.0  MATCHING  USES  AND  USERS  OF  RISK  ANALYSES  FOR  ALTERNATE  ENERGY  SYSTEMS 
As  stated  in  the  first report,  the  uses  of  analyses  may  be  categorized  by 
two  classifications,  particularly  when  addressing  risk  analysis  of  alternate 
energy  sources.  The  first  classification  is  based  upon  the  application  of  the 
analysis,  and  ranges  from  site specific studies to global  analyses,  i.e., a range 
from  micro  to  macro  analyses.  The  second  concerns  the  range  of  users  and  their 
purposes.  This  includes  policy  setting  groups  such  as  utilities,  communities, 
local,  regional  and  national  authorities,  and  international  organizations;  the 
technical  community  consisting  of  scientists,  engineers,  economists,  environ-
mentalists,  etc.;  and  the  general  public. 
These  two  classifications are  not  independent  since the  level  at  which  a 
decision  is  being  made  and  the  degree  to  which  the  analysis  is  an  input  to  a 
decision  reflects whether  a  study  will  focus  on  either micro  or  macro  aspects. 
5.1  CLASSIFICATION  BY  SCOPE  OF  APPLICATION  OF  ANALYSIS 
The  scope  of  application of  a risk  analysis depends,  in  turn,  on  the  scope 
of  the  project  undertaken  by  a  project  sponsor.  Table  2.1  lists  the  range  of 
scopes  of  projects  in  the  energy  field  for  which  risk  analyses  of  alternate 
systems  are carried out. This  list is from  the  initial  study  and  the descriptions 
below  are  abstracted  from  that  study. 
5. 1.1  Site Specific Studies 
Site specific studies  are  concerned  with  selecting  an  energy  option  for  a 
particular site.  Not  only  is  the  type  of  energy  source  an  alternative,  but  the 
particular technology  within  an  energy  source  is  also  important.  If one  is to 
use  coal,  the  kind  of coal  (hard,  soft,  lignite),  the  kind  of  combustion  process 
and  the  type  of  stack  cleaning  process  are  examples  of  parameters  which  change 
within  an  energy  alternative. 
- 90  -5. 1.2  Utility Planning  Studies 
A utility,  in  planning  for  future  expansion  to  meet  anticipated  demand, 
must  make  analyses  to  determine  the  number  and  proper  mix  of  alternative energy 
sources  to  be  installed  on  a  future  time  table.  Both  external  studies  across 
types  of energy  sources  and  internal  studies for  variations within  energy  sources 
must  be  addressed.  While  specific sites may  or  may  not  be  selected,  a utility 
can  address  the  problems  of  sources  of  energy,  price,  investment  patterns,  and 
local  demand  in  their  service  areas.  Availability  and  reliability  of  fuel 
supply,  transportation  and  price  fluctuation,  investment  patterns,  etc.,  a  11 
enter  into  such  studies. 
5.1.3  Power  Grid  Planning  Studies 
When  more  than  a  single  utility  is  part  of  a  power  grid,  the  sources  of 
energy  must  be  studied  from  a  broader  purview.  Forecasting  of  demand  for  base 
load  and  reserve,  reliability of· supply,  and  effect of  loss  of  a base  load  plant 
of  large  size on  the  grid  become  important  factors. 
5.1.4 National  Energy  Supply  Planning 
National  authorities planning  to  meet  national  demand  forecasts  must  take 
into  account  balance  of  payments,  national  security  in  terms  of  external  fuel 
supply  interruption,  integration of  national  and  international  needs.  The  state 
of  industrial  development  of  a  nation  -- industrialized,  developing,  underde-
veloped  -- the  existence  of  domestic  energy  resources,  the  size and  location  of 
the nation  and  its type of government  affect the  type  of  study to be  made  and  its 
scope.  Environmental  impacts  on  a national  scale and,  perhaps,  an  international 
scale  for  pollution  crossing  national  boundaries  are  required,  e.g.,  acid  rain 
from  the  combustion  of  coal. 
•  91  • 5.1.5 Global  Planning 
Studies  are  necessary  to  address  the  global  impact  of  environmental  pro-
blems  of  energy  production.  Acid  rain, the  "greenhouse"  effect from  the  burning 
of  fossil  fuels,  global  impact  of  radioactive  materials  such  as  c14,  H 3,  I129, 
Kr85,  Tc99,  change  in  the  libido due  to use  of  biomass,  etc.  are  examples.  Such 
studies generally ignore the site specific aspects of energy production  and  focus 
on  the  broad  impact  which  often  cannot  be  addressed  with  much  certainty.  The 
focus  is  on  scientific aspects  of  global  environmental  impacts. 
5.1.6  International  Energy  Planning 
The  scarcity of  fuels,  new  investment  and  exploration  opportunities,  eco-
nomic  cartels,  balance  of  payments,  international  borrowing  and  investment  make 
international  economic  analyses  of  alternative energy  sources  important.  These 
are  different from  the  global  environmental  impact  analyses  since  they  focus  on 
economic  matters  and  interests.  Nevertheless,  these  analyses·  must  also  take 
environmental  impact  into  account,  at  least  environmental  limitations,  if  not 
measures  for  reducing  impact. 
5.1.7 Special  Purpose  Analyses 
There  are  a number  of  different special  purpose  analyses  which  often  must 
be  made  and  some  are  listed here. 
Energy  Sub-systems  Investment  - Overall  analysis  of  short  and  long  term 
trends to  determine  investment  in  fuel  exploration  and  development,  trans-
portation  of  fuels,  alternate  energy  technologies,  waste  and  pollution 
control  industries. 
Evaluation  of  Potential  Problems  in  New  Energy  Sources  - As  new  energy 
sources  are  developed,  it is  important  to  identify potential  environmental 
and  health  problems  early  in  the  development.  Such  analysis  should  not 
attempt  to  prejudice  such  sources,  but  only  identify  potential  problems 
- 92  -and  how  they  can  be  miti·gated.  A good  example  of  such  a  program  is  the 
Health  and  Environmental  Risk  Analysis  Program  of  the  United  States  De-
partment  of  Energy•s  Office  of  Research  Analysis  and  their development  of 
Health  and  Environmental  Effects  Document  (HEEDS)  series of  reports --
11The 
principal  objective of  these  analyses  is  to  assist  in  the  management  of  a 
program  of  health  and  environmental  research  that will  provide  information 
necessary  to  reduce  uncertainties  in  critical  areas.
11 
To  Support  or  Reject  an  Energy  Option  - Protagonist  or  antagonist  special 
interest  groups  providing  either  micro  or  macro  analyses,  or  both,  in 
support  of  their particular position. 
5.2  CLASSIFICATION  BY  OBJECTIVES  AND  USES  OF  THE  ANALYSIS 
There  seems  to  a  pervading  notion  that  there  is  only  one  type  of  risk 
analysis.  This  is  far  from  the  case;  there  are  a  spectrum  of  different  risk 
analyses  based  upon  how  they  are  to  be  used.  Table  2.2  provides  a categorization 
of  some  different  uses,  each  requiring  different  approaches  for  analysis.  This 
set  is  an  expanded  version  of  the  set of  uses  described  in  the  first report. 
5.2.1  Project  Sponsor  Objectives  And  Biases 
It  is first  necessary  to  consider  the  objectives  of  an  analysis  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  sponsor.  A look  at  some  of  the  sponsor  biases  present  in 
analyses  provides  an  initial  classification.  An  analysis  may  be  classifed  as 
defensive,  offensive,  and,  perhaps,  neutral.  A defensive  risk  analysis  attempts 
to  demonstrate  that  an  estimated  level  of  risk  is  acceptable.  Essentially the 
sponsor  is  attempting  to  show  that  risk  levels  for  the  project  in  question  are 
acceptably  low,  that is, defend  his  project.  An  offensive risk analysis attempts 
to  demonstrate  that  an  estimated  level  of  risk  is unacceptable.  It represents  a 
cha 11 enge  to  an  existing  or  proposed  risk  1  eve 1.  Conversely,  a  neutra  1  risk 
- 93  -analysis  is  one  where  no  predisposition  exists  as  to  the  acceptability of  fin-
dings. 
It  is  an  overgeneralization  to  say  that  the  first  represents  government 
regulators,  the  second  represents  industry,  and  the  latter  represents  the  im-
partial  scientist,  since  most  analyses  are  made  with  good  intentions  to  do  the 
best  job  possible but  from  a predisposed  background.  Moreover,  if a scientist is 
a  promoter  of  a  particular  methodolgy,  or  is  trying  to  establish  a  scientific 
reputation  to  acquire  funding  or  status,  or  has  a  particular mind  set about  the 
risks  involved  (such  as  protection  of  public  health  as  a  primary  objective), 
scientific neutrality may  also  be  lacking. 
There  is  a  much  more  subtle  aspect  to  defensive  and  offensive  strategies 
for risk analysis. This  has  to do  with  how  uncertainties  in  the  risk  analysis  are 
handled.  Given  that  there  are  practical,  if  not  theoretical, "limits  to  know-
ledge,  how  does  one  deal  with  these uncertainties? Based  upon  rigorous  statisti-
cal  methods  it is possible to  set upper  and  lower  limits  on  risk. 
Use  of  a  high  upper  limit  is  an  offensive  strategy,  used  by  regulators, 
such  that  an  estimated  level  of  risk  is  set  so  high  as  to  provide  very  high 
confidence  that the  real  level  of  risk  lies below  the  estimate.  It represents  a 
very  large  overestimate  of  the  true risk,  especially when  margins  of  safety are 
added  to  account  for  uncertainties  in  measurements  and  models. 
The  lower  bound  can  be  used  as  a defensive  strategy.  It sets a  lower  bound 
on  measurable  risk.  This  bound,  based  upon  available  knowledge  and  measurement 
techniques,  is  set  at  a  level  for  which  it is  impossible  to  empirically demon-
strate a higher  level  of  risk from  the  evidence  available.  For  example,  one  may 
set  a  lower  bound,  say  for  cancer  risk  for  a  toxic  chemical  based  upon  animal 
bioassays,  such  that  it would  be  impossible  to  directly measure  the  effects  of 
exposure  to  the  chemical  in  epidemeological  studies  in  man.  In  this sense  a user 
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testimony  as  to  cause  and  effect,  since  the  limits  of  measurement  have  been 
reached. 
There  are,  of  course,  ethical  questions  about  how  such  analyses  can  be 
used.  However,  it is  just  as  improper  to  set  overly  strict  and  costly regula-
tions  from  severe  overestimate  of  risk  as  it is  to  attempt  to  escape  the  conse-
quences  of  one's  responsibility by  attempting  to  cloud  the  issues.  Perhaps,  the 
most  unethical  approach  is  from  that  of  the  scientist  who  claims  impartiality 
when  it  is  not  the  case,  knowingly  or  unknowingly.  This  does  not  mean  that 
defensive  and  offensive  tactics  should  not  be  used  or  that  upper  and  lower 
bounding  analyses  should  not  be  made.  Only  that  they  should  be  used  openly  and 
with  care. 
5.2.2  Uses  Of  Risk  Analysis 
The  uses  of  risk  analysis  as  outlined  in  Table  2.2  are  explained  here  more 
fully.  In  addition  the  sponsor  and  the  primary  target  users  are  indicated,  in 
terms  of  risk  analysis  of  alternate energy  systems. 
5.2.2.1 Regulatory  Analyses 
Regu 1  a  tory  ana lyses  are  conducted  by  regulatory  agencies  and  their  con-
tractors  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  primarily  to  establish  and  enforce  regula-
tions.  Another  set of  analyses  are  used  to  adhere  to existing regulations  set as 
those for environmental  impact  analysis  (In  the United  States this  is  controlled 
by  National  Environmental  Policy Act  -NEPA  - 1970  &  Code  of  Federal  Regulations 
Section  1502)  and  those  made  by  industry  to  meet  existing  regulatory  require-
ments. 
A.  KINDS  OF  ANALYSES  CONDUCTED  BY  REGULATORY  AGENCIES 
These  analyses  are  sponsored  by  regulatory  agencies,  and  are  usually di-
rected  at  risk  managers  and  the  technical  community.  Many  countries  require 
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public  presents  special  problems.  For  energy  systems  the  primary  issues  are 
environmental  issues  such  as  siting,  water  resource  and  land  use,  pollution  and 
health  and  safety issues. 
1).  Screening  Analyses  To  Determine  If A Risk  Exists  And  Is  High  Enough  To 
Be  Considered  For  Regulatory  Control. 
Risks  to  individuals  and  to  exposed  populations  is  estimated  using  crude 
estimates,  and  the  results  are  compared  against  formal  or  informal  deminimis 
1  eve 1  s  to  determine  if  the  risks  are  high  enough  to  warrant  further  action. 
Either  the  risk  level  (individual  and  population  risks)  or  the  cost-effective-
ness  of  risk  reduction  or  both  can  be  used  as  criteria for  decision  making. 
2).  Regulatory  Impact  Analysis  To  Justify Regulatory  Actions  And  Satisfy 
Administrative  Law  Requirements. 
Every  regulation,  establishing  standards  for  health,  safety  and  environ-
ment  areas,  must  go  through  a formal  administrative process  laid out  by  the  laws 
of  the  country  involved.  In  the  United  States this  is governed  by  a plethora of 
regulation. Those  for environmental  regulations  have  many  procedural  steps which 
inc 1  ude  an  advanced  notice  of  proposed  ru 1  e-mak i ng,  a  draft  regu 1  at  ion  and  a 
final  regulation,  all  involving  public  input  and  comment.  The  analysis  used  to 
support  these  regulatory steps  generally has  very  large  uncertainties  in  cause-
effect  relationships  and  exposure  estimates,  and  uses  margins  of  safety  in  the 
direction  of  increased  protection  of  human  health  to  address  these  uncertain-
ties.  These  margins  of  safety  used  at  each  step  are  aggregated  thoughout  the 
total  process  leading  to  large overstatements  of  risk.  Both  individual  and  popu-
lation  risks  should  be  addressed,  but  are  not  always  done  in  practice. 
Additional  margins  of  safety  are  often  added  to  provide  increased  agency 
credibility  in  the  eyes  of  the  agency's  constituency.  This  process  is  to  be 
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once  the  process  is  established.  Arguments  to  keep  estimates  within  realistic 
ranges  must  take  place  at  every  step  of  the  administrative  process.  Strategies 
aimed  at providing early input  into the analysis process  and  involvement  at every 
step  of  the  process  are  necessary  and  can  be  effective  in  keeping  estimates  of 
risk realistic. Industry has  had  a great deal  of  influence  on  the  process  by  this 
approach,  although  the  cost  of  keeping  up,  including  industry  risk  analyses  to 
offset the  agency  analyses,  is expensive. 
3).  Compliance  Analyses  To  Demonstrate  Regulatory  Violations. 
When  an  agency  takes  an  enforcement  action,  it makes  an  analysis  of  the 
violation  of  the  standard  with  a  "chain  of  evidence"  to  support  the  violation. 
Risk  analyses  are  required  when  the  regulation  is  based  upon  risk.  Once  again 
improper  use  of  margins  of  safety used  as  means  to  address  uncertainties must  be 
kept  within  reasonable  limits. 
4).  Analyses  In  Response  To  Judicial  And  Legislative Challenge. 
When  regulations  are  ~hallenged  in  the  courts  or  by  legislative  bodies 
(Congress  and  state  legislatures  in  the  United  States)  risk  analyses  are  often 
made  by  the  agencies  res  pons i b  1  e  for  the  regu 1  at  ion  to  defend  their  actions. 
These  analyses  are  often  extensive,  and  biased  to  support  the  action  taken. 
B.  ANALYSES  MADE  BY  OTHERS  IN  RESPONSE  TO  EXISTING  REGULATIONS 
Environmental  and  safety regulations  require  utilities or  industrial  or-
ganizations,  public  or  private,  to  make  risk  analyses  of  proposed  or  existing 
facilities.  The  utility or  industrial  organization  becomes  the  sponsor  of  the 
analysis.  The  regulating  authority  is the  primary  target user,  but  the  analysis 
must  survive  technical  scrutiny  and,  in  many  countries,  review  by  the  general 
public. 
1).  Environmental  Impact  Statements 
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National  Environmental  Policy Act  (NEPA).  It  has  been  in  force  since 1970,  and 
has  been  a  pace  setter  in  establishing needs  for  formal  environmental  analysis. 
The  process  was  fraught  with  difficulties  in  the  beginning,  but  has  resulted  in 
better understanding  of  the  risk/cost/benefit process.  Some  countries  in  Europe 
are  adapting  some  of  the  more  advantageous  aspects  of  the  NEPA  process  such  as 
the  carrying  out  of  the  analysis  of  alternatives  without  the  overly  legalistic 
framework  of  the  American  system. 
This  process  basically  requires  a  relative  risk  analysis  among  alterna-
tives;  one  of  which  is  usually  a 
11no-action
11  alternative.  The  process  does  not 
require margins  of  safety, except  to  account  for  uncertainties.  Essentially only 
a  best  estimate  is  required,  but  the  analysis  must  assure  that  an  underestimate 
of  risk  does  not  take  place.  Margins  of safety for  protection  as  in  regulations 
are  not  required;  but,  when  information  cannot  be  acquired  or  costs  of  acquisi-
tion  are  exhorbitant,  a  worst  case  analysis  is  required.  The  sponsors  of  the 
analysis  and  the  decision  makers  must  learn  to  let  it all  hang  out,  state  the 
risks  as  they  are,  put  risks  into  perspective,  and  let the  decision  maker  make 
his  decision  among  the  alternatives.  In  the  United  States  the  law  implies  that 
if the  NEPA  procedure  is met,  the  value  decision  is  up  to  the sponsoring  agency, 
and  the  courts  will  not  interfere.  The  analysis  must  be  impartial,  and  those 
conducting  the  analyses  should  not  be  an  advocate  of  any  alternative prior to the 
decision.  After  the  analysis  is  completed,  the  sponsor  may  select  a  preferred 
alternative;  and  it may  be  presented  with  the  other  alternatives. 
2).  Permitting  Requirements 
Specific regulations  requiring permits,  such  as  for  the  Resource  Conserva-
tion  And  Recovery  Act  (RCRA)  in  the  United  States,  require  some  form  of  risk 
analysis  in  the  development  of  the  justification for  the  permit.  These  analyses 
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strate that designated  criteria are  met. 
3).  Compliance  Monitoring 
Enforcement  actions  by  national,  state or  local  governments  under  existing 
regulations often  require  analyses,  made  by  the  regulating  agency  to justify the 
compliance  action.  These  are  generally offense  risk  analyses. 
C.  ANALYSES  MADE  BY  OTHERS  TO  DEFEND  AGAINST 
UNWARRANTED  REGULATORY  ACTION 
1).  Response  To  Requests  For  Comments  By  Regulators 
Utility and  industry response  to  agency  actions  as  undertaken  in  Paragraph 
A2.  above. 
2).  Support  Of  Judicial  Actions 
a.  Response  To  Improper  Agency  Actions 
Utility  and  industry  response  to  agency  actions  as  undertaken  in 
Paragraph  A2  and  A4  above. 
b.  Defense  Against  Enforcement  Proceedings 
Enforcement  actions  by  national,  state  or  local  governments  under 
existing regulations often  require analyses  made  by  the  accused  party 
for  defensive  purposes  after the  compliance  action  takes  place. 
5.2.2.2 Management  Support  Analyses 
Utilities and  industrial  organizations,  public  and  private,  make  analyses 
to assure  adequate  safety of  operations,  increased  productivity and  cost-effec-
tive operation.  These  are  sponsor  originated studies  aimed  at policymakers  and 
risk managers  at the  strategic  level,  and  may  be  aimed  at  technical  people  at 
the  operational  level. 
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Demonstrate  that  a  product  or  process  is  safe  or  harmless  on  an  absolute 
basis,  or  that  it  is  relatively  safer  and  less  harmful  than  alternative  and 
competative  products  or  process.  Often  it is aimed  at the  general  public  as  the 
ultimate consumer.  There  is, of course,  no  such  thing  as  zero  risk,  but  some  try 
to  sell  it. 
B.  'PLANNING 
1).  Research  And  Development 
a.  Risk  Reduction  - Safety Analysis 
The  purpose  is to  identify areas  of high  risk  (or relatively high  risk)  in 
part  i cu 1
1ar  products  or  processes,  and  seek  means  to  pro vi de  cost-effective 
solutions  to  reduce  these  risks.  This  is  normally  done  for  the  following 
reasons: 
1.  Safe  operation  makes  good  business  sense.  Outages  because 
of  failure can  cause  loss  of  production. 
2.  Fore  stall  the  need  for  regulation. 
3.  Reduce  exposure  to  future  liability claims. 
4.  Develop  defensive  strategies to  bound  risk  liability. 
5.  Identify  new  markets  for  risk  control  technology. 
b.  Improved  Analysis  Capability 
Identify  areas  of  high  uncertainty  in  risk  analyses,  and  undertake  pro-
grams  to  cost-effectively reduce  these  uncertainties.  This  is  a  particularly 
necessary strategy for combating  overzealous  use  of margins  of  safety which  have 
been  used  in  the  face  of  uncertainty.  This  is  also  true  for  new  product  or 
process  areas,  or  at  least  for  areas  where  risk  analysis  has  not  been  used 
effectively in  the  past  as  a result of  such  uncertainties. 
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Focus  resources  on  the  most  risk  reduction  for  a  dollar.  Can  be  used  by 
both  the private and  public  sectors.  Utilities and  industrial organizations  can 
use  this  approach  to  best  allocate resources  addressed  to safety. This  approach 
can  be  used  in  the  public  sector,  by  individual  agencies,  across  agencies,  and 
within  other organizations  as  a means  to cost effectively address  risk reduction. 
The  idea  is to  serve  the  public  by  spending  tax  dollars for  risk  reduction  cost-
effectively  and  fairly.  The  depth  of  analysis  is  less  than  that for  regulatory 
purposes  and  uses  re 1  at  i ve  risk  estimates  and  the  re  1  at  i ve  cost  of  reducing 
risks. This  is  an  area where  probabalistic risk assessment  techniques  can  be  very 
effective. 
3).  Evaluation  Of  Alternative  Systems  For  Conducting  A Process 
Evaluation  of  alternative  systems  on  a  relative  risk  basis  to  provide 
perspectives  on  the  types  of  risk  and  the  magnitude  of  risks  for  alternative 
systems  for  implementing  a specific process  or  product. 
C.  RISK  MANAGEMENT 
Prevent  risks from  occurring  by  anticipating and  controlling them.  This  is 
accomplished  by  reducing  exposure  health,  safety and  financial  risks for  a given, 
existing process  or  product.  One  can  make  analyses  for: 
1).  System  Safety 
Analyze  the  system  for points of  possible failure,  and  provide  technologi-
cal  "fixes"  for  weak  points  in  the  system.  The  use  of  probabalistic  risk  analy-
sis,  using  fault  trees  and  event  trees,  has  met  some  success  in  this  area. 
Evaluation  of  margins  of  safety  in  the  system  is  another  approach  that  may  be 
more  fruitful. 
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The  courts  begin  getting  involved  when  parties  are  believed  to  have  suf-
fered  physical  and  mental  damage  or  stress  from  a  product  that  either fails  to 
operate as  expected  or  causes  harm.  In  the  United  States this has  become  a major 
prob 1  em,  especially  in  the  cases  of  1  arge  jury  awards  when  the  courts  base 
liability on  ability to  pay  rather than  relating cause  and  effect. 
3).  Third  Party Assumption  Of  Risk 
Third  party assumption  of  risk  is  primarily through  insurance.  The  objec-
tive is to spread  the  risk more  equitably among  subscribers.  Of  course,  insurance 
companies  sell  this  service  with  a  profit  motive  in  mind.  As  a  result  the 
insurance  industry has  controls  applied  to  it and  is regulated  at  state  level  to 
varying  degrees. 
a.  Insurance 
Risk  spreading  through  pooling  of  risks  among  suscribers  for  all  types  of 
coverage.  Insurance  companies  operate  on  a  profit  basis  for  both  stock  and 
mutual  underwriters.  Large  compensation  awards  in  the  United  States Courts  have 
led  to  withdrawal  from  underwriting  in  many  areas  by  most  insurance  companies. 
For  example,  at  this writing  it is  impossible  to  obtain  Environmental  Liability 
Insurance  for  hazardous  waste  disposal  or  insurance  for  vaccine  producers  of 
side-effect risks.  The  latter may  soon  be  underwritten  through  government  action 
since  many  pharmaceutical  companies  have  ceased  to  make  certain  critical  vac-
cines. 
b.  Malpractice 
Large  liability claims  and  awards  for medical  malpractice have  led  to  large 
proportions of effort being  directed at preventing malpractice suits rather than 
for  directly  reducing  risks.  Moreover,  the  cost  of  malpractice  insurance  for 
individual  practitioners has  become  exhorbitant.  Essentially the  attention given 
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quences  is  becoming  greater,  and  in  some  instances  greater  than  the  need  to 
address  the  risks  themselves  directly. 
5.2.2.3 Public  Education 
The  public  desire  for  adequate  supplies  of  environmentally  safe  energy 
sources  at  low  prices  makes  it  incumbent  on  public  officials  to  display  energy 
options  and  their  advantages,  disadvantages,  and  problems  to  their constituents 
in  a manner  that promotes  better understanding  of  the  issues.  However,  if such 
information  is  biased  towards  specific  applications  or  energy  sources  it  may 
become  suspect,  and  its  intentions  misinterpreted.  It  is  necessary  to  provide 
information  and  commentary  on  it in  an  open  manner,  leaving  the  reader  to  draw 
his  own  conclusions,  if  such  bias  is  to  be  avoided.  This  does  not  mean  that 
summaries  and  commentaries  should  be  avoided,  only  that they  not  be  slanted. 
A.  PUBLIC  AWARENESS 
1)  Seek  Rational  Public  Responses 
Based  on  the  idea  that a knowledgeable  public will  hopefully act  on  infor-
mation  rather  than  preset  beliefs.  The  expectation  is  that  such  presentations 
will  be  without  bias,  if they  are  sponsored  and  carried out  by  public or  private 
organizations  who  are  not  stakeholders. 
2)  Fulfill  Regulatory  Requirements  For  Public  Disclosure 
Even  though  public  disclosure  may  be  required  by  law,  a  good,  simplified 
and  accurate  disclosure can  also  be  a useful  educational  tool, whether  or  not  the 
sponsor  is  a  stakeholder. 
B.  ANXIETY  FACTORS 
1)  Bring  Perceived  Risks  More  Closely  Into  Alignment  With  Objective  Risks 
Public  anxiety  can  be  allayed  to  some  extent  by  changing  the  perception  of 
risks  by  making  the objective risk estimates meaningful  to people.  While  anxiety 
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strategy  since  an  informed  public  can  often  be  expected  to  act  in  a  rational 
manner. 
2)  Frighten  People  Into  Action  Or  Agreement 
For  those  seeking  attention,  premature  or  overstatement  of  risks  to  the 
public can  arouse  anxiety.  This  is an  offensive strategy,  attempting to stir fear 
and  anxiety. 
5.3  Cross  Classification Of  Uses  And  Scope  Of  Application 
Table  5.1  provides  an  initial cross  classification of  the  uses  outlined  in 
Table  2.2  and  described  in  the  previous  section with  the scope  of  application of 
projects  shown  in  Table  2.1.  The  objective  is to  identify where  patterns of  use 
may  emerge,  especially  those  where  incompatibilities  may  exist  among  applica-
tions.  This  is  an  ongoing  effort  in  our  research. 
So  far  the  primary  pattern  that  we  have  identified  is  that  projects  that 
address  generic  issues  use  risk  analysis  primarily  for  planning  and  for  public 
awareness  purposes.  Those  which  are  aimed  at specific sites for construction and 
operation  primarily use  regulatory risk  analyses. 
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A CROSS  CLASSIFICATION  OF  USES  OF  RISK  ANALYSIS  FOR  DIFFERENT  SCOPE 
OF  APPLICATION  OF  PROJECTS 
Dl FFERENT  USES  I.  REGULATORY  ANALYSES  II •  MGMT  SUPP  ANAL 
OF  RISK  ANALYSIS 
SCOPE  OF  APPLI CA T1 ON 
A.Site Specific Projects 
B.Util i ty Planning Studies 
C.Power  Grid Planning Studies 
D.National  Energy Supply 
Planning Studies 
E.Global  Planning And 
lq::~&ct  Studies 
F.lnternational  Energy 
Planning 
G.Publ ic  Information And 
D  i ssemi nation 
Special  Purpose Studies 
H.  Energy Subsystem 
Investment 
I.  Evaluation Of  Potential 
New  Energy Source 
Problems 
A.CONDUCTED  BT  REGULATORY  AGENCIES 
1.Screening 
·  2 .Reg.  lq::~&ct 
X 
X 
X 
3.Compl iance 
4.Response 
X Exist.  X 
Systems  e.g.  EIS 
X  X 
X  X 
B.MADE  BY  OTHERS  IN  RESPONSE  C.MADE  BY  OTHER  IN  A.MARKETING 
TO  EXISTING  REGULATIONS  DEFENSE  TO  REGS. 
1.  Env.  lq::~&ct  St 1nnts  1.Request  For 
2.Permitting  Conments 
3.Compl i- 2.Litaga-
ance Mon.  t ion 
X  X  X  X e.g. 
Siting 
X Generic 
EIS 
X  X  X  X  X 
X  X  X  X 
1.Absolute 
Safety 
X 
X 
X 
X 
2.Relative 
Safety 
X 
X. 
X 
DIFFERENT  USES  II.  MANAGEMENT  SUPPORT  ANALYSES 
OF  RISK  ANALYSIS 
SCOPE  OF  APPLI CA Tl ON 
A.Site Specific Projects 
B.Util ity Planning Studies 
C.Power  Grid Planning Studies 
D.National  Energy Supply 
Planning Studies 
E.Global  Plaming And 
.  I  q::~&ct  Studies 
F.lnternational  Energy 
Plaming 
G.Publ ic  Information And 
Dissemination 
Special  Purpose Studies 
H.  Energy  Subsystem 
Investment 
1.  Evaluation Of  PoteAtial 
Hew  En'!rgy  Source 
Problems  I 
B.  PLANNING 
1.Res.  & Oev•mt 
2.Cost Effective 
Use  Of  Resources 
a.  Risk  b.Jq>roved  3. Eval. 
Reduct 1n  Anal.  Cap.  Of  Alt. 
X  X 
X  X  X  X 
X  X 
X  X  X  X 
X  X  X  X 
X  X  X  X 
X  X 
X  X  X 
B.MADE  BY  OTHERS  IN  RESPONSE  C.  RISK  MANAGEMENT 
TO  EXISTING  REGULATIONS 
1.  Env.  lq::~&ct St •nnts 
2.Permitting 
3.Compti-
ance Mon. 
X  X  X 
X Generic 
EIS 
X  X  X 
X  X  X 
1.Prevent Risks  From  Occurring 
2.  Reduction Of  Exposure 
a.Systems  b.Productc.3rd Party 
Safety  Liability  Risk  Ass. 
X  X  X 
X OUtage  & 
Cap.  Prob. 
X 
X 
OJ FFERENT  USES  II I.  PUBLIC  EDUCT A  ION  AND  PERSUASION 
OF  RISK  ANALYSIS 
SCOPE  Of  APPL I  CA Tl ON 
A.Site Specific Projects 
B.Util ity Planning Studies 
C.Power  Grid Planning Studies 
D.National  Energy Supply 
Planning Studies 
E.Global  Planning And 
lq::~&ct  Studies 
F.lnternational  Energy 
Planning 
G.Publ ic  Information And 
Dissemination 
Special  Purpose Studies 
H.  Energy Subsystem 
Investment 
1.  Evaluation Of  Potential 
New  Energy source 
Problems 
A.PUBLIC  AWARENESS 
1.Seek Rational  Public 
Response 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
2.Reg.  Req•mt 
Publ.  Oiscl. 
X 
X 
X 
X 
B.  ANXIETY  CONTROL 
1.  Align Perceived Risks 
With  Actual  Risks 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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2.Frighten 
People  Into 
Action 
X 
X CHAPTER  6 
6.0  BENEFITS  OF  ALTERNATIVE  ENERGY  SYSTEMS  AT  AND  BEYOND  THE  BUSS  BAR 
While  a  kilowatt  of  electrical  energy  at  the  buss  bar  appears  to  be  the 
same  at first  glance  for  any  energy  source,  this  assumption  only  holds  over  a 
narrow  range  of  alternatives  for  any  given  analysis.  There  are  many  other 
aspects  of  energy  production  that  have  benefits  which  can  neither  be  easily 
quantified nor  measured  in  a monetary  sense.  Table  6.1  summarizes  these factors. 
6.1.  FUEL  ABUNDANCE 
The  benefits  of  a  particular  energy  alternative  are  very  much  dependent 
upon  the  abundance  and  source  of  the  fuel  supply  being  considered.  Those  fuels 
in  abundant  supply  and  readily  retrievable  and  usable  are  most  economically 
beneficial.  Conventional  fuels  of  low  quality  and  small  quantity are,  at best, 
only  short  term  sources. 
6.2.  UNINTERRUPTIBLE  FUEL  SUPPLIES 
Another  non-monetary  benefit  for  some  fue 1  supp 1  i es  are  that  they  are 
within the  nation  consuming  them.  This  is particularly important  for  purposes  of 
maintaining  the national  security and  national  economy.  A country's security and 
economic  strength  is  a benefit which  directly depends  upon  the  domestic  control 
of  the  resources  used  for  power  production. 
6.3.  EXHAUSTION  OF  RESOURCES 
Another  consideration of  relying totally upon  the  use  of  domestic  supplies 
of  energy  is  that  of  the  eventua 1  exhaustion  of  these  resources.  There  is 
something  to  be  said for  using  imported  sources  of  energy  when  domestic  sources 
are still available.  However,  this option  is not  without  a cost.  First,  partial 
contra 1  of  the  economy  is  now  at  the  discretion  of  foreign  or  even  corporate 
powers.  Second,  with  production  being  shifted  to  foreign  sources,  domestic 
sources  will  fall  into  dis-use  and,  therefore,  the  time  lag  and  distribution 
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FACTORS  AFFECTING  THE  BENEFIT  OF  ENERGY  AT  THE  BUSS  BAR 
1.  BENEFITS  OF  PARTICULAR  CHOICES  OF  ENERGY  SOURCES; 
Continuity  of  Supply 
Perservation  of  National  Resources 
Vulnerability 
2.  OPPORTUNITIES  FOR  EFFICIENT  USE  OF  ENERGY  MIXES; 
Distributed  and  Centralized  Energy  Source  Mixes 
Matching  Needs  for  Base  Loads  and  Variable  Loads 
Plant  Capacity 
3.  ECONOMICS  OF  FUEL  SUPPLY; 
Balance  of  Payments 
Investment  Strategies 
Economies  of  Scale 
Price  Elasticity of  Demand  for  Fuel  Sources 
Reliability and  Capacity 
Substitutability 
4.  INDIRECT  BENEFITS  OF  ENERGY  PRODUCTION 
Employment 
Separate  Supporting  Industries 
By-products  of  Energy  Production 
5.  FINANCIAL  DETERMINANTS  OF  FUEL  SUPPLY 
Interrelationship of  Finance  and  Economics 
Financing  as  a Means  to  Realization  Of  Energy  Benefits 
6.  NEGATIVE  BENEFITS. 
Undefined  And  Diffuse  Dysbenefits 
Opportunities  Foregone 
Hidden  Dysbenefits 
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solution  to  this  problem  could  be  subsidies  for  a  system  that  would  respond 
immediately  and  satisfactorily in  the  event  of  a disruption of  supply.  However, 
this  alternative may  be  very  economically  costly. 
6.4.  INDIRECT  BENEFITS  AND  RISKS 
There  is  a major  question  as  to  whether  a number  of  activities related to 
energy  systems  should  be  considered  as  risks or benefits from  energy  systems.  Two 
particular aspects  are  the mining  and  construction  industries.  In  most  studies, 
mining  of  uranium  and  coal  and  the  construction  of  power  plants  have  risks  and 
benefits  that have  been  apportioned  to particular energy  alternatives.  There  is 
a  strong  argument  that  these  should  not  be· included.  Each  industry,  mining  and 
construction,  operate  on  their  own  cost-risk-benefit  balances,  independent  of 
energy  sources.  Alternative  energy  sources  are  considered  as  market  opportuni-
ties for  expanding  the  industry.  A coal  miner  does  not  particularly care whether 
the coal  he  mines  is  use~ to  make  steel, for  space  heating,  for electrical energy 
production,  etc.,  as  long  as  the  market  ensuring  his  job  remains  available.  In 
the  same  man~er,  a construction  worker  may  differentiate among  contracts  invol-
ving  bridges  and  tunnels,  buildings,  power  plants,  etc.  as  being  different types 
of  jobs,  but  the  benefits  of  being  employed  on  any  of  these  risky  undertakings 
outweighs  the risks.  Each  of  these  industries must  make  its own  balance of risks 
and  benefits,  and  the  degree  of  regulation  involved  will  depend  upon  the  risk 
level  in  each  industry  and  the  regulatory  bodies  involved,  e.g.  Department  of 
Labor. 
6.4.  FINANCIAL  DETERMINANTS  OF  FUEL  SUPPLY 
The  means  of  financing  fuel  supplies  can  have  significant  affect  on  the 
economic  viabilty of  particular alternative energy  sources.  This  interrelation-
ship  of  the  finance  and  economics  of  fuel  supply  must  not  only  be  explicitly 
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particular alternative energy  systems.  Some  of  the  factors  to  be  considered  in 
this  light  are: 
a.  Efficiency  Of  Financing  Measures  - Leading  to  relatively expeditious, 
low-cost  energy  at  a particular site. 
b.  Evaluation  Of  Alternative  Financing  Sources  - Yielding  corresponding 
trade-offs  as  to  savings  schedules  for  what  volume  consumed  for  what 
source,  and  when. 
c.  Characterization  Of  Financing  Strategies  - Estimates  of  the  business, 
social  and  technological  outcomes  of  different financial  approaches. 
d.  Impact  Of  The  Financing  Methods  Selected  As  Indirect Benefits or  Detri-
ments  - To  providers,  end  users  and  specified  third parties. 
6.5.  NEGATIVE  BENEFITS 
Negative  benefits  are  defined  here  as  those  undesirable  aspects  of  energy 
alternatives not  associated with  direct costs  or  environmental  impact.  They  can 
be  considered  as  dysbenefits  rather  than  costs  or  risks.  Most  studies  address 
these  in  only  a general  fashion  and  either specifically omit  them  from  discus-
sion, or  treat them  superficially.  In  particular,  these  have  to  do  with  alterna-
tive energy  sources  vulnerability to  sabotage,  terrorism,  or  to  incapacitation 
due  to war.  Moreover,  the  problem  of  weapon  development  at the  national  level  is 
peculiar to  some  nuclear  options.  Vulnerability of  large  centralized  plants  to 
military or  paramilitary activities  is  one  consideration.  Use  of  stored  energy 
such  as  the  thermal  energy  in  nuclear  power  plants  or  potential  energy  of  water 
behind  dams  can  make  such  facilities  prime  targets. 
Another  aspect  of  negative  benefits  are  opportunities  forgone.  These  can-
not  be  considered  costs,  but  opportunities  lost.  Failure  to  become  energy  inde-
pendent  is  an  example. 
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7.0  APPLICATION  TO  ALTERNATE  ENERGY  SYSTEMS 
There  are  a  number  of  issues  to  be  addressed  as  we  attempt  to  use  the 
framework  described  previously  to  alternate  energy  systems.  These  include  the 
following  as  a minimum: 
1.  Differences  in  analysis  for  different parts of  the  energy  cycle 
A.  Separation  of  fuel  production  from  the  rest  of  the  energy 
system. 
B.  Waste  disposal  as  a special  problem 
C.  Life  cycle  costs 
2.  De  minimis  concepts  and  uses 
A.  For  determining  significance of  issues 
B.  For  determining  when  cost  effectiveness  of  risk  reduction 
has  reached  an  end  point 
3.  Cost-effectiveness  of  risk  reduction  under  different concepts: 
A.  Systems  Safety Resource  Allocation 
B.  Value  of  a  life 
C.  End  point  considerations 
D.  Role  of  finance  and  different finance  methods 
7.1  DIFFERENCES  IN  ANALYSIS  FOR  DIFFERENT  PARTS  OF  THE  ENERGY  CYCLE 
There  are  a number  of  issues  that must  also be  addressed  in  the application 
of  the  framework. 
7.1;1.  Fuel  Preparation 
The  risks  from  the  production  and  preparation  of  fuel  can  be  arguably 
separated  from  the  rest  of  the  fue 1  eye 1  es.  We  are  only  considering  the  raw 
production  which  includes  exploration, mining  and  transporation to fuel  prepar-
ation facilities in  this case; fuel  preparation  is a separate consideration that 
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cases,  the fuel  produced  is only partially used  in  the electrical energy  produc-
tion  cycle.  Coal  is  used  for  steel  making,  chemical  feedstock,  and  central 
heating.  Oil  is used  for  transportation,  chemical  feedstock  and  space  heating. 
Natural  gas  is  used  for space  heating,  cooking  and  hot  water  heating.  Uranium 
and  thorium  production  is  somewhat  unique  in  that fuels  are  used  primarily for 
electrical  energy  production  and  to  some  extent for weapons  production.  One  can 
argue  for  fossil  fuels  that  a prorated  proportion  of  risks  can  be  assigned  for 
energy  production.  This  may  be  improper  for several  reasons.  First,  any  formula 
for  prorating  risks  based  solely  on  proportion  of  fuel  used  will  be  arbitrary 
and  incorrect.  It may  well  be  that  the  marginal  demand  for  fuel  affects  risk 
more  than  the  actual  amount  used.  At  low  prices,  reducing  amount  of  resources 
committed  to  safety is one  means  of  lowering  competative  production  costs.  At 
high  demand,  more  risky operations  may  be  used  as  additional  supplies.  How  does 
one  a  11 ocate  margi na 1  changes  in  demand  among  the  competing  uses  of  fue 1  s? 
Certainly  not  by  simple  allocation  formula  based  upon  static usage. 
The  a  11 ocat ion  of  such  costs  puts  nuc 1  ear  energy  at  an  advantage,  s i nee 
nearly all mining  risks will  be  allocated to energy  production.  However,  this  is 
not  an  argument  for  separation  of  fuel  preparation,  only  an  observation.  The 
major  argument  for separation  is that the  risks from  fuel  acquisition  are  nearly 
all  to  workers,  whether  from  mine  and  transportation  accidents,  black  lung 
disease  or  lung  cancer,  or  to  the  environment  from  excavation  and  waste  dispo-
sal.  The  production  and  sale  of  fuel  is  one  of  the  major  industries  in  the 
world,  and  jobs created are considered opportunities by  workers.  Mine  safety is 
a regulated  activity in  many  countries;  and  safety and  the cost-effectiveness of 
risk  reduction  are  not  balanced  against  the  use  of  the  fuel,  but  rather  versus 
the  value  of  the  fuel  and  the  job  opportunities  created.  Thus,  there  are  major 
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for  most  of  the  uses  addressed  in  Chapter  5.  Perhaps  separation  might  not  be 
appropriate  in  the  most  general  risk  analysis,  but  a  good  case  can  be  made  for 
it  in  all  other  analyses.  The  risk  analysis  of  fuel  production  for  any  cycle 
should  be  contained  in  a  separate  analysis,  aimed  at  allocating  resources  to 
improve  production  safety. 
In  any  case  the  choice  of whether  to allocate fuel  preparation costs or  not 
will  depend  upon  the  specific situation  and  the  requirements  of  the  analysis. 
7.1.2 Other  Parts  Of  The  Fuel  Cycle 
For  the  remaining  fuel  cycle  components,  the  cost-effectiveness  of  risk 
reduction  must  be  addressed  in  terms  of  both  short  term  costs  and  life  cycle 
costs.  This  includes  the  disposition  of  wastes  and  decommissioning  of  facili-
ties by  acceptable  means.  Short  term  costs  may  be  used  for  parts  of  the  cycle 
for  allocation  of  health  and  safety  resources.  Life  cycle  costs  are  used  for 
overall  system  performance  assessment. 
7.2  THE  DE  MINIMIS  CONCEPT  AND  ITS  APPLICATION 
For  different magntudes  and  types  of  risk  there  are  de  minimis  levels  of 
probability where  the  probabilities are  so  low  as  to  be  below  reasonable thres-
holds  of  concern  or  even  to  have  meaning.  This  concept  is different from  that 
of  "acceptable  risk"  which  occurs  at  a much  higher  level.  The  concern  here  is 
with  risks  so  small  as  not  to  be  considered  significant.  If  they  are  signifi-
cant,  then  they must  be  addressed  and  an  acceptable  risk  level  adopted  formally 
or  informally. 
The  question  of  an  "acceptab 1  e"  1  eve 1  of  risk  is  a  concept  1  eft for  the 
analysis  itself.  What  we  are  concerned  with  here  is  the  concept  of  "de  minimis 
risk".  This  concept  is  adapted  from  common  1  aw  where  a  matter  that  is  con-
sidered to  be  too  trivial to  be  considered  by  the  court  is cited  as  de  minimis • 
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and  consequence  1  eve 1  s  that  are  sma 11  enough  to  be  be 1  ow  the  thresho 1  d  of 
concern.  This  threshold  of  concern  is a changing  target,  a value  judgement  that 
is well  below  levels  established  for  acceptable  risk.  Some  large magnitude  risks 
such  as  the  sun  exploding  in  the next  few  years  and  the earth being  hit by  a  large 
meteorite  have  extremely  low,  but finite probabilities.  We  go  about  our  business 
without  giving  them  much  concern  nor  in  the  latter case  becoming  troglodytes. 
The  probabilities  are  below  our  threshold  of  concern,  due  to,  perhaps,  a built 
in  response  to  anxiety  over  events  that are  only  remotely  possible,  beyond  our 
control,  or  a combination  of  these. 
The  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA)  has  been  addressing  this 
issue for  radiation for  both  individual  and  population  risk.  They  have  proposed 
1 millirem  for  individuals  and  100  man  rems  for  population  exposure  as  de 
minimis  levels.  No  such  levels  exist  for  other  fuel  cycles  as  far  as  we  know. 
These  levels for  radiation  may  be  lower  than  others  in  society.  We  have,  however, 
been  involved  in  establishing  such  levels  for  the  United  States  Forest  Service 
for  pesticide  application  in  Environmental  Impact  Statements.  These  have  been 
set  in  the  order  of  a  lifetime  risk  of  1  in  100,000,000. 
7.3.  COST-EFFECTIVENESS  OF  RISK  REDUCTION  UNDER  DIFFERENT  CONCEPTS: 
We  will  address  three  different  uses  for  the  cost-effectiveness  of  risk 
reduction  for  alternate energy  systems  as  a minimum  in  subsequent  research.  The 
first is the  cost-effectiveness of  relative risk  reduction  for  allocating safety 
resources  within  a fuel  cycle.  In  this  case  risks  are  relative to  each  other, 
and  absolute  risk  estimates  are  only  important  when  the  results  are  pegged  to 
benchmark  risk  level.  The  major  difficulty  in  analysis  is  the  differences  in 
uncertainties about  risks and  to a lesser extent about  cost estimates for differ-
ent  fuel  cycles  and  parts  of  fuel  cycles.  The  separation  of  risks  into  normal, 
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grouping  and  addressing  the  uncertainties.  The  major  difficulty in  implementing 
such  strategies is the  partitioned nature of  the  fuel  cycle operations.  As  Cohen 
points  out;  one  can  hardly  imagine  shifting safety resources  from  the mining  of 
coal  to  control  of  sulfur dioxide  emmision.  Those  allocating the  resources  will 
have  to  make  the  value  judgement  of  allocating  resources  across  the  categories. 
Those  actions  that  reduce  rare events  may  increase  normal  or  abnormal  risks  and 
vice  versa.  This  interaction can  become  clear by  analyses  using  this classifica-
tion. 
The  question  of  when  to  stop  spending  resources  for  risk  reduction  is 
another  matter.  It  requires  an  absolute  risk  assignrt:Jent,  if  only  by  pegging 
relative risks to  a single benchmark  risk analysis. The  end  point for spending  is 
based  upon  the  resultant  absolute  risk  estimates  for  each  category.  There  are 
several  ways  to  address  the  end  points. 
The  first  is  to  use  established  de  minimis  levels  for  each  category  of 
risk.  This  has  already  been  addressed. 
A second  approach  is  to  use  the  value  of  a  life.  However,  the  value  of  a 
life may  very well  be  different for the different risk categories  addressed.  The 
consequences  of  an  event  involving  accidents  and  chronic  effects,  such  as  ex-
posure  to  toxic materials  or  radiation,  involve  morbidity,  premature  injury  and 
death,  and  property damage.  However,  the  cause  of  death,  the manner  of dying  and 
injury,  and  the  type  of  gamble  involved  all  influence  the  subjective evaluation 
of these consequences.  The  causes  and  manner  of  injury or  dying  fall  into  four 
general  classes: 
1.  Immediate  Acute  Effects- Immediate  death  or  injury from  an  accident 
involving  explosion,  fire,  suffocation,  action  of  corrosives  and 
poisons,  etc.,  resulting from  a specific  incident. 
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sive toxic exposure  as  a result of a specific event or  set of events. 
3.  Observable  Chronic  Effects  - Premature  death  and  increased morbidity 
resulting from  exposure  to  identified substances  over  a  long  period. 
The  effects  are  often  cumu 1  at  i ve  such  as  in  meta 1  and  pesticide 
poisoning  or  latent such  as  in  carcinogenesis. 
4.  Unobservable  Chronic  Effects  - Contribution  to  premature  death  and 
increased  morbidity  by  the  hypothesized  synergistic or  contributing 
action  of  a particular substance.  Some  substances  indicate toxicity 
at  high  1  eve 1  s  of  exposure,  but  action  at  1  ow  1  eve 1  s  cannot  be 
established.  Others  operate  synergistically  such  as  exposure  to 
asbestos  for  smoKers. 
Society  treats  these  consequences  in  different  ways  and  reacts  to  them 
differently,  and  not  necessarily  by  the  categories  above.  Such  factors  as  the 
ability or  willingness  to  pay  indemnities,  the extent of  pain  and  disability are 
just a few  of  the  confounding  factors.  However,  the  categorization  above  does 
explain  to  some  extent  why  accidents  are  treated differently than  disease. 
This  valuation  of  consequences  is,  primarily,  a  subjective  evaluation. 
Values  of  life,  as  well  as  de  mimimis  and  acceptable  risk  levels,  used  to  judge 
one  kind  of  consequence  may  not  be  suitable to  judge  other kinds. 
A third  approach  uses  the  "limits of  knowledge"  as  a criterion.  There  are 
practical,  and  perhaps,  theoretical  limits  to  measurement.  This  approach  can 
only  be  used  when  risk magnitudes  are  small  enough  to  represent  only  a fraction 
of  the  uncertainty band,  then  these  limits  may  be  used  as  end  points.  One  must 
recognize that as  measurements  can  improve,  the end  points may  also  be  tightened. 
Finally one  must  not  ignore  the  role  that  finance  and  specific  financing 
methods  play  in  establishing the  cost-effectiveness of  risk reduction  by  partic-
ular alternatives.  The  integrality of  finance  and  insurance  is one  example.  The 
cost  of  insurance  and  the  spreading  of  risk  through  the  insurance  mechanisms 
directly affect the  cost-effectiveness ratio.  If underwriters will  provide  prem-
ium  reduction  for  proven  safety features  at  specific  sites  as  is  presently not 
the  case,  then  increased  safety can  be  highly  cost-effective.  Additionally the 
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may  well  be  the  key  factor  in  whether  innovative  alternatives may  survive. 
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8.0  CONCLUSIONS 
The  use  of  the  framework  we  have  developed  provides  a number  of  advantages 
for  analyzing  the  risks  and  benefits  of  alternative energy  systems: 
o  Combines  both  policy  analysis  needs  and  technical  analysis  in  one 
process  without  confusing  the  two  aspects.  Lets  the  po 1  icy  aspect 
govern  the  technical  analyses  in  an  effective manner. 
o  Provides  direct assessment  of the  differences  in  analyses  needed  for 
different uses  and  different  situations. 
o  Fits the  analysis  to  the  use  intended.  Not  the  other  way  around. 
o  Makes  clear the  implications  of  intended  usage. 
o  Makes  apparent  value  conflicts visible;  and,  if not  resolvable,  in-
dicates the  political realities of  the  choice  among  alternative sys-
tems. 
o  Demonstrates  that quantitative analysis  by  itself can  seldom-direct-
ly  resolve major  value  conflicts. 
o  Provides  information  for  policy  and  decision  makers  and  the  general 
public  in  an  easily  understandable  fashion,  but  also  provides  the 
technical  community  with  visible,  traceable,  and  repeatable  means 
for  addressing  the  details of  the  technical  estimates. 
o  Separates  value  judgements  from  technical  content. 
o  Provides  a  perspective of  what  is most  likely going  to  occur  during 
the  lifetime of  a  system,  rather  than  focusing  on  only  the  adverse 
aspect  of  risks  (Normal  Operation). 
o  Shows  what  the  system  is  designed  to  cope  with  and  the  associ a  ted 
risks  in  a balanced  fashion  (Abnormal  Operation). 
o  Treats  different  aspects  of  rare  events  separately  in  a meaningful 
fashion  for  decision  making  and  policy  analysis  as  well  as  public 
concerns. 
o  The  use  of  interval  estimates  shows  both  the  level  of  risk  and  the 
uncertainty in  estimates  at the  same  time.  The  width  of  the  interval 
is  a direct measure  of  the  uncertainty  in  the  estimate. 
o  Does  not  aggregate  beyond  meaning.  Provides  a  small  number  of  key 
resu 1  ts  which  are  easily  addressed  by  a  11  target  audiences.  This 
does  not  mean  that  the  results  will  still  not  be  subject  to  value 
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accentuated  and  made  visible. 
o  Does  not  attempt  to  acquire  and  quantify  information  beyond  that 
which  is  useful  to  the  use  and  objectives  of  the  analysis. 
o  Assures  that  needed  information  acquisition  is cost-effective. 
o  Takes  into  account  that energy  at the  buss  bar  is not  independent  of 
beneficial  choices. 
o  Provides  a logical  framework  for  addressing risk  issues.  The  frame-
work  has  been  used  effectively in  a number  of other applications,  but 
has  not  yet  been  applied  to  an  actual  case  of  comparing  alternative 
energy  systems. 
In  spite of  laying  oyt  a step  by  step methodology  in  Part  I., the  particu-
lar steps  in  the methodology  are not  fixed or static. They  are more  in  the  form  of 
a  checklist  than  a  prescriptive methodology.  Moreover,  these  are  guidelines  of 
how  to  use  both  top-down  and  bottom-up  analyses  in  a  combined  manner  to  cost-
effectively resolve  policy decisions. 
The  generic  approach  described  has  been  used  effectively  in  a  number  of 
other  areas.  In  each  case  the  application required emphasis  on  particular steps 
in  the  methodology,  omitting  some  as  appropriate.  As  long  as  the  reason  for 
omitting  steps  is clear,  such  omission  is proper.  The  adaptation  to  analysis  of 
the  risks and  benefits of  alternative energy  systems  is new  here.  The  success  of 
its use  will  only be  ascertained by  actually carrying out  some  authentic analyses 
and  determining  whether  the  analysis  aids  in  resolving  the  policy  decisions 
involved.  Under  these  conditions,  actual  scenarios for critical variables can  be 
developed  and  subject  to  policy  evaluation  and  specific  rules  for  addressing 
uncertainty  can  be  addressed. 
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SAMPLE  SCENARIOS 
CONDITIONAL  VARIABLES  FOR  SITUATION  #26 
#1  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  High 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  High 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  High 
OPEC  members  agree  on  production  quotas  and  fue 1  prices  soar.  Co a  1  and 
uranium  costs  rise very  sharply.  Very  heavy  anti-nuclear  sentiment  with  a 
"Green  Party"  coalition  possible,  with  sabotage  attempts  and  civil  diso-
bedience  highly  probable.  A major  nuclear  event  likely to  occur  - may  or 
may  not  involve  loss  of  life,  but  has  high  coverage  by  the media. 
#2  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Moderate 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  High 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  High 
OPEC  members  don 
1 t  agree  on  production  quotas,  but  war 1  d  cr1 s 1  s  make 
shipments  of  fuel  difficult.  Cost  rise  with  scarcity,  but  at  reasonable 
levels.  Difficulty of  delivery  more  of  a  problem  for  coal  than  nuclear. 
Very  heavy  anti-nuclear sentiment with  a "Green  Party"  coalition possible, 
with  sabotage  attempts  and  civil  disobedience  highly  probable.  A major 
nuclear  event  likely to  occur  - may  or  may  not  involve  loss  of  life,  but 
has  high  coverage  by  the  media. 
#3  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Low 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  High 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  High 
OPEC  members  don 
1 t  agree  on  production  quotas,  and  present  prices  and 
availability of  fuels  are  maintained  indefinitely.  Very  heavy  anti-nuclear 
sentiment  with  a  "Green  Party"  coalition possible,  with  sabotage  attempts 
and  civil  disobedience  highly  probable.  A major  nuclear  event  likely  to 
occur  in  country if nuclear option  selected.  May  or  may  not  involve  loss  of 
life,  but  has  high  coverage  by  the  media. 
#4  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  High 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Moderate 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  High 
OPEC  members  agree  on  production  quotas  and  fue 1  prices  soar.  Co a  1  and 
uranium  costs  rise very  sharply.  Very  heavy  anti-nuclear  sentiment  with  a 
"Green  Party"  coalition  possible,  but  sabotage  attempts  and  civil  diso-
bedience  are  unlikely.  Political settlement sought.  Nuclear  accident  like 
Chenobyl  likely  in  another  country.  Only  small  accidents  if  nuclear  is 
selected  in  country. 
- 120  -#5  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Moderate 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Moderate 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  High 
OPEC  members  don 
1 t  agree  on  production  quotas,  but  war 1  d  cr  1  s  1  s  make 
shipments  of  fuel  difficult.  Cost  rise  with  scarcity,  but  at  reasonable 
levels.  Difficulty of  delivery  more  of  a  problem  for  coal  than  nuclear. 
Very  heavy  anti-nuclear sentiment  with  a 
11Green  Party
11  coalition possible, 
but  sabotage  attempts  and  civil  disobedience  unlikely.Nuclear  accident 
like Chenobyl  likely in  another  country.  Only  small  accidents  if nuclear 
is  selected  in  country. 
#6  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Low 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Moderate 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  High 
OPEC  members  don 
1 t  agree  on  production  quotas,  and  present  prices  and 
availability of  fuels  are maintained  indefinitely.  Very  heavy  anti-nuclear 
sentiment  with  a 
11Green  Party  ..  coalition  possible,  but  sabotage  attempts 
and  civil  disobedience  unlikely.  Nuclear  accident  like Chenobyl  likely in 
another  country.  Only  small  accidents  if nuclear  is  selected  in  country. 
#7  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  High 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Low 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  High 
OPEC  members  agree  on  production  quotas  and  fue 1  prices  soar.  Coal  and 
uranium  costs  rise· very  sharply.  Very  heavy  ant~-nuclear sentiment  with  a 
11Green  Party
11  coalition  possible,  but  sabotage  attempts  and  civil  diso-
bedience  are  unlikely.  Political  settlement  sought.  Nuclear  accidents 
will  not  occur  if nuclear  option  is  taken. 
#8  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Moderate 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Low 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  High 
OPEC  members  don•t  agree  on  production  quotas,  but  world  cr1s1s  make 
shipments  of  fuel  difficult.  Cost  rise  with  scarcity,  but  at  reasonable 
levels.  Very  heavy  anti-nuclear  sentiment  with  a 
11Green  Party
11  coalition 
possible,  but  sabotage  attempts  and  civil  disobedience  are  unlikely.  Po-
liti  ca 1  sett  1  ement  sought.  Nuc 1  ear  ace i dents  wi 11  not  occur  if  nuc 1  ear 
option  is  taken. 
#9  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Low 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Low 
Degree  Of  Anti-~uclear Sentiment  High 
OPEC  members  don 
1 t  agree  on  production  quotas,  and  present  prices  and 
availability of  fuels  are  maintained  indefinitely.  Very  heavy  anti-nuclear 
sentiment  with  a 
11Green  Party  ..  coalition  possible,  but  sabotage  attempts 
and  civil disobedience  are  unlikely.  Political settlement sought.  Nuclear 
accidents  will  not  occur  if nuclear  option  is  taken. 
- 121  -#10  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  High 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  High 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Moderate 
OPEC  members  agree  on  production  quotas  and  fue 1  prices  soar.  Co a  1  and 
uranium  costs  rise  very  sharply.  Organized  opposition  to  nuclear  energy 
exists,  but  does  not  become  a political  issue.  Sabotage  attempts  and  civil 
disobedience  highly  probable.  A major  nuclear  event  likely  to  occur  in 
country  if nuclear  option  selected.  May  or  may  not  involve  loss  of  life, 
but  has  high  coverage  by  the  media. 
#11  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Moderate 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  High 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Moderate 
OPEC  members  don
1t  agree  on  production  quotas,  but  world  cr1s1s  make 
shipments  of  fuel  difficult.  Cost  rise  with  scarcity,  but  at  reasonable 
levels.  Organized  opposition  to  nuclear  energy  exists,  but  does  not  become 
a  political  issue.  Sabotage  attempts  and  civil  disobedience  highly 
probable.  A major  nuclear  event  likely  to  occur  in  country  if  nuclear 
option  selected.  May  or  may  not  involve  loss  of  life,  but  has  high 
coverage  by  the media. 
#12  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Low 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  H1gh 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Moderate 
OPEC  members  don 
1 t  agree  on  production  quotas,  and  present  prices  and 
availability of fuels  are  maintained  indefinitely. Organized  opposition to 
nuc 1  ear  energy  exists,  but  does  not  become  a  po 1 it  i ca 1  issue.  Sabotage 
attempts  and  civil  disobedience  highly  probable.  A major  nuclear  event 
likely  to  occur  in  country  if  nuclear  option  selected.  May  or  may  not 
involve  loss  of  life,  but  has  high  coverage  by  the media. 
#13  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  High 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Moderate 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Moderate 
OPEC  members  agree  on  production  quotas  and  fue 1  prices  soar.  Co a  1  and 
uranium  costs  rise  very  sharply.  Organized  opposition  to  nuclear  energy 
exists,  but  does  not  become  a political  issue.  Sabotage  attempts  and  civil 
disobedience  unlikely.  Nuclear  accident  like  Chenobyl  likely  in  another 
country.  Only  small  accidents  if nuclear  is selected  in  country. 
#14  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Moderate 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Moderate 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Moderate 
OPEC  members  don 
1 t  agree  on  production  quotas,  but  war 1  d  cr1 s 1  s  make 
shipments  of  fuel  difficult.  Cost  rise  with  scarcity,  but  at  reasonable 
levels.  Organized  opposition  to  nuclear  energy  exists,  but  does  not  become 
a  political  issue.  Sabotage  attempts  and  civil· disobedience  unlikely. 
Nuclear  accident  like  Chenobyl  likely  in  another  country.  Only  small 
accidents  if nuclear  is  selected  in  country. 
- 122  -#15  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Low 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Moderate 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Moderate 
OPEC  members  don't  agree  on  production  quotas,  and  present  prices  and 
availability of  fuels  are  maintained  indefinitely. Organized  opposition to 
nuclear  energy  exists,  but  does  not  become  a  political  issue.  Sabotage 
attempts  and  civil  disobedience  unlikely.  Nuclear  accident  like  Chenobyl 
likely in  another  country.  Only  small  accidents  if nuclear  is  selected  in 
country. 
#16  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  High 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Low 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Moderate 
OPEC  members  agree  on  production  quotas  and  fue 1  prices  soar.  Co a  1  and 
uranium  costs  rise  very  sharply.  Organized  opposition  to  nuclear  energy 
exists,  but  does  not  become  a political  issue.  Sabotage  attempts  and  civil 
disobedience  will  not  occur.  Nuclear  accident  like  Chenobyl  unlikely  in 
another  country.  Only  very  minor  incidents  if  nuc 1  ear  is  se 1  ected  in 
country. 
#17  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Moderate 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Low 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Moderate 
OPEC  members  don't  agree  on  production  quotas,  but  world  cr1s1s  make 
shipments  of  fuel  difficult.  Cost  rise  with  scarcity,  but  at  reasonable 
levels.  Organized  opposition  to  nuclear  energy exists,  but  does  not  become 
a  political  issue.  Sabotage  attempts  and  civil  disobedience  will  not  oc-
cur.  Nuclear  accident  like  Chenobyl  unlikely  in  another  country.  Only 
very  minor  incidents  if nuclear  is  selected  in  country. 
#18  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Low 
#19 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Low 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Moderate 
OPEC  members  don't  agree  on  production  quotas,  and  present  prices  and 
availability of  fuels  are  maintained  indefinitely. Organized  opposition to 
nuc 1  ear  energy  exists,  and  does  not  become  a  po 1 it  i ca 1  issue.  Sabotage 
attempts  and  c i vi 1  d  i so bed i ence  wi 11  not  occur.  Nuc 1  ear  ace i dent  1  ike 
Chenobyl  unlikely in  another country.  Only  very minor  incidents  if nuclear 
is  selected  in  country. 
Fuel  Cost  Esculation 
Expectation  Of  Disruption 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment 
High 
High 
Low 
OPEC  members  agree  on  production  quotas  and  fue 1  prices  soar.  Co a  1  and 
uranium  costs  rise very  sharply.  No  organized  opposition  to  nuclear energy 
exists,  and  does  not  become  an  issue. Sabotage  attempts  highly probable.  A 
major  nuclear  event  likely to  occur  in  country  if nuclear option  selected. 
May  or  may  not  involve  loss  of  life,  but  has  high  coverage  by  the  media. 
- 123  -#20  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Moderate 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  High 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Low 
OPEC  members  don 
1 t  agree  on  production  quotas,  but  war 1  d  cr1 s 1  s  make 
shipments  of  fuel  difficult.  Cost  rise  with  scarcity,  but  at  reasonable 
1  eve 1  s.  No  organized  opposition  to  nuc 1  ear  energy  exists,  and  does  not 
become  an  issue.  Sabotage  attempts  highly  probable.  A major  nuclear  event 
likely  to  occur  in  country  if  nuclear  option  selected.  May  or  may  not 
involve  loss  of  life,  but  has  high  coverage  by  the  media. 
#21  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Low 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  High 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Low 
OPEC  members  don 
1 t  agree  on  production  quotas,  and  present  prices  and 
availability of  fuels  are maintained  indefinitely.  No  organized  opposition 
to  nuclear  energy  exists,  and  does  not  become  an  issue.  Sabotage  attempts 
highly  probable.  A major  nuclear  event  likely  to  occur  in  country  if 
nuclear option  selected.  May  or  may  not  involve  loss of  life, but  has  high 
coverage  by  the  media. 
#22  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  High 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Moderate 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Low 
OPEC  members  agree  on  production  quotas  and  fue 1  prices  soar.  Co a  1  and 
uranium  costs rise very  sharply.  No  organized  opposition  to  nuclear energy 
exists,  and  does  not  become  an  issue.  Sabotage  attempts  and  civil  diso-
bedience  unlikely.  Nuclear  accident  like Chenobyl  likely in  another  coun-
try.  Only  small  accidents  if nuclear  is  selected  in  country. 
#23  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Moderate 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Moderate 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Low 
OPEC  members  don •  t  agree  on  production  quotas,  but  war 1  d  cr1 s 1  s  make 
shipments  of  fuel  difficult.  Cost  rise  with  scarcity,  but  at  reasonable 
levels. Organized  opposition  to  nuclear energy  exists,  and  does  not  become 
a political  issue.  Sabotage  attempts  and  civil  disobedience  unlikely.  N-
uclear  accident  like Chenobyl  likely  in  another  country.  Only  small  ac-
cidents  if nuclear  is selected  in  country. 
#24  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Low 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Moderate 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Low 
OPEC  members  don 
1 t  agree  on  production  quotas,  and  present  prices  and 
availability of  fuels  are  maintained  indefinitely.  No  organized  opposition 
to  nuclear  energy  exists,  and  does  not  become  an  issue.  Sabotage  attempts 
and  civil disobedience  unlikely.  Nuclear  accident  like Chenobyl  likely in 
another  country.  Only  small  accidents  if nuclear  is  selected  in  country . 
•  124  • #25  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  High 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Low 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Low 
OPEC  members  agree  on  production  quotas  and  fue 1  prices  soar.  Co a  1  and 
uranium  costs  rise very  sharply.  No  organized  opposition  to  nuclear energy 
exists,  and  does  not  become  an  issue.Sabotage  attempts  and  civil 
disobedience  will  not  occur.  Nuclear  accident  like  Chenobyl  unlikely  in 
another  country.  Only  very  minor  incidents  if  nuclear  is  selected  in 
country. 
#26  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Moderate 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Low 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Low 
OPEC  members  don't  agree  on  production  quotas,  but  world  cr1s1s  make 
shipments  of  fuel  difficult.  Cost  rise  with  scarcity,  but  at  reasonable 
levels.  No  organized  opposition  to  nuclear  energy  exists,  and  does  not 
become  an  issue.Sabotage  attempts  and  civil  disobedience  will  not  occur. 
Nuclear  accident  like  Chenobyl  unlikely  in  another  country.  Only  very 
minor  incidents  if nuclear  is  selected  in  country. 
#27  Fuel  Cost  Esculation  Low 
Expectation  Of  Disruption  Low 
Degree  Of  Anti-Nuclear  Sentiment  Low 
OPEC  members  don't  agree  on  proquct ion  quotas,  and  present  prices  and 
availability of  fuels  are  maintained  indefinitely.  No  organized  opposition 
to  nuclear  energy  exists,  and  does  not  become  an  issue.Sabotage  attempts 
and  civil  disobedience  will  not  occur.  Nuclear  accident  like  Chenobyl 
unlikely  in  another  country.  Only  very  minor  incidents  if  nuclear  is 
selected  in  country. 
- 125  -GLOSSARY 
Acceptable  Level  Of  Risk  - A level  of  involuntary  risk  designated  to  be  low 
enough  to  be  acceptable  in  a regulatory sense.  This  concept  is  NOT  used  in  these 
criteria. 
Accident  Risks  - Risks  caused  by  accidents  resulting  in  direct trauma  or  death. 
Recovery  from  injury  in  non-fatal  accidents  occurs,  but  not  always. 
Annual  Risk  - Risk  to  an  individual  or  population  in  a calendar year of  365  days, 
for  example,  the probability of  .001  per  year  that  an  individual  will  be  injured 
in  an  autmobile  accident.  An  example  for populations  is 10  automobile fatalities 
per  year  per  100,000  people  exposed. 
Average  Exposed  Individual  - An  individual  whose  received exposure  (dose)  repre-
sents  the  average  exposure  (dose)  to  an  exposed  population. 
Consequence  - A possible  undesirable  outcome  of  an  event. 
Consequence  Magnitude- The  measured  size  of  the  consequences:  an  objective 
measure. 
Consequence  Value- The  value  of  a  consequence  to  those  impacted  by  it:  a 
subjective measure. 
Conservative Assumptions  - Assumptions  made  which  overstate the most  likely risk 
estimate. 
•  126  • Defined  Consequence  - A particular consequence  whose  description  is precise  and 
delineated.  For  example,  a non-fatal  cancer. 
De  minimis  - A legal  term  designating  a transgression that  is  so  trivial  as  to  be 
below  the  concern  of  the  courts. 
De  minimis  Level  Of  Risk  - A level  of  risk  so  small  as  to  be  below  the  threshold 
of  concern  by  general  agreement. 
Disease  Risks  - Risks  caused  by  acute  or  chronic  exposure  to  a disease vector  or 
a  toxic  substance  or  an  environmental  stress.  The  cause-effect  relationship may 
be  direct or  indirect,  and  often  involves  a latency period.  Cures  may  or  may  not 
be  possible. 
Exposure  - The  condition  of  being  vulnerable  to  a  threat. 
Exposure  Pathways  - The  temporal  and  spatial  pathways  by  which  individuals  are 
threatened  by  risky events. 
Exposure  Potential  - The  number  of  people  who  could  possibly  be  exposed  by  a 
postulated event  in  contrast to what  the expected  exposed  number  of  people  might 
actually be. 
Individual  Risk  - Risk  to  a single  individual  who  is exposed.  Expressed  in  terms 
of  annual  risk,  that  is,  probabi 1  ity  of  a  given  consequence  per  year,  e.g., 
fatalities/yr,  or  lifetime  risk,  that  is,  the  probability  of  the  given 
consequence  occurring  in  a  persons  lifetime.  The  individual  may  be  subject  to 
•  127  -maximum  exposure  (see  Maximum  Exposed  Individual)  or  an  average  representation 
of  all  those  exposed  (see  Average  Exposed  Individual). 
Involuntary Risk  - Risks  for which  the  gamble  is  inequitably  imposed  on  the  risk 
taker  (i.e.,  the  recipients  of  the  risks  and  benefits  are  not  the  same),  or 
knowledge  about  the  risks  are  purposely  withheld,  or  no  alternatives  are 
available.  Risks  to  the  general  public  from  Forest  Service  actions  are  of  an 
involuntary  nature.  Those  who  naively  or  carelessly  ignore  prudent  precautions 
may  have  to  be  classified as  involuntary risk to cover  Forest Service responsibi-
lity to  protect the  public. 
Lifetime  Risk  - Risk  to  an  individual  or  population  for  exposure  over  a 70  year 
lifetime for the general  public  and  for  47  years  (18-65  years  of  age)  of exposure 
to  workers  during  employment. 
Maximum  Exposed  Individual  - A  hypothetical  individual  who  represents  the 
maximum  possible  exposure  (dose)  that  an  individual  can  receive  from  a  given 
event. 
Most  Likely  Risk  - The  risk  estimate  that  attempts  to  neither  overstate  nor 
understate  the  estimated  risks  based  upon  available  data.  It  is  the  realistic 
risk  estimate,  i.e.,  the  best estimate of  what  the  actual  risks may  be. 
Population Risk  -Risk to  the collective population  exposed  by  an  event •.  Expres-
sed  as  the  number  of  effects in  the  total  population,  e.g.  number  of  cancers  per 
year  for  one  million  potentially  exposed  people.  If  the  number  is 
- 120  -less  than  one  it  is  interpreted  as  the  probability  of  one  effect  in  the  total 
population  exposed. 
Probability  Of  Effect  - (pef)  - Given  that  an  event  leading  to  exposure  takes 
place,  the  probability that  the  defined  consequence  occurs.  For  example,  given 
that a truck  carrying hazardous  materials has  an  accident,  the probability that a 
rupture occurs  leading to release to  potable drinking water  is the  probability of 
effect for  an  accident.  For  disease,  given  that exposure  to  a pesticide occurs, 
the  probab i 1  i ty  of  an  exposed  person  of  getting  cancer  is  the  probab i 1  i ty  of 
effect.  (see  probability of  an  outcome) 
Probability Of  Exposure  - (pex)  - Probability  that  an  event  occurs,  leading  to 
exposure  of  the  target  populations.  For  example,  the  probability  that  a  truck 
carrying hazardous  materials  has  an  accident or  the probability that a person  may 
be  exposed  to  a dose  of  a pesticide are  probabilities of  exposure.  (see  probabi-
lity of  an  outcome) 
Probabilty Of  An  Outcome- (p
0c)  -The joint probability that an  event occurs  and 
the  probability that  the  defined  consequence  takes  place: 
Poe  = Pex  x Pef 
For  example,  the  probabilty  that  an  accident  takes  place  AND  the  particular 
consequence  occurs.  Also  the probability that a person  is exposed  to  a dose  of  a 
pesticide  AND  that person  actually gets  cancer  as  a result of  the  exposure. 
Realistic Assumptions  - Assumptions  supporting  the  most  likely risk  estimate . 
•  129  • Risk  - Risk  is  the  downside  of  a  gamble.  It  is  the  potential  for  the  unwanted, 
negative  consequences  on  an  event  (1).  The  formulation  of  a  quantitative  risk 
description  involves  a functional  relationship between  two  parameters:  the  pro-
bability of  occurrence  of  a particular consequence  of  an  event  and  the  magnitude 
of  the  event. 
Risk  Analysis  - Risk  analysis  is the process of estimating the magnitude  of risks 
and  displaying these  risks for  decision making.  The  probabilities  and  magnitudes 
of  outcomes  of  the  risk  factors  occurring  as  a  result of  a proposed  action  are 
determined,  based  upon  available  data.  A realistic  estimate  of  the  risks  is 
sought;  but,  in  the  absence  of complete  data, conservative and  worst  case  assump-
tions  are  used  in  place  of  such  data. 
Risk  Factor  - An  exposure  situation  that  may  lead  to  a  risk-.  Many  such  risk 
factors  are  examined  in  a  risk  analysis. 
Voluntary  Risk  - Risks  for  which  the  risk  taker  knowingly  takes  the  gamble 
involving the risks,  believes the  gamble  is equitable,  and  that possible alterna-
tives  were  available.  Risks  to  workers  and  to  those  who  purposefully  and  out-
rageously  disregard  prudent  precautions  might  be  considered  of  a  vo 1  untary 
nature,  in  terms  of  Forest  Service  responsibility  to  protect  the  public  and 
workers. 
Worst  Case  Assumptions  - Assumptions  made  using  extreme  conservatism,  such  that 
one  may  be  sure  that  the  actual  risk  will  be  below  the  worst  case  estimate. 
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The  purpose of this  report  is  to  provide guidelines for conducting  analyses of the 
risks  and  benefits of alternative energy systems in  an  effective manner. There are 
considerable difficulties in  carrying out such analyses as described in our previous 
study for the European Atomic Energy Community entitled 'Assessment of compara-
tive  and  non-comparative factors  in  alternative  energy systems'.  The  objective of 
the  present study  is  to  carry out several  of these  recommendations  made  in  the 
initial  study,  leading  to  rational  and  effective  approaches for  analysing  risks  and 
benefits  in  alternative energy systems and  meaningful  presentation  of the  results 
to the user community. The result will be guidelines and methods that can be directly 
employed in  such analyses and  presentations.  Except for examples illustrating the 
methodologies described  in  the  guidelines,  no  actual  analyses  are  carried  out  in 
this report. 